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 “The Seductive Fallacy” provides a literary focus for feminist critiques of fascist gender 
and sexuality. It explores two fascist and three anti-fascist novels—Wyndham Lewis’ The 
Revenge for Love (1937), Olive Hawks’ What Hope for Green Street? (1945), Virginia Woolf’s 
The Years (1937), Phyllis Bottome’s The Mortal Storm (1938) and The Lifeline (1946)—that 
illuminate British domestic fiction’s rhetorical range in the prolonged crisis of liberal hegemony 
after World War I. Across political purposes and a range of readerships and styles, they 
illuminate the genre’s efficacy to theorize modern women’s social, political, and cultural agency. 
In particular, the dissertation’s critical readings of these novels explore fascism’s emergence 
within liberal democracies.  
 Juxtaposing Lewis and Hawks with literature from the archives of the British Union of 
Fascists (BUF), the first two chapters stress fascism’s production and consumption of political 
fantasies prevalent throughout the British novel’s humanist tradition, especially notions of 
women’s agency inscribed in the traditions of nineteenth- and twentieth-century domestic 
literature. The last two chapters highlight and evaluate Bottome’s and Woolf’s divergent critical 
representations of fascist domesticity. The dissertation concludes that Woolf’s anti-humanist 
feminist domestic fiction better enables readers to perceive the irreducible modernity of fascism.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
My title refers to a “seductive fallacy” that understands fascism as a primitive and foreign 
(German or Italian) cultural phenomenon in absolute opposition to British liberal democracy. 
Cold War geopolitics demanded the perception of radical differences between (benevolent) 
British racism and empire from continental European forms, and emphasized fascism’s historical 
tendency to congeal into totalitarianism. Although well-intended, this fallacy is seductive, 
dangerously engendering intellectual and political complacency. It obscures the presence and 
persistence of fascist values that permeated politics and culture to facilitate race, gender, and 
sexual discrimination in Britain.  
Cultural critics, as Erin Carlston has noted, have written eloquently about the “numerous 
manifestations of fascist influence on European political, cultural, and intellectual life between 
the wars,” and on the various forms of theater, film, and literature that were important in 
establishing the consent necessary for the evolution of fascist parties into totalitarian 
dictatorships (10).1 In making explicit the connections between official fascist doctrine and 
various literary and artistic movements, they have produced important questions about the 
“aesthetic” and cultural nature of twentieth-century politics in general.  
The overt aestheticization of political forums and processes was fascism’s real 
“innovation.” Walter Benjamin argued in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
                                                 
1 See Robert Soucy, Fascism in France: The Case of Maurice Barrès (Berkeley: U of California P, 1972); 
Robert Soucy, Fascist Intellectual: Drieu La Rochelle (Berkeley: U of California P, 1979); David Carroll, French 
Literary Fascism (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1995); Alice Yaeger Kaplan, Reproductions of Banality: Fascism, 
Literature, and French Intellectual Life (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986); Walter Adamson, Avant-Garde 
Florence: From Modernism to Fascism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1993); Walter Adamson, “The Culture of 
Italian Fascism and the Fascist Crisis of Modernity: The Case of Il Sevaggio,” Journal of Contemporary History  30 
(1995): 555 – 75; George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New 
York: The Universal Library, Grosset & Dunlap, 1964); Jeffrey T. Schnapp, “Border Crossings: Italian/German 
Peregrinations of the Theater of Totality,” Critical Inquiry 21 (Autumn 1994): 80 - 123; Marcia Landy, Fascism in 
Film: The Italian Commercial Cinema, 1931-1943 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986); and Mary Ann Frese Witt, 
“Fascist Discourse and Pirandellian Theater,” South Atlantic Quarterly 91. 2 (Spring 1992): 303 – 31. 
1 
 Reproduction” that fascism renders politics aesthetic, substituting the masses’ demand for rights 
with a fulfillment of their desire for expression (241). Alice Kaplan echoes his observation, 
explaining that “fascism can be characterized formally as an entry of aesthetic criteria into the 
political and economic realms” (26).  
 Although keenly emphasizing the aesthetic nature of inter-war politics, studies of British 
(or expatriate American) writers have tended to focus on the relationships between writers’ 
political activities (e.g., W.B. Yeats, Ezra Pound, Wyndham Lewis) and fascist regimes outside 
England. In related projects, writers such as W.H. Auden, Christopher Isherwood, Stephen 
Spender, and C. Day Lewis, have appeared as the heroic (but also problematic) intellectuals 
fighting against Franco during the Spanish Civil War.2 This focus, in eliding fascism’s presence 
in Britain, tempts us to regard it primarily as a foreign influence.3
 Some historical and social aspects, however, make it much more difficult to posit the 
“otherness” of fascism in Britain. Not only the dispossessed, but leading establishment 
aristocrats comprised a considerable portion of the BUF constituency.4 In his journal, The Week, 
Claude Cockburn revealed a group of wealthy powerful Britons who sympathized with Hitler 
                                                 
2 Auden wrote in the Foreword to The Orators, “My name on the title-page seems a pseudonym for 
someone else, someone talented but near the border of sanity, who might well, in a year or two, become a Nazi.”  In 
1934, Christopher Isherwood praised the new Youth Movements in Germany as “brave and worthy citizens” in “The 
Youth Movement in the New Germany,” Action, Dec. 10, 1931.  On these writers, see Valentine Cunningham, 
British Writers of the Thirties (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1988). 
3 John Weiss claims that “The lower middle class was too well off and too liberal to supply Mosley with 
significant votes—no fascist ever sat in Parliament” (81). Colin Cross also explains, “Classically, Fascism grows 
form a discontented lower middle class. But in the mid-1930s the bulk of the British lower middle classes was in a 
heyday of prosperity” (130). 
4 Most influential were the newspaper baron Lord Rothermere, the socialite Lady Diana Guinness, née 
Mitford (later Mosley’s wife), Lucy Houston (Lady Byron), and Oswald Mosley himself. For a fuller discussion of 
aristocratic influence on the BUF, see Robert Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley. 
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 (the “Cliveden Set”).5 Oswald Mosley’s retrospective accounts of the British Union’s appeal 
during the inter-war period also refer to a prevalent middle-class fear of déclassment.6  
Moreover, historical research shows that some proto-fascist neo-Romantic youth 
movements in Germany took their cue from the structure of English public schools—institutions 
crucial for reproducing an upper middle-class dominated British social order. The program of the 
Wandervögel, for instance, was developed by Hermann Lietz, a pedagogue who transplanted the 
English public school emphasis on militarism and physical fitness in a German setting. Lietz 
substituted Germanic ideology in lieu of English claims to imperial superiority.7 As World War 
II accelerated and both nations were rushing to mobilize warfare economies, officials of the 
Third Reich admired the impact of Britain’s official propaganda on women; the British 
government imposed compulsory work for women in munitions factories with amazingly little 
protest.8 British women even volunteered hard labor in rural areas and para-military apparatuses. 
The Nazis’ admiration for the British government’s ability to mobilize women for the military 
state attests to similar patriarchal practices and institutions across nations and political poles.  
We can locate the force of the seductive fallacy nonetheless in the British Union of 
Fascists’ (BUF) eventual demise. In 1932, Oswald Mosley founded the BUF after attempting to 
establish two earlier proto-fascist incarnations, the New Party and the Action Party. The party 
never posed a powerful threat to parliamentary politics. Most historians estimate 50,000 
                                                 
5 See Janet Montefiore, Men and Women Writers of the 1930s: The Dangerous Flood of History (New 
York: Routledge, 1996) 37 - 8. 
6 Oswald Mosley writes in My Life, “In the affluent society, a man who has a full plate whisked away from 
in front of him can be quicker to react than the down-and-out of the pre-war period who was accustomed to 
protracted conditions of unemployment and poverty.  It is the ruined middle class which makes revolutions, and in 
pre-war terms nearly everyone is middle class now” (278). 
7 The model for Lietz was the public school at Abbotsholme, which emphasized the production of the 
imperial classes; “Education Equals Empire” was one of its mantras” (Mosse, Nationalism 157 – 60). 
8 See Timothy Mason, “Women in Germany 1925-1940: Family, Welfare and Work.  Conclusion.” 
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 members at the peak of the BUF’s popularity in 1934, after which memberships began to 
plummet. By the time the National Government issued Regulation 18B to outlaw the BUF in 
1940, the numbers had already dwindled considerably.9 And although BUF rhetoric was full of 
chauvinistic imperial sloganeering, many patriots considered official fascism “un-British,” in 
part because the BUF blatantly borrowed designs for icons, uniforms, and banners from the 
German and Italian regimes. Many historians of British fascism have argued that the BUF’s 
ultimate failure was destined by Britain’s overall continuing economic prosperity and imperial 
domination despite the Depression. 
In line with this argument, some political theorists have suggested that fascism requires 
the peculiar circumstances of a developing economy in which the “industrializing elite cannot 
eliminate or neutralize the traditional elites” (Gregor 188). The pressure to industrialize quickly 
and satisfy two sets of elites gave birth historically to “syncretic” or “dual” governments.10 
Indeed, the syncretic features of official fascist regimes such as those in Italy and Germany 
resulted partly from economies struggling to industrialize while appeasing the existent ruling 
classes. The European fascisms that succeeded in gaining state control were undeniably fueled 
by their nations’ inferior positions in the imperial race.11 Since dual governments retain the class 
hierarchy already in place even as they modernize economically, we might describe the process 
                                                 
9 Robert Skidelsky in Oswald Mosley has argued that had the BUF not been outlawed by Regulation 18B, it 
might have experienced an upswing on its pacifist platform. 
10 See A.F.K.  Organski on Italian fascism as a syncretic governments that compromised between industrial 
and agrarian elites in The Stages of Political Development (New York: Knopf, 1965). 
11 Barbara Spackman discusses the cultural climate that increasingly associated national health with 
imperial “vigor” in Italy in the years just prior to the fascist regime. She cites Pasquale Turiello, who claims that 
“Italy has suffered from ‘muliebrita politica’ since the Risorgimento .  .  . a womanliness that consists in a languid 
weakness that has caused the nation to give in too easily to other nations, in particular to France, and to have passed 
up the opportunity to acquire colonies” (75). See also E.  J. Feuchtwanger’s Introduction to Upheaval and 
Continuity: A Century of German History (Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 1974) for an account of how racialism 
contributed to the process of rapid industrialization in Germany in the early twentieth century. 
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 as a “revolution from above.”12 Britain in contrast was during the 1930s a well-developed, even 
leading, economy.  
In fact, a syncretic government and civil society had already existed in Britain, partly due 
to its precedence in modern imperialism and the industrial revolution.13 Tom Nairn claims that 
England long cultivated a “transitional” state that similarly appeased two sets of elites: “Neither 
feudal nor modern, it remained obstinately and successfully intermediate” (19). Moreover, the 
dual industrial and agrarian fronts occasionally combined to guard their common interests 
against the working classes. Nairn continues, “There is little doubt that this is the key to 
understanding the class composition of modern English civil society, for the pattern lasted from 
the 1840s until after the Second World War” (29).  
In England’s “rule from above,” parliamentary apparatuses of representation helped 
create the unusual conservatism of the English working class: “The representative mechanism 
converted real class inequality into the abstract egalitarianism of citizens, individual egoisms into 
an impersonal collective will, what would otherwise be chaos into a new state legitimacy” (Nairn 
24). These apparatuses also helped maintain middle-class equivocation vis-à-vis democratic 
practices and imperialism. Daniel Bivona attributes the prevalence of middle-class imperial 
jingoism in the late nineteenth century to their fear of national decline: “The era of unlimited 
imperial competition had begun, and with it, the ambivalence of the British middle-class public 
toward the exercise of government power would be increasingly resolved in a direction 
                                                 
12 See Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making 
of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) for more on this political effect. 
13 Works consulted for British history throughout this introduction include: George Dangerfield, The 
Strange Death of Liberal England, 1910-1914 (New York: Capricorn, 1961); T. K. Derry, A Short Economic 
History of Britain (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1965); R. Palme Dutt, The Crisis of Britain and the British Empire (New 
York: International Publishers, 1953); Eric Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: The Birth of the Industrial Revolution 
(New York: Penguin, 1999); R.  F.  Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance 1918-1939 (London: 
Macmillan, 1981); Tom Nairn. The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London: NLB, 1977); and 
David Thomson, England in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Penguin, 1979).  
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 favorable, not only to the ideals of ‘social efficiency’ at home, but to expansionism and the 
efficient—and deadly—exercise of military force abroad” (Bivona 21).  
The period re-exposed glaring signs of political and economic crisis already seriously in 
effect before World War I. England’s exports—the traditional industries of steel, iron, textiles, 
and coal—began to experience sharpened competition from the U.S., continental Europe, and 
Japan. One result of international competition was high unemployment and an eight-fold jump in 
Labour Party membership from 1910 to 1922. The 1926 General Strike, which occurred more 
than ten years after its foundations had been laid, put to rest the Liberal Party’s hold on the 
Left.14 In common with Germany and Italy, massive unemployment bred resentment and 
polarized political interests between the classes, and between men and women. In the inter-war 
era, liberalism’s internal contradictions—its monopoly over definitions of justice and liberty, and 
its exclusion of women and the working class from exercising them—surfaced more sharply than 
ever.  
In the attempt to specify the conditions of fascism’s emergence in leading but insecure 
liberal democracies, I juxtapose writing in the BUF archives with both canonical and obscure 
inter-war literary critiques of liberalism. I focus on their representations of mass politics, crises 
of gender and sexuality, biopolitical surveillance, economic depression, and the decline of 
empire. These were central concerns for writers Right and Left, realist and modernist, and pro- 
and anti-fascist. In the process, I reveal ideological features that liberalism paradoxically shares 
with the fascism it sought to counter, thereby extending critical lines of inquiry that have shown 
the instrumental significance of British-led discourses of race, sexuality, and class for both 
British imperialism and continental fascism. In particular, I attend to British fascism’s “native” 
                                                 
14 See George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, 1910-1914 (New York: Capricorn, 
1961). 
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 elements by stressing its incorporation of and influence on political fantasies prevalent in British 
cultural production.  
The British cultural and political scenes during this era evince a thick web of intersecting 
fascist intellectual vectors. British fascism managed to attract some of the era’s most influential 
writers and politicians. When Mosley founded the proto-fascist New Party, the Marxist John 
Strachey left the Labour Party to help lead, the diplomat Harold Nicolson founded and edited its 
press organ, the journal Action, and Christopher Isherwood contributed to it, as did Vita 
Sackville-West, Nicolson’s wife and the inspiration for Virginia Woolf’s novel Orlando (1928). 
Later, the British Union Quarterly published Wyndham Lewis.15 In The Road to Wigan Pier 
(1937), George Orwell observed that in the throes of the Slump, masses of desperate unemployed 
and middle-class Britons were becoming dangerously prone to fascist politics. But he also 
warned that fascism was growing in venues less likely than those of the official fascist party. 
Literary writers were assembling an “underlying feeling of fascism” more subtly and effectively: 
“Some such attitude is already quite clearly discernible in writers like Pound, Wyndham Lewis, 
Roy Campbell, etc. . . in certain popular novelists and even, if one looks below the surface, in su-
superior conservative highbrows like Eliot and his countless followers” (Orwell 213). The 
interwar literary scene was so interconnected that many writers could not claim anti-fascist 
“purity” despite subsequent attempts to elucidate positions and opinions. Despite persistent 
myths of British individualism, doubts about the oppositional nature of brutal fascism and 
humanist civilization (of which imperialism was one facet) emerge in the 30s Leftist works of 
Orwell, Auden, Spender, and Woolf.  
                                                 
15 I discuss Wyndham Lewis, “‘Left Wings’ and the C3 Mind,” The British Union Quarterly Jan.-Apr. 1937 
in Chapter 1. 
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 In light of such ambiguities, my purpose is not to indict individual writers biographically. 
Instead, I repeatedly draw attention to these intersections to explore how fascism had captured 
the imagination of many prominent and original cultural producers.  
In Britain, fascism appealed much more to men than it did to women. Mosley expressly 
stated in The Greater Britain that the fascist movement was “a microcosm of a national manhood 
reborn” (53). Winifred Holtby noted in 1934 that Mosley’s national program showed little 
departure from what was “characteristic of that Fascist inclination to dream of an eclectic 
Olympus of he-men . . . separated sharply from all lower forms of being” (Berry 84). I focus, 
however, on how British fascism also concerned itself with women’s enfranchisement and 
professionalization in the inter-war era. I foreground the gendered elements of a deep seated, 
powerful counterrevolutionary tradition of bourgeois hegemony important for British fascist 
rhetoric.  
Women made up 20 – 33% of total BUF membership, showing that fascism could indeed 
appeal to women in industrialized nations (Durham 25). By studying fascism in the British 
context, I foreground fascist tactics and strategies addressing “modern” women, i.e., 
enfranchised women in a powerful imperial liberal democracy. In this context, the following 
facts are significant. The first Fascist party in Britain, the British Fascisti, was founded in 1923 
by Rotha Linton-Olman, who served in the Women’s Reserve Ambulance during World War I 
and attempted to incorporate military exercises for women (Durham 25). And more than the 
parties in Germany or Italy, the BUF attempted to appeal to feminist nationalists, such as former 
Suffragettes who presumably had a stake in “practical citizenship,” playing on the achievement 
of creative individuality and their part in developing a healthy national population to recruit 
8 
 women (Durham 44-5).16 Therefore, in contrast to many political studies that consider gender 
and fascism together, I consider fascism not as a mode of “phallic warfare,” but as an active 
interpolation of multiple gendered positions within the nation. Putatively “feminine” concerns 
were in many ways at the heart of the fascist imagination. Nevertheless, fascists revolted against 
the liberal authorization of women over domestic space and organization, enacting strategies of 
containment for their ever increasing political, cultural, and economic demands. 
Many factors contributed to a political and literary focus on domestic discourse in inter-
war Britain overall. Between the wars, the propaganda campaign that had lured women into 
wage labor and the war effort was reversed to compel them back into the home. Alison Light 
argues that during the period, national perception had shifted to a type “at once less imperial and 
more inward-looking, more domestic and more private—and, in terms of pre-war standards, 
more ‘feminine’,” partly since by the 1930s, “the memory of the First World War had then begun 
to erode” (8).17  
We can nonetheless detect in the inter-war period’s various official and unofficial 
rhetorics of “home” a massive shift that diverges from earlier incarnations in a socius organized 
by Victorian private patriarchy. The domestic home became a vexed site of fevered literary 
                                                 
16 Julie Gottlieb further suggests that in addition to trench soldiers, militant ex-suffragist women were 
collectively disillusioned with parliamentary politics in this period. The fascists appealed to both groups by 
acknowledging their disappointment with parliamentary politics: “The BUF’s ex-suffragettes had all been 
unsuccessful in their bids to be elected to Parliament, and felt first hand the disappointment that arose from the 
failure of any suffrage campaigner to benefit from the constitutional right they had fought for so tirelessly. . . they 
were all members of one of the main political parties before they opted for the abolition of the entire decadent party 
system and the over-throw of ‘Financial Democracy.’ While none had been active in a feminist organisation during 
the inter-war period, each identified the fulfillment of her own national service-oriented feminism in fascism” (156). 
For discussions of “feminist fascism” in Italy and Germany, see Barbara Spackman, Fascist Virilities: Rhetoric, 
Ideology, and Social Fantasy in Italy (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996); Victoria DeGrazia, How Fascism 
Ruled Women: Italy, 1922-1945 (Berkeley: U of California P) 1992; and Leila G. Rupp, “Mother of the Volk: The 
Image of Women in Nazi Ideology” Signs.  3:21 (Winter 1977): 362-379. 
17 Light further notes that this “inward” turn in national perception reached its apex in World War II 
propaganda, where the focus on the home front served to highlight the contrast between a domestic and “decent” 
England and the brutally imperious dictatorships (9). 
9 
 debate and mass political contestations due to cataclysmic historical events that changed the 
British imagination of domestic space. On one hand, skepticism marked the new views of 
“home” and its gendering functions. The debacles of the Boer War and World War I, and 
women’s massive entry into wage labor had placed Victorian notions of masculinity and 
femininity in severe crisis. Paul Fussell notes furthermore returning soldiers’ disillusionment 
with the “home front” in which peacetime prosperity was regarded as traitorous to the younger 
generation’s male camaraderie effected by trench warfare.18 In his autobiographical account 
Blasting and Bombardiering, Wyndham Lewis also argues that the war had obliterated the notion 
of home as a private haven to create a chasm between former trench soldiers and the civilians 
who had been screened from (or actively forgot) the horror of modern war.  
The BUF profited from this chasm, arguing repeatedly that the “old women” and 
“daddies” of Parliament were unable to lead the nation as effectively as would those familiar 
with the devastation of war.19 Fascists focused on the nuclear family and home as a space that 
always potentially degenerates and regresses from national destiny. It appears at times that 
British fascism attempted to blot out the legacy of the nineteenth-century private patriarchal 
family altogether, combining calls for a feudal return to guild socialism on one hand, and a 
futurist emphasis on the equalizing powers of technology and machines on the other. As its 
ambiguous “other,” the domestic scene acted at times as the paranoid object of fascist scrutiny 
and judgment. 
                                                 
18 See Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (London: Oxford UP, 1975). 
19 See Chapter 2 for elaboration on the anti-patriarchal dimensions of British fascist propaganda.  
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 Nevertheless, fascism prioritized issues of gender and sexuality in politics, which as 
Carlston has noted is one of its major legacies for post-World War II politics as a whole.20 The 
dissolution of private patriarchy acted as a convenient scapegoat for political and economic 
crises and traumatic shifts in culture. Various political camps lamented the “disappearance” of 
the domestic woman and achieved consensus for the belief that women in non-domestic work 
“emasculated” men. This transformation of the non-domestic woman into a threatening figure 
was central in inter-war political rhetoric across Europe. Claudia Koonz observes that in inter-
war Germany, “Progress for women occurred in the context of trench warfare for soldiers, and 
starvation, deprivation, social dislocation, and defeat for society as a whole” (26).  
In England between the wars, the agitation of “surplus women” accelerated women’s 
progress in labor and politics. In reaction, fascist rhetoric, in contradiction with some of its other 
elements, represented domestic space as an integral component of the state and retained 
bourgeois domestic ideology’s valorization of the gendered home to recreate means to 
pathologize women while insisting on their authority within a gender division of labor.  
In view of this historical and political backdrop, Peter Gay and Alice Kaplan have both 
pinpointed some prevalent features of German and Italian proto-fascist novels. The narratives 
feature a young male protagonist who, alienated by his surroundings, rebels against social 
authority (often represented in paternal figures) and experiences a simultaneous 
compulsion/repulsion toward feminine figures. Women and the urban settings are specifically 
associated with the emasculating degeneration of peacetime. Kaplan attributes the often ironic, 
self-conscious narrative styles to the texts’ compulsion toward more “masculine action” and 
presence—namely, catastrophe and apocalypse. Marinetti, for instance referred to his proto-
                                                 
20 Gender and sexuality “have emerged as the privileged sites of political discourses both reactionary and 
progressive” (Carlston 191). 
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 fascist novel Mafarka as a willful “incest of genres.” Drieu la Rochelle, the French proto-fascist 
novelist, referred to contemporary novels as sterile and bourgeois, and endorsed a populist 
practice of literary language that could revitalize society spiritually and sensually.  
In marked contrast, the only two novels included in the largest University-based BUF 
archives are by women, and inscribe women’s political concerns. The protagonist of The Mill 
(1965), a semi-autobiographical novel by Nellie Driver is a woman leader in the “Millstone” 
(Nelson, Lancashire) BUF branch, Nora Hartley, who agitates on behalf of exploited weavers.21 
The other is a domestic novel by Olive Hawks (the BUF’s Chief Woman Organizer), What Hope 
for Green Street? (1946), the subject of my second chapter.22 In addition, Wyndham Lewis’ The 
Revenge for Love (1937), the subject of my first chapter, is an authoritative defense of fascism 
for modern women readers. I contend that fascism’s emergence in Britain as an established 
liberal democracy finds a powerful medium in domestic fiction. These novels evince deliberate 
appeals to women as political, economic, and familial subjects rather than glorifying figures of 
military virility.  
These appeals are paradoxical for several reasons. Realist novels in nineteenth-century 
Britain were a key factor in successfully establishing consent to liberal governance. In particular, 
the dynamic history of British domestic fiction helped establish bourgeois hegemony and consent 
to these apparatuses.23 The domestic novel, according to Vineta Colby, acted primarily as “an 
alternative to the romantic ideal” and therefore “was an effort, relatively short-lived but vigorous 
while it lasted” (Colby 38). Certainly, its status as serious fiction peaked in the mid- to late-
                                                 
21 Nellie Driver, The Mill: Fictionalisation of Her Story as Told in From the Shadows of Exile. In the 
Rawnsley Collection at the University of Bradford, UK.  
22 In the BUF collection at the University of Sheffield, UK, and at the British Library.  
23 See Armstrong’s Introduction to Desire and Domestic Fiction.  
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 nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the inter-war era revived its social relevance as a medium for 
defenses of and challenges to liberalism. Despite its decreasing prestige in twentieth century 
literary critical apparatuses, the domestic novel was still a rich site for revisionary explorations 
of political and economic agency under liberalism.  
During the interwar period, literary criticism proliferated outside the university and 
exclusive journals. For instance, readers could access book reviews and discussions in a new 
array of magazines and library subscriptions. As a result, women writers had many more 
opportunities to publish and make an impact on the cultural imagination bypassing traditional 
critical organs. In view of “middlebrow” and “lowbrow” texts’ growing popularity, writers like 
Aldous Huxley, Wyndham Lewis, and Q.D. Leavis argued against the cultural and political ills 
of “democratic” access to art. For Lewis, fascism provided one medium to articulate his 
antagonism against women’s literary production and the massification of art. Associating these 
artistic concerns with movements in the political sphere, he endorses fascism as a cultural 
defense against degenerate feminist and communist influences.  
In analyzing Lewis’ aestheticization of politics, I access feminist literary histories that 
have tapped into the gendered terms under which writers worked during this period, and that 
have considered how changes in the literary market affected political understanding. Critics like 
Anthea Trodd, Nicole Beauman, and Maroula Joannou have shown how gendered literary market 
conditions in the inter-war era inflected modernist writers and their politics. I connect Lewis’ 
pathologization of Bloomsbury “decadence” in particular to the BUF’s cultural criticism to show 
how his modernism echoes, spurs, and embeds fascist assumptions about gender, sexuality, and 
literary production.  
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 Lewis suggests that women’s writing along with film and communist aesthetics threaten 
British imperial supremacy and in turn the working class. Therefore, many critics have 
interpreted his unexpected valorization of the domestic woman in The Revenge for Love as a 
self-ironic undermining of a modernism/fascism nexus. On the contrary, I argue that his unusual 
occupation of domestic fiction is entirely consistent with his anti-feminist view of literary 
production, and with fascist critiques of the free market’s cultural effects.  
Phyllis Bottome was a “middlebrow” writer who reenergized domestic fiction for anti-
fascist purposes. In line with the genre’s focus on sexuality and disciplinary power, her novels 
The Mortal Storm (1938) and The Lifeline (1945) represent fascism as a sexual perversion that 
deviates from liberal democracy based on individual rights, reason, and justice. She rhetorically 
aligns its illegitimate lack of consistency and rationality with “femininity” and homosexuality. 
Women are implicated as especially prone to charisma in their lower stakes in the Enlightenment 
discourse of reason. The “otherness” of fascism is also aligned with homosexuality in the belief 
that it celebrates sublimated homosexual camaraderie and figures of military virility.24 She 
shares this rhetoric with some of the most rigorous psychoanalytic anti-fascist critiques such as 
Theodor Adorno’s Minima Moralia and Sigmund Freud’s Moses and Monotheism.25 Her 
narrative solutions inscribe figures of female doctors to assert liberal “biopolitics” as a strong 
counter to fascist psychological and economic deviations.  
                                                 
24 For instance, Claudia Koonz retains the paradigm of seduction to explain Hitler’s employment of mass 
media and religious discourse to “court” Germany (224-5). About the apparent enthusiasm of German Catholic 
women after the Concordat was signed by Hitler and the Pope (1933), she writes, “But the courtship between a 
powerful man and frightened women was bound to end in a mismatch, for the partners were too unequal, and 
negotiations for the marriage contract broke down” (Koonz 278). Merry Pawlowski also employs the paradigm of 
seduction when she argues, “Nor was Woolf easily seduced by a dictator’s charm” (9). 
25 I discuss these works in Chapter 2. See also Andrew Hewitt, Political Inversions : Homosexuality, 
Fascism, and the Modernist Imaginary (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996) for an analysis of Adorno’s work in these 
terms.  
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  I incorporate throughout the dissertation the historical work of Jacques Donzelot and 
Michel Foucault, who describe biopolitics as the ubiquitous practices of conformity and 
compulsion that police individuals as bodies reflecting the quality of national populations. Their 
analyses suggest that biopolitics materialized some of its potential effects in the liberal state’s 
prioritization of medical and psychiatric authority, but also in the fascist state’s surveillance of 
families and reproduction. I explore how fascism and liberalism both employ a modern 
biopolitical paradigm to connect women to modernity.  
 Hawks calls for domestic women’s authority over family, health, medicine, and sexuality 
as proxies of the racist imperial nation, a move that exposes the fascist coalescence of biopolitics 
and genocide, foregrounding the utopia of a disciplinary society in common with liberalism.26 
She and Bottome unexpectedly share a political and economic disciplinary logic that articulates 
the value of women’s domestic labor for the imperial nation. I trace that logic in examples of 
nineteenth-century domestic fiction. Domestic labor in counterrevolutionary texts such as Jane 
Eyre and North and South is supposed to fulfill women’s deepest domestic desires and 
strengthen the nation simultaneously, prefiguring a direct political route for women through their 
domestic identity.  
That modernists centrally opposed Victorian fiction is a common literary critical given. 
Lewis and Woolf were no exceptions, deploying modernist irony in their literary criticism and 
fictional works toward nineteenth-century domestic novels and their heroines. In my analysis, I 
qualify and differentiate their practices of irony.  
                                                 
26 Foucault and Donzelot suggest the contradictory coincidence of idealism, fascism, liberalism, and 
genocide. In “Sade: Sergeant of Sex,” Foucault writes, “The Nazis were charwomen in the bad sense of the term. 
They worked with brooms and dusters, wanting to purge society of everything they considered unsanitary, dusty, 
filthy; syphilitics, homosexuals, Jews, those of impure blood, Blacks, the insane. It’s the foul petit bourgeois dream 
of racial hygiene that underlies the Nazi dream.” Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion, 
trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: The New Press, 1998) 226.   
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 Lewis actually enacts the domestic heroine’s characteristic sublimation of satirical irony 
in order to indict the inter-war political scene. The Revenge for Love and Hawks’ What Hope for 
Green Street eventually re-aim their satire to justify women’s confinement to domestic labor and 
to suggest their abnegation of political agency. Despite their ostensible critiques of the private 
patriarchal family, both writers reveal fascism’s patriarchal investment in women’s domestic 
identity. 
Woolf’s irony toward domestic heroines in The Years is both more consistent and 
historically analytic. She indicts not only domestic women’s capitulation to private patriarchy 
but also public patriarchal forms of women’s domestic labor, especially philanthropy and social 
reform, that compelled some powerful biopolitical feminist articulations in the inter-war era 
(including Bottome’s). And whereas Lewis and Hawks suggest women’s wholesale renunciation 
of political and cultural agency in their ambivalent and ironic practices of domestic fiction, 
Woolf renews the genre’s focus on domestic space and inter-generational relationships to suggest 
the creation of wider and different political contexts for the emergence of women’s agency.  
I imply in this contrast Woolf’s place in a wider constellation of feminist revolts against 
domestic literature. Not only Woolf, but also Elizabeth Bowen, Sylvia Townsend-Warner, and 
Katharine Mansfield highlight liberalism’s patriarchal marginalization of women as a central 
tenet of capitalist liberal hegemony. In distinguishing Woolf’s modernism from Lewis’, I rely on 
feminist work in modernist studies that in the last twenty-five years has emphasized women’s 
challenges to patriarchal language and power as a central modernist concern. Feminist critics like 
Bonnie Kime Scott, Marianne de Koven, Shari Benstock, and many others usefully distinguish 
between “masculinist” and “feminist” strains of modernist writing.  
Materials and Methodology 
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 My primary materials are domestic novels that expose fascism’s claims to speak and act 
on women’s behalf. I specify how each novel works with and against modern theories of the 
state, biopolitics, empire, economics, and family by selectively echoing and disavowing 
nineteenth-century domestic fiction’s established tropes and narrative processes. Studying 1930s 
and 40s British cultural production and politics through this genre reveals fascism’s syncretic 
impulses as well as the wide disparity between humanist and anti-humanist critiques of fascism. 
Furthermore, I attempt to displace the seductive fallacy’s implication that women are 
susceptible to “irrational” political forms and the fascist leader’s “sexual charisma” by showing 
that in the British context, fascism appropriated prevalent features of the British novel’s liberal 
humanist tradition. Fascism and liberalism intersect in their political and literary deployment of 
domesticity, and share gendered political fantasies inscribed in the traditions of nineteenth and 
twentieth-century domestic fiction. In particular, I emphasize the domestic literary enlistment of 
women for (rather than their exclusion from) modern biopolitics. Invoking a Foucauldian view of 
liberalism throughout, I show that anti-humanist feminist writing, acknowledging the discursive 
nature of sexuality, creates far more promising anti-fascist strategies.  
Chapter One 
Although Lewis has been overlooked by canon formation, his importance in the 
development of British modernist art, literature, and theory cannot be underestimated. His work 
gives us the opportunity to detect fascist reverberations in a wider range of British modernist 
writing. In the first chapter, I concentrate on his most critically acclaimed novel, The Revenge 
for Love (1937), an explicitly pedagogical project that teaches its audience to read domestic 
fiction satirically for the political benefit of women. Part of that lesson mobilizes the forms of 
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 irony already perfected in eighteenth and nineteenth-century domestic fiction’s satirical 
representations of patriarchal power (Austen is the exemplar).  
This mode of satire, however, incorporates a sentimental appraisal of domestic women 
that the modernist reader must disavow. A turn in Lewis’ narrative redirects the satiric eye 
toward the domestic protagonist to characterize her sentimentality as a politically degenerate 
force, and her body as a dehumanized machine. Although he valorizes her political perception, 
he denies the possibility of political or sexual equality. The Revenge for Love dissolves the idea 
of the “couple” and the family bounded by the contractual relations inherent to domestic fiction’s 
humanist vision of love, finally to subordinate the domestic woman.  
Lewis shares this specific ambiguity of narrative irony with Hawks. Together they 
comprise a recognizable category of “fascist domestic fiction.” Both link Britain’s increasingly 
precarious domination of the international market and “dissolution” of national culture to the 
incompetence of (patriarchal) liberal domestic ideology, and Jewish and communist influence. 
Both locate their satirical objects in the liberal capitalist split between private and public spheres, 
the failure of the private patriarchal leadership of the family, and the communist party’s 
machinations. Finally, both foreground the disorder of the inter-war working-class domestic 
scene, and shore up women’s ethical purity attributed in part to their distance from the public 
sphere. In my analysis of Lewis’ writing, however, I specify an endorsement of fascism that is 
inextricably tied to modernist and literary theoretical concerns.  
Chapter Two  
 I extend my observations about fascist irony by juxtaposing Olive Hawks’ What Hope for 
Green Street? (1945) with BUF propaganda. In so doing, I call attention to the deployment of 
satirical critique and domestic personas in fascist political writing. Hawks, and official BUF 
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 rhetoric as a whole, justifies fascism as a satirical critique on behalf of the British women, even 
as it directs irony against progressive literary representations of women’s authority under liberal 
democracy.  
In her satire of the urban working-class domestic scene, moreover, Hawks diverges from 
Lewis in two important ways and in the process, exposes British fascism’s cultural breadth. In 
creating a reactionary domestic novel, she employs not only the British tradition of “conservative 
Juvenalian” satire consistent with Lewis’, but also that of “radical political” satire to invoke a 
populist dimension. Second, Hawks, in line with the official British fascist imagination, 
represents the family as a site for racial fortification, and an incitement to and proof of national 
health. In ways that would probably have repulsed Lewis, Hawks proposes a greater realm of 
female authority in the state with a justification of “biopolitics.”  
In so doing, she incorporates (rather than repels) the language of competing oppositional 
political movements, socialism and materialist feminism, in her discussion of domestic labor.27 I 
show that far from exhibiting nostalgia for the traditional roles of womanhood, her claims take 
advantage of contemporary feminist debates over the value of domestic labor. This situation 
requires a fundamental shift in critical conceptions of women and fascism.  Namely, rather than 
victims of hypnotic seduction or overt domination, women had often very complex stakes in 
fascism and its ability to mobilize discourses across the modern political spectrum.  
                                                 
27 Organized groups for anti-fascism were predominantly communist, socialist, or feminist.  Seline Cooper, 
Women Against War and Fascism British delegate to the conference in Paris, 1934 was a correspondent for the 
Daily Worker and the Daily Herald, reporting on the specific effects of repression in Nazi Germany on women.  See 
Jill Liddington’s The Life and Times of a Respectable Rebel: Selina Cooper (1864-1946) (London : Virago, 1984) 
and Sue Bruley, Leninism, Stalinism, and the Women's Movement in Britain, 1920- 1939 (New York: Garland Pub., 
1986). The No More War Movement, launched in 1920, depended on tenets of peace as physical mothers, 
commitment by virtue of conditioning in caring roles, and positions outside major power hierarchies.  See J. Eglin, 
“Women and Peace” in Campaigns for Peace: British Peace Movements in the Twentieth Century, eds. Richard 
Taylor and Nigel Young (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987). 
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  In the same era and location, two feminists pulled the domestic novel into overtly anti-
fascist directions. Virginia Woolf and Phyllis Bottome explore and assess the cultural anti-fascist 
potential of British liberal democracy. Woolf’s The Years (1937) and Bottome’s The Mortal 
Storm (1936) The Lifeline (1946) represent and oppose fascist domestic ideology in radically 
different ways. Bottome commits to capitalist modernity as a model of liberation and progress, 
and “diagnoses” fascism as a psychological disorder, a homosexual rejection of domesticity, and 
the persistence of feudalism. Woolf on the other hand locates fascist conceptions of mass politics 
and sexuality in the heart of nineteenth-century bourgeois hegemony and biopolitics in Britain. 
Chapter Three 
 Phyllis Bottome, a bestselling novelist employed by Britain’s Ministry of Information, 
exemplifies the “seductive fallacy.” The relation between women and political discourse takes 
center stage in her novels, The Mortal Storm (1933) and The Lifeline (1946). Bottome represents 
the British Empire as a gendered but morally sound model of statecraft and culture. Her work 
suggests that, in contrast, fascism depends in historical terms on the anachronistic persistence of 
feudalism in modernity, and in psychological terms, homosexuality as a form of madness. In her 
novels, fascism revolts against the domestic self-sufficiency and surveillance provided by 
modern heterosexual marriage.  
 As a counter to these fascist elements, Bottome suggests a “biopolitical feminism,” 
shoring up the figure of the woman doctor as a liberal mediation between competing definitions 
of feminist agency in the inter-war period. I argue that her analysis necessarily obscures from 
view fascism’s irreducible dependence on modern biopolitical values. Foucault’s historical work 
on the history of madness and Nancy Armstrong’s literary criticism enable me to connect 
Bottome’s Brönte-esque endorsement of bourgeois domestication to structures of capital and 
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 biopolitical discipline. Although her liberal feminist project seeks to widen the scope of domestic 
women’s authority, the misrepresentation of fascism’s similar inscription of disciplinary power 
leads to a key critical failure. Tracing surprising similarities to Hawks in their biopolitical 
articulations of domestic women’s agency, I show how her well-intended works are nevertheless 
inadequate in perceiving the modern and familiar pleasures of fascism for its subjects, and 
therefore the very conditions of its possibility.  
Chapter Four 
 Virginia Woolf’s The Years (1937), on the other hand, empties the domestic fictional 
mode from the inside out, systematically directing modernist irony against both liberal and 
fascist cultural defenses of the British imperial project and their masculinist premises. Woolf 
locates anti-fascist practices of gender and sexuality not in properly gendered imperial subjects, 
but directly counter to Bottome, in the liminal positions of non-domestic middle-class women 
and gay men in the inter-war period. She thereby challenges the prevalent liberal representation 
of fascism as a feminine or homosexual perversion of humanist agency. Their 
disenfranchisement by the imperial project and their simultaneous inclusion within institutional 
power suggests an anti-fascist disavowal of statist identity and capital, and a joyful, anti-
patriarchal transformation of sexuality and labor. 
 Furthermore, I show that The Years illuminates fascist sexuality’s textual and literary 
nature to characterize fascism not as a seduction from, but as a consummation of women’s 
political fantasies of agency implicit in British domestic fiction’s humanist tradition. She 
provides a model of reading that perceives imperial and biopolitical modes of domestic fiction as 
supports, not counters, to fascist elements of British culture with regard to gender, sexuality, and 
race.  
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 Conclusion 
The danger of unsettling the presumed oppositions between fascism and liberalism is, as 
Carlston has observed, that “we might end by dismissing it from our theory altogether” (15). In 
other words, attempts to criticize fascism as a part of modern British culture in the end may only 
serve to help justify it. I believe we must remain committed to anti-fascist cultural production 
that problematizes the seductive fallacy. To pinpoint what bourgeois hegemony has contributed 
to fascism is to continue extricating the progressive elements of modernity from their fascist 
incarnations. Only in acknowledging the possible familiar attractions of fascism to modern 
subjects can we hope to ascribe divergent cultural values to the relatively recent mass entry of 
women into politics. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
“ARTIFICIAL, UNREAL, YET PENETRATING” 
WYNDHAM LEWIS’ DOMESTIC FASCISM  
 
Wyndham Lewis’ experience as a World War I trench soldier and officer was inseparable 
from his belief that most cultural products in inter-war Britain had become irrelevant. Although 
registered by very few artists, the landscape and raw violence of Passchendaele, he claimed, had 
massive implications for methods of representation.28 Above all, Lewis believed that peace was 
the true artist’s imperative, and therefore deeply opposed war and violence as means for 
resolving political conflicts.29 He explicitly questioned whether any state in a “Machine-Age” 
could claim a moral purpose for sending soldiers into battle.30 Along with many other British 
modernists, then, Lewis actively opposed the growing militarization of inter-war European 
society. His attempts to invigorate the functions of art and writing in this context remain sharp, 
unrelenting, and unique in British painting, literature, and politics. Nevertheless, Lewis 
strengthened the rhetorical defense of war “despite” himself by creating an interface between a 
devastating critique of liberalism and fascism.  
Lewis’ criticism of liberalism differed remarkably from that of the prominent British 
Marxists of the period. The latter sometimes aligned British imperialism with elements of 
                                                 
28 In Blasting and Bombardiering, Lewis writes that weapons and war “transform a smart little modern 
township, inside an hour, into a romantic ruin” (116). For Lewis, only deep misunderstanding interprets the effects 
of war in a romantic light.  
29 He writes, “Whichever of the forces confronted upon the political stage to-day may get the upper hand, 
the Red or the Black, any detached artistic effort, on the grand scale, will be quasi-impossible. There will not be 
present the will, the psychological incentive, the time, or the peace, that are requisite for that” (Blasting and 
Bombardiering 256).  
30 “[W]hether the machine-age has left any State intact in such a way as to put men under a moral or 
emotional compulsion to die for it, is a matter I am unable to discuss” (Blasting and Bombardiering 188).  
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 fascism to condemn them as “of a piece.” Stephen Spender warns in Forward from Liberalism 
(1937), for instance, that British liberal democracy adapted fascist methods in India.31 C. L. R. 
James also explicitly called attention to the fascism of the British Empire even in its 
“democratic” support of Abyssinia against Mussolini.32 Lewis, on the contrary, placed fascism in 
radical opposition to the corrupt alliance of liberalism with communism. He regarded this 
alliance as the apex of political deception, believing that through their dual claims to Christian 
humanism and scientific objectivity, liberals and communists deliberately attempted to rule their 
subjects with “parliamentary humbug,” “pretences of benefaction,” and freedom (Lewis, The Art 
of Being Ruled 73). In much of Lewis’ work, fascism was a bracing tonic against such political 
irresponsibility. Fredric Jameson writes that Lewis’ attacks on “the ideological dishonesty of 
hegemonic liberalism, are indeed more powerful and damaging than anything formulated by the 
Marxism of that period” (19). In this chapter, I explore the attractions of fascism for this 
powerful critic, and further, show how his writing seeks to justify fascism as an advantageous 
form of politics for “the ruled.”33 I focus on his concern for readers who are fed “misleading” 
modern cultural products. 
In The Revenge for Love (1937) in particular, Lewis focuses on the effects of modern 
books and paintings on the lives and minds of domestic women. I contend that here, his fascist 
commitment to peace (or more accurately, appeasement) considered the repercussions of 
                                                 
31 “Many people seem to imagine that English ‘liberty’ is permanent and static; yet the English are using 
fascist methods of government in India,” writes Spender in Forward from Liberalism (138). He also identifies Lewis 
as an exponent of the “imperialist press” which advocates positions “extreme right and fascist” (142). 
32 James argued that Britain’s impetus for supporting Abyssinian national independence was comparable to 
Mussolini’s nakedly aggressive claims to the territory because both sought to defend their own imperial aims in 
“Abyssinia and the Imperialists” (James 63 – 66). 
33 He claims in Blasting and Bombardiering that his work has comprised inimitable “advice to ‘the ruled’ . . 
. not to those who do the ruling” (339). In Rude Assignment, he reiterates, “I am—after my fashion—all the time 
upon the side of the ruled. I identify myself with humanity” (206). 
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 international politics on the home first and foremost. This consideration is echoed in his 
intellectual memoir published in the same year, Blasting and Bombardiering, where he claims to 
oppose war primarily for its effects on domestic life. Citing World War I as the primary cause of 
his mother’s death, he presents an autobiographical persona whose inter-war politics and 
aesthetics are devoted to domestic peace: “the Great War . . . had worn her down and killed her: 
and I swore a vendetta against these abominations” (Lewis, Blasting and Bombardiering 211). In 
The Revenge for Love, this peace depends ultimately on the elimination of women’s social 
agency. I argue that Lewis’ conception of the inter-war artistic task suggests women’s self-
abnegation in modern society, and is allied with German and British fascism in the political 
sphere. 
My reading of Lewis is idiosyncratic; he is read typically as an enemy of women tout 
court. Indeed, he regularly aligned women and femininity with “degenerate” motifs and concepts 
such as interiority, intuition, subjective “Time,” and dolls/puppets, to which he consistently 
opposed exteriority, vision, objective space, and machines.34 In his view, writers and artists like 
Woolf, Sitwell, Joyce, Stein, the surrealists, and the impressionists, uncritically exploited 
interiority on one hand, and meaningless surfaces on the other, and thereby adhered themselves 
to commodification, femininity, sexual inversion, and modern war.35 Whereas they turn away 
from the imperative inter-war task—to create a peaceful society that obliterates liberal and 
communist deceptions—Lewis’ modernism invested the machine and satire to reinvent the role 
of art in modernity. (I will address Woolf’s own criticism of war and liberal hegemony in 
                                                 
34 See especially Lewis’ The Art of Being Ruled (1926), Time and Western Man (1927) and Men Without 
Art (1934).  
35 In Time and Western Man, (1927), he writes, “the time-mind would be much the same as the geographic 
one, fanatically circumscribing this or that territorial unit with a superstitious exclusiveness, an aggressive 
nationalist romance” (83).  
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 Chapter 4.) Thus, underlying Lewis’ sympathy for domestic womanhood is a deep contempt for 
what he considered to be the effects of “feminization.” He cannot in any way be described as a 
feminist writer. I foreground his ambivalence to highlight what I believe Lewis as a writer 
regarded as ideological solutions for women in fascism. Without such a view, we are left with a 
theory of fascism as pure repression that can hardly account for its attractions for modernist 
intellectuals.  
Lewis’ notorious polemical non-fiction throughout the inter-war period attests to his 
sympathy with fascism. In The Art of Being Ruled (1926), he explained, “if anything, I favour 
some form of fascism rather than communism”(35). Because communism deludes the masses 
with a promise of equality that would inevitably lead to revolutionary warfare, fascism better 
embodies the promise of peace by announcing the inevitability of political hierarchy. This work, 
and his journalistic treatment of Nazism in Hitler (1931) first published as a series of articles in 
the journal Time and Tide, have often been cited to confirm Lewis’ status as a reactionary 
fascist. I find, however, that this sympathy is heavily qualified throughout his work. Even in this 
citation, he avows his preference for fascism hesitantly, as the less offensive of two already 
available alternatives to liberal democracy. Furthermore, as Andrea Freud Loewenstein notes, 
“Lewis was no joiner. He never actually became a member of Mosley’s party, and while he was 
enthralled in turn by Marinetti, Mussolini, Mosley, and Hitler, each of these violent enthusiasms 
was followed by a later strong rejection” (Loewenstein 138-9). Any study of Lewis’ literary 
fascism, therefore, must depart from the methods used to explore more programmatic and 
enthusiastic proto-fascists like Marinetti, Sorel, Péguy, and Maurras, who valorized organized 
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 militancy. Lewis distanced himself and his defense of fascism from these writers.36 He 
disavowed Marinetti’s hearty celebration of “he-men,” or virile “men of action” in particular 
because he believed that it created a cultural predilection for war. Representing fascism instead 
as the road to peace in a modern, technologically advanced Europe, Lewis “forgives” men of 
action, rather than recruiting them.  
Some critics have defended Lewis by calling attention to his fundamental 
misunderstanding of fascism, his inability to detect the real implications of Hitler’s anti-
Semitism, and his later recantation in The Hitler Cult (1939). Lewis had not yet read Mein 
Kampf when he wrote Hitler, and was convinced by Nazi pretensions to pacifism: “I believe 
Hitler himself—once he had obtained power—would show increasing moderation and tolerance” 
(Lewis, Hitler 48). Others note that Lewis’ anti-Semitism and misreading of Nazism merely 
reflected those of mainstream British culture. D. G. Bridson, for instance, observes, “Even if one 
finds him sadly awry in his estimate of the dangers inherent in Nazism, the truth remains that he 
was far from being alone in his wrong judgment” (viii). At moments, however, his cynical 
endorsement of fascism clearly goes beyond the pale of even the most conservative mainstream 
commentary. In The Art of Being Ruled, Lewis wrote that under fascism, “no person anywhere 
will be able to escape assassination if he . . . holds, too loudly, opinions that displease it. As the 
press will be . . . under the direct control of the central government . . . death, imprisonment, or 
banishment can be inflicted on anybody, anywhere, without ruffling the surface of opinion” 
(321). 
                                                 
36In Rude Assignment, he writes, “The veneration for action, and for men of action, is a feature of 
Twentieth Century thinking . . . Sorel, Péguy, Maurras, Malraux, have exalted the life of action . . . This is in fact the 
betrayal, specifically indicated by Benda” (35).   
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 In view of this passage, John Harrison writes that Lewis certainly understood what 
fascism would mean for cultural producers: “Lewis later attacked the Nazi regime in Germany, 
but not because of the cruelties it perpetrated, the complete domination of the individual by the 
state by means of secret police; he had foreseen these and did not consider them evil” (103). As 
we know in retrospect, fascism attracted proponents across classes and genders who invested it 
with a broad range of political visions and fantasies. Many were indeed horrified by its 
subsequent results. For my purposes, whether or not Lewis “understood” fascism’s genocidal 
goal is beside the point. I ally myself broadly with critics who have analyzed Lewis as a writer 
who invested fascism with value for modernist cultural production.37 Although I believe that his 
endorsement was not “total,” fascism did temporarily offer him an attractive contrarian model 
because he sought to annihilate what he considered the all too powerful influences of feminist 
literature and politics. In his mapping of contemporary cultural production, feminism epitomizes 
democracy’s absurdly destructive capacity.  
Feminist critics of Lewis, however, have tended to align Lewis’ voice with those of his 
own fictional characters, especially the misogynist title character in Tarr (1918), Cantleman in 
the war issue of Blast (1915) and the mastermind Pierpont in The Apes of God (1930).38 Using 
this reading method, Bonnie Kime Scott has identified Lewis as a typical proponent of 
“architectonic male modernist designs” based on the scaffold and modern architecture, as 
opposed to “feminine” modernists such as Woolf, Joyce, and Barnes who instead suggest “web-
work,” “polyvalence,” and “polyphony” (Scott xxiv-xxix). He and other male modernists “place 
the female at the bottom of their conceptual hierarchies, with mud, vegetative material, and 
                                                 
37 For examples, see Geoffrey Wagner and Mark Conroy.  
38 See Andrea Freud Loewenstein 110-187.   
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 animals” (Scott 104). But as Kelly Anspaugh has noted, Scott enables an “ad hominem” attack 
that confuses Lewis’ characters with the writer, and allows no room for his potentially ironic 
interventions (366). 
Both Scott and Loewenstein incorporate Lewis’ biographical details to assess his writing, 
and therefore tend toward indicting the author’s psychology. In Loewenstein’s analysis, the 
paranoid outlook of his everyday social interactions accounts partially for his writing’s misogyny 
and proto-fascism. Whereas these accounts may be valid for a study of fascist psychology, they 
are not useful for critics of literary fascism because they are too pathologizing (in the medical 
sense) and particularizing. (Chapter 3 will elaborate my charges against psychological 
assessments of fascism in more detail.)  
Although he incorporated his own experiences in his fiction, notably in Tarr (1918), The 
Wild Body (1927), Snooty Baronet (1932), The Revenge for Love (1937), and Self-Condemned 
(1954), he was mercilessly self-ironic. Jameson observes that Lewis “makes himself the 
impersonal registering apparatus for forces which he means to record, beyond any whitewashing 
and liberal revisionism, in all their primal ugliness” (21). His misogynist characters are by no 
means “heroes” in the text. Timothy Materer further observes that in Blast and The Revenge for 
Love, Lewis highlights “the disparity between the reality of his own characters’ behavior and 
their own interpretations of it” and thereby “avoids identifying with them” (Materer 98). Lewis 
as a writer and artist also “performed” personas. SueEllen Campbell and Materer discuss the 
writerly mask of the uncompromising “Enemy” that influenced Lewis’ contemporaries, Yeats 
and Eliot, and created a vantage point from which to satirize inter-war culture.39  
                                                 
39 Sue Ellen Campbell focuses exclusively on Lewis’ aesthetic of aggressive partisanship: “Everywhere, 
and on every level, he thinks in structures of opposition” (xiii). Materer writes, “Lewis felt that the . . . Enemy mask  
. . . would protect his real identity as an artist. He shared this hope not only with W.B. Yeats, but also with his nearer 
contemporaries: T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound” (11-12). 
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 I do not therefore read Lewis as one of his characters. My presentation of Lewis’ writing 
claims, contrary to the biographical/psychological approach, that it is in his irony, i.e., in the 
strategic and meaningful distance between the writer, narrator, and characters, that Lewis is most 
effectively fascist. In this chapter, I am especially interested in how he invokes the domestic 
fiction tradition and stretches the persona of the satirical enemy to accommodate a “domestic” 
persona dedicated to a peaceful modern society in an age of dehumanizing war, mass politics, 
communications, and technology.  
“Apolitical” Politics 
In his literary critical and polemical writing, Lewis offers two personas of the artist/critic. 
On one hand, Lewis constantly struggled to articulate an impersonal, objective, and non-
committed position. “I am not a partisan, but an independent observer,” he writes in The Art of 
Being Ruled (35). In Rude Assignment, he writes that “all government reeks of force” (70). 
However, he also just as often acknowledged that all modern life is necessarily political. In 
Blasting and Bombardiering, he recalls, “I began writing about politics, not because I like 
politics but everything was getting bogged in them and before you could do anything you had to 
deal with the politics with which it was encrusted” (339). In other words, he writes from an 
apolitical position, but articulates the need for some kind of government given his reactionary 
characterization of the masses in modern social relations. “Although the power, the presence of 
unbridled power, causes (in really bad periods) endless suffering, yet . . . Power is, in its origins . 
. . to assure us safety and peace” (Lewis, Rude Assignment 180). Thus, he also presents himself 
as the responsible political intellectual who endorses fascism as the necessary antidote to the 
worst political effects of an age that endorses mindless and infantile “revolution.” He plays the 
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 role of the reluctant interfering spirit, only pulled into political articulation by a concern for his 
country.40 In coalescing these personas, Lewis invokes a British tradition of Juvenalian satire.  
In his pamphlet Satire and Fiction (1930), Lewis advocates a modernist appropriation of 
“tragic laughter” embodied by Dryden, Swift, and Pope. Their visual privileging of surfaces, the 
“eye” in representation, would effectively counter the degenerate valorization of the “inside-
method” practiced by modernist writers like Joyce, Stein, and Lawrence. The satirical objective 
method is based upon intellectual truth rather than “the ‘truth’ of the average romantic 
sensualism” (45-7).  
The satirist’s intellectual truth, however, takes for granted the primacy of language in the 
creation of “reality,” or the ideological nature of modern life. In Men Without Art, Lewis writes 
in defense of satire that “Art consists . . . in a mechanizing of the natural. It bestows its delightful 
disciplines upon our aimless emotions: it puts its gentle order in the place of natural chaos: it 
substitutes for the direct image a picture. And ultimately . .. it substitutes  a thing for a person 
every time” (128-9). In Time and Western Man, Lewis argues that to be an effective writer, one 
must in some way create ideological strategies: “There is no department that is exempt from the 
confusions of this strategy—which consists essentially in removing something necessary to life 
and putting an ideologic simulacrum where it was able to deceive” (78).  
His writerly strategy therefore does not claim, as much other fascist literature, that 
fascism enables a romantic return to nature. Rather, he employs the satirist’s role of political 
prophet and outsider to defend a capitulation to fascism. Fascism, in turn, appears to be an 
ideology that would organize modern society in a blatantly hierarchical race, gender, and class 
                                                 
40 “I cannot understand the indifference of people to what happens to the inhabitants of England” (Lewis, 
Rude Assignment 70).  
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 structure to supersede liberal and communist deception.41 The corporate state would better 
distribute material necessities to the masses within a hierarchical capitalist paradigm, pre-empt 
various revolutionary ideologies of resentment, and thereby create a peaceful social order. 
Fascism as a form of government appears as the objective politics because it unveils necessary 
operations of power. 
This convergence of “objectivity” and fascism leads to assertions that some current 
political issues should not be considered at all debatable. In Hitler, Lewis condemns feminism 
for creating a superfluous “sex-war”: “[A] very bad ‘War’ that can be, when some poor 
uneducated couple are stirred up by newspaper slogans and ‘provocative’ sex-warlike 
propaganda, and fall upon each other .  .  .  All the normal strife of loving couples is embittered a 
thousandfold” (71). Lewis defends the official fascist suppression of feminists by defending the 
ideological necessity of sexual hierarchy.  
He also aligns fascism with disinterested politics in a 1937 article written for the British 
fascist periodical, The British Union Quarterly, in which he claims that ordinary Britons are at 
the mercy of the Communist Party because of its enormous wealth: “When I see such an 
immensely one-sided distribution of Opinion as exists at present in Great Britain, I cannot help 
asking myself how it comes that all the dough has got to one end of the scales” (Lewis, “Left 
Wings” 22). As an objective spectator of the political world, however, Lewis ably resists the 
seductive appeal of the wealthy party: “I am the last person to set myself up as a model of what 
is objective. Yet in spite of myself, almost, I am objective, I am detached, if I compare myself 
with say Trotsky or Baldwin. For I am not a politician . . . the beaux yeux of a possessing class 
play no part at all for me, except to repel” (30). Lewis bases his claim to objectivity and 
                                                 
41 Paul Edwards explains the tension inherent to these stances: “Lewis’ belief that social reality is 
ideologically constructed” counteracts his “urge to translate into the verbal medium the ‘outside of things’” (477). 
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 apolitical critique on his status as a “private citizen,” as opposed to the politician’s business of 
seduction. With relatively no preconceptions or critical attachments, Lewis enumerates the 
superiority of fascist values. Members of the British Union of Fascists (BUF) have a finer 
understanding of the “Have-nots,” and stand for justice:  
You as a Fascist stand for the small trader versus the chain-store; for the peasant against 
the usurer; for the nation, great or small, versus the super-state; for personal business 
against Big Business; for the craftsman versus the Machine; for the creator versus the 
middleman; for all that prospers by individual effort and creative toil, against all that 
prospers in the abstract air of High Finance or of the theoretic ballyhoo of 
Internationalism. (33) 
The fascist, in other words, actually does defend the poor, the “have-nots,” and the underdogs, 
while communists merely bluff their sympathy ultimately to serve the world’s magnates. As in 
much other British fascist journalism, he simultaneously maintains touchstones of anti-capitalist 
rhetoric (“peasant,” “craftsman”) and capitalist individualism (“individual effort,” “personal 
business”). This conflation is resolved in capitalist autarky in BUF propaganda, whereas here, 
Lewis invokes the aesthetic superiority that would emerge (“creator,” “creative toil”). 
He endorses a blatantly white supremacist European imperialism as an aesthetically 
“objective” goal in The Hitler Cult (1939), technically a “retraction” of his previous, misguided 
defense of Hitler. His newfound critical stance toward Nazism is based on his opinion that it has 
violated a more traditional form of imperialism by colonizing Eastern Europe, which he 
considers to be equally inhabited by “Aryans.” In contrast, the British Empire, he claims, was “a 
healthy—expansion, secured at the expense of no one except dusky beings who were as different 
from ourselves as if they inhabited another planet” (188). The British Empire, in other words, is 
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 a “risk-free” form of global domination because it is organized by the aesthetic criterion of skin 
color. This “anti-fascist” tract suggests that Europe could halt Germany’s race-betraying 
totalitarian takeover of Europe by pooling resources and continuing imperialism without “a lot of 
unnecessary trouble,” or without war between England and Germany (234). A united Europe no 
longer needs to carry the crippling liberal pretenses to “universal” humanity and civilization, 
since imperialism of the British ilk is a form of expansionism grounded in the superior aesthetic 
ideology of racist hierarchies.  
What I find interesting in Lewis’ writing despite his ultimately unoriginal conservative 
stance (or as Jameson puts it, his basic defense of the “white European male”) is precisely his 
emphasis on ideology and language. In The Revenge for Love, a fascist logic of gender and 
sexuality is worked out on the terrain of literature, narrative, and reading. In framing the debates 
in this way, the novel is a rich source for understanding the place of literary production in the 
British fascist imagination, and the insertion of British high modernism in the gendering of 
fascism. Lewis thereby demonstrates why literature and painting matter to fascists and vice 
versa—the stakes that cultural producers might have in fascism.  
In The Art of Being Ruled, Lewis caustically criticized inter-war British communists as 
“a small privileged class . . . playing at revolution, and aping a ‘proletarian’ freedom that the 
proletarian has not yet reached the conception of” (134-5). They are also the major antagonists in 
The Revenge for Love. Set immediately before the Spanish Civil War, the novel presents the 
machinations of “millionaire bohemian” communists in London. Two communists in particular, 
Abershaw and Sean O’Hara, mastermind a gunrunning scheme to aid the communist effort 
against Franco in Spain. To carry out the scheme, they trap Victor Stamp, a sincere but failed 
artist, into participating, and eventually betray him. His wife, Margot Stamp, the novel’s 
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 “apolitical” moral center, cares only for Victor; in the selflessness of her love, she paradoxically 
articulates the most legitimate sense of political responsibility. Margot, who plays the role of the 
standard heroine of domestic fiction throughout much of the novel, sees through the communists’ 
plot, but bungles her attempt to save Victor. In the tradition of Austen, this domestic heroine is 
led astray by her reading.42 Her quasi-feminist aspirations, instilled by feminist literature, leads 
them to their deaths. 
A third protagonist, Percy Hardcaster, in contrast to the other communists, has “genuine” 
working-class origins. Having lost his leg after being shot by a fascist prison guard in Spain near 
the beginning of the novel, he dutifully but cynically plays the role of a wounded communist 
exemplar for the London “parlour pinks.” With serious misgivings about the hypocritical politics 
he is contributing to, he is the only communist who eventually “sympathizes” with the Stamps 
against the conspirators. Although he also participates in the gunrunning scheme, he turns 
himself in to the fascist police in order to save Victor once he learns of the communists’ betrayal. 
Back in the Spanish prison, he learns that the Stamps have perished in the mountains where they 
had hidden after accidentally killing a Civil Guard. 
Lewis suggests women’s investment in fascism by dramatizing the “woes of women” as 
consequences of communist and feminist cultural production in the inter-war moment. I suggest 
that in order to analyze Lewis’ literary mode of justifying fascism for British women, we should 
read it under the rubric of domestic fiction. Lewis mobilizes his powers of narrative and 
characterization to articulate fascism as the “truth” of politics by invoking a naïve domestic 
woman. Fascism appears to benefit women politically in the face of mechanical and deceptive 
                                                 
42 In Satire and Fiction, Lewis privileges Austen’s place in satirical fiction, asking what she and other 
satirists “would have thought of the frantic and incessant critical pronouncements of our most celebrated critics.” He 
argues that through this perspective, “we perceive the extent of the degradation, from a high and fastidious standard, 
that the art of letters has suffered in England” (55).   
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 communists and liberals. At the same time, the narrator’s irony rebukes the domestic woman’s 
temptation to feminist articulations of agency. Although I do not consider the novel a disguised 
political tract, Lewis’ polemical and autobiographical writings of the period provide an 
illuminating commentary on the connections between literature, art, and politics. Thus, I weave 
many of his non-fictional writings into my analysis. 
Domestic fiction 
Margot both inherits and trims the role of the heroine in nineteenth-century domestic 
fiction. Famously, Lewis’ Vorticist work in Blast condemned the progressive cultural production 
of the nineteenth century: “BLAST years 1837 to 1900 . . . WRING THE NECK OF all sick 
inventions born in that progressive white wake.”43 Valerie Parker observes that “Lewis argues 
against social and individual harmony, against the family and the integration of the personality 
for the sake of society, values implicit in nineteenth-century novels” (212). While I would agree 
that Lewis in no way defends the patriarchal family unit so integral to traditional domestic 
fiction, I believe that he allies The Revenge for Love with domestic fiction’s solemnization of 
women’s domestic identity, and its unprecedented and formidable methods of consensus 
building. This contradiction is the key factor that coalesces Lewis’ work with the polemics of 
British fascist fiction (which I will elaborate in Chapter 2).  
In Desire and Domestic Fiction, Nancy Armstrong argues that late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth-century “revolutionary” domestic fiction helped the advent of industrial capital by 
modeling a new form of female “subjectivity,” predicated on the transformation of “woman” 
from a sensual object of exchange into an ahistorical form of spiritual interiority. This subject 
modeled the bourgeois capacity for self-discipline and self-determination—features of a 
                                                 
43 Wyndham Lewis, “Long Live the Vortex,” in Blast: Review of the Great English Vortex.  
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 hegemonic discourse that defined the self as the owner of labor-power, and instituted contractual 
exchange in lieu of the feudal use of force to extract labor. It was therefore on the domestic front, 
over which the female had apparent “authority,” she claims, “perhaps even more so than in the 
courts and the marketplace [that] the middle-class struggle for dominance was fought and won” 
(24). Particularly in its earlier forms (e.g., the novels of Richardson, Burney, and Austen), 
domestic novels asserted the superiority of egalitarian and democratic institutions, presenting 
“female desire” as a spiritual interiority “freed” from feudal repression. This revolution in 
representation masked the fact that the domestic woman’s transcendence relied on the invention 
of a private sphere, which required her exclusion from the masculine public sphere, and therefore 
enforced her political and economic disenfranchisement.  
A later tradition of “counterrevolutionary” domestic fiction adapted to the changing 
needs of middle-class hegemony. Armstrong elaborates on the turbulent era between “the 
Reform Bill of 1832 and the onset of mid-century prosperity,” when growing numbers of the 
exploited working classes threatened to exercise “universal” liberal humanist values against 
bourgeois domination. In this context, domestic fiction began to shun earlier celebrations of 
“female desire” and modern subjectivity; instead, this desire came to represent an ominous and 
even monstrous force.44 Domestic fiction “no longer provided a fantasy in which one could enjoy 
watching class lines dissolve within marriage.  Instead, it began marking boundaries that it had 
formerly felt free to cross” (Armstrong 52). The archetypal Jane Eyre (1848), for instance, 
valorized conformity to modern (polar) definitions of sex and gender, and can be aligned with 
contemporary political writing that indicted working-class acts of “combination” (organized 
resistance) by classifying them as sexual and moral offenses against “nature.” 
                                                 
44 Armstrong cites the sudden appearance of the “deranged” and “monstrous” woman in the domestic 
fiction of the late 1840s  as one indication of this shift (166).   
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 Counterrevolutionary domestic fiction justified capital by articulating a universal form of (quiet) 
revolution against a sedimented aristocratic social structure, while ideologically banishing any 
revolution other than its own. By mid-nineteenth century, many domestic novels resonated with 
counterrevolutionary representations of the masses.  
In this section, I show how The Revenge for Love continues the complex tradition of 
British domestic fiction to coalesce an “apolitical” stance with the viewpoint of the domestic 
woman. But it by no means “empowers” women, even in the private sphere. The narrator’s irony 
allows us to judge our domestic heroine, Margot Stamp, as both ethically superior and 
intellectually inadequate. This use of irony urges women’s retreat from politics. To tie the 
novel’s vision of the domestic woman to fascism, I clarify how it imagines fascism correcting the 
deception of liberal and communist politics, and relieving the degradation of women’s positions 
in liberal modernity and domestic life.  
Margot Stamp as revolutionary domestic heroine 
The Revenge for Love trains the reader to distinguish between the binary qualities of the 
living and the dead, solid and liquid, flesh and ghost, substance and shadow, and real and unreal. 
“False Bottoms” was in fact the original working title for The Revenge for Love.45 Margot 
assesses and marks “false” and misleading politics, representations of power, and narrative. Her 
proximity to “truth” depends on her distance from the scene of (corrupt) political power.  
In the first half of the novel, the irony of the narrator is directed primarily at her lack of 
descriptive ability. As a product of modern culture, she is inarticulate and must to some extent, 
be spoken for. Parker observes that Lewis “uses her as a powerful force of goodness, loyalty and 
truth which is opposed to nearly all the other characters” but since Margot “is an ignorant 
                                                 
45 “There are a series of actual false bottoms in the novel .  .  .  but these examples are there to help show 
that the world is pervaded by false bottoms, by things that are not really what they seem” (Dasenbrock, Afterword). 
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 woman,” she “says and thinks things which the narrator cannot” (211). I would add that the 
narrator says things that Margot cannot.  
Margot sees the terrifying emptiness underneath the communists’ apparent good will 
toward the working classes. She suspects their political shams and conspiracies, and therefore 
constantly doubts the substance of their statements, and even their physical human appearance. 
Faced with these products of massification and inauthentic personality, Margot’s perception, 
trained by domestic detail and inspired by the desire to sustain the home, acts as a form of 
political intelligence. For instance, Margot immediately perceives the sinister, inhuman qualities 
of Abershaw, the mastermind behind the elaborate gunrunning scheme that eventually leads to 
the Stamps’ death. “He smiled and then went back, with a sudden collapse of the countenance, to 
his watchful owlishness, in a manner that positively advertised its automatism, and shouted at 
you that it was unreal—boasting, as it were, that you could not hurt it, because it was all a 
guttapercha pretence” (165). His countenance, an artificial device, signals his political duplicity 
by mutating from one extreme to the other.  
Nevertheless, because she remains on the “plane of emotion, where words were all mixed 
up with images,” the narrator lends Margot the term, “pukka,” meaning “authentic,” to help her 
articulate a critique of the parlor communists (152). Helped thus by the narrator, Margot sees the 
communists in their true light—as “wax dolls” who, in their “arrogant futility,” divert attention 
from the “pukka underdogs” (153).  
Throughout his work, Lewis opposed “puppets” or “dolls” to “natures,” based on an 
original distinction by Goethe: “Today there is an absurd war between the ‘puppets’ and the 
‘natures,’ and the pressure on the ‘natures’ increases. We are all slipping back into machinery, 
because we all have tried to be free. And what is absurd about this situation is that so few people 
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 even desire to be free in reality (Lewis, The Art of Being Ruled 125). Communists often appear 
as the puppets par excellence because they actively disavow “individuality,” and expedite the 
“associational” or modern group identity formations.46 They are the logical result of a 
nightmarish society that valorizes “revolution” over stability. (Lewis does valorize the machine, 
however, when it allows consciousness and individuality to flourish—a paradox I will present 
later in this chapter.)  
Margot is appropriately vigilant around them. She even suspects that the home of Sean 
O’Hara, Abershaw’s co-conspirator, is actually a malevolent trap of “deceptive security,” 
complete with false walls, trapdoors, and the “masked heads of shafts” (153). Appropriately, at a 
party thrown there in Percy Hardcaster’s honor, Margot leans against a bookcase to find that it 
slides inward to a secret room where Abershaw and O’Hara are busy practicing the forgery of 
Victor’s signature. This space, powerfully reminiscent of the elaborate castles and ruins of 
Gothic fiction, signals the heroine’s justified paranoia.47  
Reed Way Dasenbrock argues that Lewis’ valorization of paranoia is also “central to the 
fascist worldview, to the fascist way of imagining the world, particularly to its Nazi variant” 
(“Wyndham Lewis’ Fascist Imagination” 93). In fact, Lewis distinguishes between several 
sources of paranoia. In The Art of Being Ruled, he observes that paranoia is the pathological 
result of elaborate liberal deceptions, and therefore could be eliminated by fascism. Furthermore, 
in The Revenge for Love, some of the communists are just as paranoid as Margot. Sean O’Hara, 
                                                 
46 In The Art of Being Ruled, Lewis writes, “The more classes (of which, in their various functions, he is 
representative) that you can make him become regularly conscious of, the more you can control him, the more of an 
automaton he becomes. . .” (109). Furthermore, automatons are paradoxically stronger because they are not truly 
alive: “the inventive individual is constantly exposed to destruction in a way that the uninventive, mechanical 
associational man is not” (363).  
47 Tanya Modleski, Loving with a Vengeance: Mass Produced Fantasies for Women (New York: Methuen 
1982) discusses the justification of paranoid fantasies in Gothic fiction. Paranoia engenders the need for an 
identifiable villain, which Gothic fiction typically embodies in patriarchal figures. 
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 like Margot, also sees through “false bottoms,” but only because he constantly creates byzantine 
conspiratorial plots.48 The narrator hints that O’Hara had tipped off a communist to the Nazi 
régime, which led to his execution, and that he had collected funds for the Dublin branch of the 
Communist Party, only to decamp with them later (133-4). In contrast, Margot enacts paranoia 
from the position of the “powerless.” The impetus for her paranoia is her compassion for Victor, 
and her correct perception that he is constantly victimized by those around him. Her paranoia 
enables her accurate assessment of the power structure, so that “Victor was a pukka underdog 
she saw quite well” (152).  
Through Margot, Lewis defines the apolitical woman as the site of authentic and vigilant 
politics. Margot’s self-sacrificing love contrasts the sinister world of politics that surrounds it, 
and enables a clear view of that world. In contrast, the “millionaire bohemian” communists cloak 
the nature of political hierarchy, by fashionably “slumming” their way into proletariat status. 
Their narratives also support this mode of political (self) deception. In this way, Lewis asserts 
the superiority of a reader armed by skeptical paranoid domesticity.  
At Sean O’Hara’s party, Percy recounts how he was wounded by a fascist guard. His 
story, a piece of “atrocity propaganda,” appeals to the audience as a thrilling tale of masculine 
glory. The communists’ enthusiasm for his story is distinctly marked as feminine and 
splendiferously Victorian: “A red patriarch, Percy Hardcaster reclined, propped by a plethora of 
red cushions, upon a wide reddish settee, in Red invalid magnificence . . . There were four 
women beside him upon the settee” (140). Percy assesses their desire for “fun and excitement” 
and “the romance of revolution,” and obligingly embellishes his own heroism, as well as the 
fascists’ capacity for evil (195). The resulting narrative is a radically simple and childish 
                                                 
48 His wife describes his “paranoid imagination,” saying, “He was such a born conspirator” (Lewis, The 
Revenge for Love 131)! 
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 representation of power that garners a morally indignant reaction from the audience and piques 
their thirst for blood. The narrator satirically represents the communist narratives as instances of 
Christian ressentiment: “their doctrine was a universal Sicilian Vespers, and which yet treated 
the real poor, when they were encountered, with such overweening contempt, and even derision” 
(152). In a Nietzschean vein, the communist narratives’ sensitivity and morality only serves to 
conceal a violently sadistic will to power.  
Percy’s heroic tale is swallowed whole by a wealthy communist named Gillian, the wife 
of Tristan Phipps who is a successful communist artist and a friend of Victor’s. Later, Percy 
disabuses her of the “atrocity propaganda,” telling her that the fascist nurses did not actually rub 
salt into his wounds, and that in fact, they were unusually kind. Gillian, humiliated by her own 
gullibility, unleashes her real contempt for the poor, ordering an admirer to remove Percy 
forcefully from her flat. She stands by as he kicks Percy’s leg repeatedly in the barely healed site 
of amputation—truly one of the most graphically sickening episodes in 1930s British modernist 
fiction.  
Gillian’s assault reveals communism as a violent and resentful politics affiliated with 
feminine sentimentality and vicariousness. In rehashing Nietzsche’s famous connection of 
ressentiment with women, Lewis bypasses Nietzsche’s congruent presentation of the 
transvaluative potential of feminine “dissimulation” in the critique of humanism.49 In her 
                                                 
49 In The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York Vintage Books, 
1967) Friedrich Nietzsche similarly describe the “false piety” of women: “Holiness—perhaps the last thing the 
people and women still get to see of higher values, the horizon of the ideal for all who are by nature myopic” (163). 
On the other hand, in The Gay Science, Nietzsche attributes “the most powerful magic of life” to the dissimulating 
possibilities of “women”: “a veil of beautiful possibilities, sparkling with promise, resistance, bashfulness, mockery, 
pity, and seduction.  Yes, life is a woman” Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1974) 271-2. See Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles, trans. Barbara Harlow (New 
York: Columbia UP, 1979) 67-9 for an account of Nietzsche’s contradictory readings of “femininity” in modernity. 
For an account of Nietzsche’s influences on Lewis, see Toby Myrthen, “Wyndham Lewis: Between Nietzsche and 
Derrida,” English Studies in Canada 16 (1990) 339-53, E. W. F. Tomlin, “The Philosophical Influences,” Wyndham 
Lewis: A Revaluation, ed. Jeffrey Meyers (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s UP, 1980) 20-46, and Alistair Davies, “Tarr: 
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 representation of the political world, Gillian insists on the melodramatic clarity of good and evil, 
a dashing masculine hero, and her own moral transcendence. This insistence makes her 
responsible for revolting violence, and thus places her in the position of what she had mistakenly 
imagined as that of the “fascist woman.” She wryly contemplates this reversal: “How would she 
fare, according to the machiavellian rules of communist policy, it flashed through her mind? 
Would she subsequently be described as splitting her sides with laughter, in the company of 
Jack—after rubbing vinegar in the wounds inflicted upon a defenceless man” (200)?  
Margot, in contrast, had already perceived, even before this episode, that the “women’s 
class” of “millionaire” communism is quite capable of the statist violence they ostensibly 
deplore. At the O’Haras’, she observes that their “grand voices,” cultivated by expensive 
schools, “oppressed one like the helmet of a policeman” (162). This intuition is supported by the 
narrator’s greater access to knowledge about the war between fascism and communism. 
 Whereas the communists’ image of fascism is outrageously “sensationalized” throughout 
the narrative, the “undistorted” glimpses we do get of it through the narrator’s direct 
observations of fascists are far more complex and conciliatory. In fact, fascism has much more in 
common with a genuinely working-class communism, a point Lewis had made polemically in 
The Art of Being Ruled, where he compared “marxian doctrine” to “the fascist ideal.” Though 
related, he determines that the latter is “the most suitable” form of socialism “for anglo-saxon 
countries” because “to get some sort of peace to enable us to work, we should naturally seek the 
most powerful and stable authority that can be devised” (321). As articulated by Percy sans his 
heroic mask, working-class communism is “communism when it’s naked, with the frills off, 
communism from the working-class angle, not of the Chelsea party, or of the young Foreign 
                                                                                                                                                             
A Nietzschean Novel,” Wyndham Lewis: A Revaluation, ed. Jeffrey Meyers (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s UP, 1980) 
107-19. 
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 Office or Air Ministry clerk . . . the communism of the Barrikadenfodder” (241). Percy’s “real” 
communism is administrative and disdainful of the “masses”: “It is better,” he explains to his 
prisonmate Virgilio at the beginning of the novel, “that class should be frankly—starkly—
vertical” (55)! He later divulges to Gillian that as an authentic, truly working class communist, 
“I’d rather see your sort hanging from the nearest lamp-post” (194). At these moments, he aligns 
himself with fascism, as his interlocutors never fail to point out. Virgilio remarks, “I sometimes 
believe, Don Percy, that you are really a Fascist” (56). Gillian tells him, “you’d be more at home 
in a fascist organisation than in ours” (194). Like that of Victor in response to communist 
machinations, which I will present shortly, Percy’s enactment of ressentiment bypasses the 
vicariousness of sadism, announces its violence forthrightly, and therefore compares favorably to 
that of the “parlor pinks.”  
 Percy’s version of communism offers the reader a more complex vision of power, and a 
sympathetic appreciation of fascists that accords with the narrator’s objectivity. Most important, 
fascism offers men and women a political medium to express deeply gendered characteristics. 
The fascist nuns who nurse Percy back to health, for instance, are “tenderly compassionate 
women.” (54). The narrator reveals Alvaro Morato, the fascist prison guard who shot Percy, as a 
man of integrity who insists against his communist and petty criminal prisoners that “You are not 
free to put expediency in the place of law” (14)! Percy declares, even after he is shot, that 
“Morato was rather a fine man in his way” (190). Fascism in these passages, though by no means 
unproblematically endorsed, is closer to true working-class revolution, the true revelation of 
political power, and the best organization of the sexes.  
Significantly, Margot prefers fascism over her acquaintances’ bohemian communism: 
“That she should plump for a Blackshirt—that testified to the fact that, as far as she could feel 
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 anything of that sort strongly, she entertained something approaching aversion for the ‘Red’” 
(74). Her preference for fascism deepens as she recalls meeting a Blackshirt who resembles 
Victor: “There was enough . . . to endear him to her, in a reflection from her cult” (74). As I will 
show later, her momentary departure from the “cult of Victor” triggers disaster. Here, even while 
acknowledging her “faulty” logic, noting that her propensity toward fascism is tinged by love 
and not attributable to properly political reasons (“as far as she could feel anything of that sort 
strongly”), the narrator sympathizes with her reasoning. Her tendency toward fascism results 
simply from her aversion to its competition, and the resemblance of a Blackshirt to Victor. But 
the narrator suppresses the satiric impulse vis-à-vis Margot. Her unsullied, naïve, and basically 
accurate perception counterposes the communists’ treatment of politics as sentimental 
entertainment and parlor game in which real men get shot. In contrast, Margot’s “political” 
choices are surprisingly genuine.  
By claiming “love” as a legitimate impetus for politics, Margot deflects from the 
comparatively “abstract” and alienating category of class. Margot’s involvement with politics is 
determined solely by her desire to protect Victor. Her love in turn directly threatens 
communism’s mechanical worldview:  
It was their reality, that of Victor and herself, that was marked down to be discouraged 
and abolished, and it was they that the others were trying to turn into phantoms and so to 
suppress. It was a mad notion, but it was just as if they had engaged in a battle of wills, to 
decide who should possess most reality—just as men fought each other for money, or 
fought each other for food. (163)  
Love is Margot’s “cause.” When she anxiously confronts Percy about the danger the communists 
pose to Victor by involving him in their plots, she argues, “I will prevent anything that looks as if 
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 it might make a victim of Victor. Is that plain speech, Percy? Victor is my racket” (296). Her 
politics and her love determine each other and are “true” because of that intertwining.  
A fascist disavowal of masculine heroism 
The narrator praises Margot’s total self-sacrifice for Victor, a love that is repeatedly 
materialized in gifts of food and punctuated by her constant hunger. But for readers to be 
convinced by this convergence of apolitical and fascist viewpoints, they must believe that 
“heterosexual love” necessitates female sacrifice. Lewis cashes in on the ahistorical and 
apolitical status of love here, even as he radically changes the terms of the domestic fiction 
tradition that helped prop up that status.  
Lewis significantly departs from the discourse of progress and humanism that informs 
domestic fiction in its “revolutionary” mode. The practice of love in revolutionary domestic 
fiction supposedly provides a basis for abstract spiritual equality in marriage between the sexes 
despite class standing. The Revenge for Love drastically curbs the domestic heroine’s translation 
of spiritual love into political power by demoting the domestic novel’s figuration of the social 
contract. Margot’s love diverges from this model, and disillusions the female lover of the need or 
even possibility of contractual equality. Reflecting this critique of marriage as sexual and social 
contract, the Stamps have never “officially” married although Margot has taken Victor’s name.  
Nevertheless, Victor does not live up to the heroic status that Margot wishes him to: 
“Victor was not a hero in a book . . . They were hemmed in by a chaotic reality, against which 
‘heroism’ would be of little avail” (278). In the next two sections, I elaborate on Lewis’ 
evaluation of fascist masculinity, which I believe is negative in two ways. First, his evaluation 
marks Lewis’ divergence from Italian fascism whose proto-fascist intellectuals, especially F. T. 
Marinetti, he had often been compared to in his own lifetime (including by Marinetti himself). 
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 Second, though he vacillated intensely on the cultural production of fascist virility—the “he-
men” of Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany—Lewis ultimately valorizes its forceful 
negation of liberal and communist effeminacy. In this way, they act as a sort of bodyguard for 
the “Western man,” the ideal civilized and non-violent male endorsed in Time and Western Man 
(1934).  
Victor exploits his movie star (Clark Gable) good looks, a habit that makes him 
regrettably unwary of the plots against him. In addition, Victor is a failed artist, who probably 
should have stayed a spectator. As such, he embodies the “amateur” who in The Art of Being 
Ruled, Lewis claims has contributed to the deplorable state of British art.50 Furthermore, as 
David Ayers notes, Victor’s “recourse to mute violence is only a negative assertion of the self: it 
is the assertion of the self’s inarticulacy, and its mark is a cancellation and not an affirmation” 
(180). Indeed, the “man of action” is characteristically mindless and self-destructive in Lewis’ 
writing. Nevertheless, Lewis repeatedly values his ceaseless and unbridled opposition. Although 
deeply ambivalent vis-à-vis the effects of masculine “Action” in art throughout his writing, 
Lewis ultimately valorizes Victor’s identification with fascist Action for its rebellious stance 
against communist and Jewish influences on European aesthetics.  
In The Revenge for Love, the London art world is corruptly occupied by committed, 
powerful, leading communist intellectuals. Despite their apparent dedication to proletarian 
artists, Margot correctly sees that they “abominate art” (295). The Jewishness of this world is 
highlighted by the high status of Peter Wallace, “née Reuben Wallach,” in it. Peter epitomizes 
communist art criticism as the “genuine article,” or as a “levite Communist” (145). He relishes 
                                                 
50 Lewis writes, “the audience . . becomes professional, or, worse, semi-professional. . .  The merging of the 
spectator and the performer—for that is the technical definition of amateurism in its widest application—can 
scarcely be expected in art or social life to have a more satisfactory upshot than the same process applied in politics 
or industry” (The Art of Being Ruled 125) 
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 the desperate situations of working artists as sources of sadistic aesthetic pleasure, and his 
doctrinaire attitude reduces art criticism to biographical references to the artist’s class origins. 
Victor assesses this propaganda as the product of “Jewish smart alecks from Paris” (148).  
The communists’ criticism of the commodification of art and the bourgeois taste for “Old 
Masters” results only in the extreme corruption of art—forgery. They set up a forgery factory, 
justifying its latent critique of bourgeois ownership and the market’s marginalization of 
contemporary modern art. As they conflate artistic labor with factory labor, they inoculate and 
feminize art. This degeneration is again embodied in a Jew, Isaac Wohl, who is the ideal 
forger—a quietist and a “perfect, reliable machine” who adeptly copies Marie Laurencins (229). 
Victor, whom the communists pull into the forgery scheme knowing that he is approaching dire 
poverty, is capable in contrast of forging “masculine” Van-Gogh self-portraits.51  
Ayers notes that “The Jews occupy the position of manipulator and victim in the 
Lewisian text. Wohl is the victim-Jew to Peter Wallace’s manipulator-Jew” (Ayers 180). 
Supporting this assertion, Blasting and Bombardiering represents Jewishness as the 
subordination of the individual to organization (a damning trait in Lewis’ system), and the 
insinuation of foreignness into British society (243, 274). Jewish forces dispose of the artist’s 
individuality and feminize art in their incongruous commodification and proletarianization.  
Against these forces, Victor eventually rebels by stamping his foot through his “work in 
progress.” In staging this rebellion, Lewis poses a struggle between the possibility of the artist’s 
political detachment against that of the artist’s political leadership.52 Peter Bürger ties this 
                                                 
51 Jeffrey Meyers notes the significance of Victor’s identification with Van Gogh: “Van Gogh’s great art is 
prostituted while Victor’s earnest efforts are ignored” (228). 
52 In The Art of Being Ruled, Lewis connects this distinction to an older problem of the Enlightenment in 
the eighteenth century: “Our minds are all still haunted by that Abstract Man, that enlightened abstraction of 
common humanity, which had its greatest advertisement in the eighteenth century. That No Man in a No Man’s 
Land, that phantom of democratic ‘enlightenment,’ is what has to be disposed for good in order to make way for 
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 problem to a larger debate in modernist art. He refers to modern artists who revolted against the 
bourgeois separation of art from the “praxis of life” through commodification, and the use of art 
to justify the “means-end rationality of daily bourgeois existence.” The “avant-garde” produced 
two paradoxically related responses (Bürger 10-50). In the British context, “autonomy” 
aestheticists like Pater and Wilde reacted against consumerist and politico-moral conceptions of 
art production. Related to them through a common concern to “aestheticize life,” politicized 
artists like Ruskin and Morris sought to lead politics by insisting on the primacy of aesthetics in 
social existence.  
In his non-fiction, Lewis repeatedly sought to synthesize these postures. The true artist 
creates new modes of human perception, and therefore must be regarded as a leader of the 
masses. Ideally, however, the artist must be independent of and supersede all political ideology: 
“As measure is the principle of all true art, and as art is the enemy of all excess, so it is along 
aesthetic lines that the solution of this problem [of violence] should be sought rather than along 
moral (or police) lines, or humanitarian ones” (The Art of Being Ruled 64-5).53 He suggests that 
this synthesis is impossible in the present circumstances, given the reduction of “detachment” to 
art for art’s sake, and the debasement of political leadership to communist influence.54 Though 
                                                                                                                                                             
higher human classifications, which, owing to scientific method, men could now attempt” (375). The modern artistic 
task is to dismantle the specter of universal reason that underlies democratic conceptions of the human.  
53 See Foshay for a detailed account of Lewis’ avant-garde stance, especially in The Caliph’s Design and 
his Vorticist work.  
54 Lewis’ conception of the artist as individual recalls Oscar Wilde’s contrast between artistry and “public 
opinion” in “The Soul of Man under Socialism” (1891). In sharp contradistinction, however, are their divergent 
evaluations of modern technology. Whereas Wilde calls attention to exploitative conditions under capitalism in 
observing that “At present machinery competes against man. Under proper conditions machinery will serve man” 
(269), Lewis repeatedly compares humans to machines in order to advocate dictatorship as a stabilizing force: “In 
the mass people wish to be automata: they wish to be conventional: they hate you teaching them or forcing them 
into ‘freedom’: they wish to be obedient, hard-working machines, as near dead as possible—as near dead 
(feelingless and thoughtless) as they can get, without actually dying” (Art of Being Ruled 151).  
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 Victor is a failed artist, he is the novel’s lone voice against the sacrifice of this avant-garde 
synthesis as he refuses to capitulate to Jewish/communist corruption: 
For better or for worse these broad and hostile shoulders belonged to Nature, with her big 
impulsive responses, with her violent freedom, with her animal directness: 
unconservative, illogical, and true to her elemental self.  He subscribed therefore to a 
larger scheme: the smaller, the watertight, the theoretic, the planning of man’s logic, he 
repudiated.  . . So Stamp crouched and waited, attending the blow he knew would 
descend, and which, fatally, he would resist.  For self-preservation was still his law. 
Indeed the lightest rap, and he would have sprung into action. (236) 
In Victor, Lewis reverses personification to invest the human with animal qualities that deeply 
contrast the communist mechanical puppets. He taps into the “natural,” “unconservative,” and 
“elemental” capacity of the human. Victor is “big,” “violent,” and thus evinces an admirable 
correspondence between his feelings and his expressions that is totally opposed to the 
communists’ careful cultivation of the surface and use of deceptive masks.55  
The communists compare Victor’s revolt to the Nazi revolt against the Treaty of 
Versailles; both suffer from the feeling of being terribly wronged, and their strength is aroused 
by unprecedented “crisis”: “He feels like a Great Power .  .  .  A rather impoverished, mutilated, 
but extremely chauvinistic Great Power” (244)! Fascism, embodied here in Victor, is framed as 
an elemental revolt by a poverty-stricken “underdog” rather than aggressive oppression by the 
“master races.” Although motivated by an “inferiority complex,” fascism is understood as a 
reaction to the injustice of the “Haves.” Victor’s, revolt, and by implication Germany’s, 
                                                 
55 “[W]hen he took counsel with himself, the thing was done in public, as it were; and upon his face, as 
upon a screen, was reflected what was going on within. . . He would have regarded it as improper to possess a self 
that had any secrets, from other selves” (Lewis, The Revenge for Love 234). 
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 legitimately and honestly reacts against the corrupt world of art and politics that suppresses his 
signature and capitalizes on his hunger.  
Lewis and continental fascism 
In recent years, criticism of Lewis’ tendency toward fascism has benefited from 
comparisons of his characters to the Freikorps in Klaus Theweleit’s classic psychoanalytic 
critique of fascism, Male Fantasies (1987-88). In these readings, Lewis’ satires similarly 
precipitate a tough exteriority, an “ossature,” or shell to protect oneself against the constant 
threat of collapse after World War I (Men Without Art 99). Many critics have analyzed his 
comparison of satire and “mechanization” as a fascist fetishization of dehumanized masculine 
machines.56 Hal Foster, for instance, analyzes the fascism implicit in Lewis’ production of a 
“machine body” that transforms “stimulus shock into protective shield” (23). 
As Jessica Burstein has observed, Lewis’ understanding of masculinity was complex, and 
assumed the ideological nature of gender: “Lewis’ politics are bound to an understanding of 
sexuality that hinges on the wavering boundary between the natural and constructed” (151). I 
would also argue that Lewis always represents masculinity as a construction, or as he puts it, a 
“highly unstable and artificial mode of life.”57 In The Art of Being Ruled, he writes, “Men were 
only made into ‘men’ with great difficulty even in primitive society: the male is not naturally ‘a 
man’ any more than the woman. He has to be propped up into that position with some ingenuity, 
and is always likely to collapse” (247). In this context, the “Western Man,” a reasonable 
                                                 
56 Holloway writes, “Lewis’s fiction employs two rather distinct models of the non-human or the sub-
human. On the one hand there is that of the engine: active producer of the mechanical. On the other, that of the 
puppet, mere product of the mechanical” (10). Conroy writes, “Just as the machine, though outwardly cold, 
embodies the energetic force of nature, so in Lewis’ conception of Vorticism the artwork . . is produced by and 
embodies, indeed usurps, that power” (22). 
57 “‘Mind’ is an artificial, pumped-up affair—just as the ‘male’ is a highly unstable and artificial mode of 
life. All we can say is that certain entelechies . . are adapted to sustain these sporadic feats of superlative activity, 
and others are not” (Lewis, Time and Western Man 304). 
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 philosopher and artist, or the epitome of civilized “individuality” is nothing more than an 
ideological creation, but a necessary one for European civilization: “Western Man . . . is of 
course the completest myth. The only question is whether we should not erect that myth into a 
reality, define it more . . . and whether, in short, some such generalization would not serve our 
purposes better than the multiplicity of myths that swarm in our drifting chaos” (Time and 
Western Man 134).  
In contrast for the Italian Futurists, the sexualized conflation of men with machines rather 
than the philosopher-artist presented a positive masculine model of class relations and technical 
innovation. In her important study of gender and fascism, Fascist Virilities, Barbara Spackman 
advances the study of “virility” in the “fantasized economics” of Italian fascist culture and 
literature (49). Under the aegis of the virile nation, the forceful annexation of colonies and 
violence against women appear as acts of self-defense. Virility is constructed by an autarchic 
worldview that melds man to machine. Marinetti, in particular, suggests a “virile” imperial revolt 
against bourgeois illusions of progress and egalitarianism. Throughout the 1920s, Marinetti’s 
texts “revolutionized” autarky by incorporating an anti-hierarchal rhetorical element. They were 
full of enthusiasm for capitalist deterritorialization, impatiently and vehemently disavowing all 
manner of class (but not sexual or racial) discrimination within the nation. He implies that 
capital’s coupling of men with machines would eventually flatten out all the sedimented classes, 
including the nobility, especially as war increasingly dominated production:  
One can say of the great french railway strike that the organizers were unable to persuade 
a single mechanic to sabotage his locomotive.  To me this seems entirely natural.  How 
could one of those men have been able to wound or kill his great faithful devoted mistress 
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 with her quick and ardent heart? His beautiful steel machine that had so often glowed 
with pleasure beneath his ardent caress? (Marinetti 90)  
Lewis’ imagination departs significantly from Marinetti’s celebration of the virile 
machine/man. In The Art of Being Ruled, he writes that “the physical joining up, as it were, of 
the futurist” with objects “produces a monster, a hydra, a leviathan, and is a megalomaniac 
creation” (191). The Western Man, on the other hand, supposedly guides all humanity toward 
peace against liberal democracy’s bitter renunciation of the intellectual artist. 
Within Lewis’ myth of the Western Man, then, the status of Italian fascism is ambivalent. 
Fascism worships “Action,” and is therefore “apt to set up a climate as unsuitable for artistic 
pursuits as the most narrow of theocratic régimes”(Blasting and Bombardiering 263). In Time 
and Western Man, he writes, “The fascists have the word action on their lips from morning till 
night. It is their magic word, recurring in all their speeches or incantations: violence is their god” 
(201). He therefore tempers the enthusiastic fascist exaggeration of masculinity that provokes 
war.  
Furthermore, Lewis disdained fascism’s appropriation of mass politics and its 
contamination by mass art, especially film. His version of fascism refuses to embrace Marinetti’s 
enthusiasm for the masses.58 Compared to Marinetti, Lewis’ writing exhibits a will to preserve 
the nation’s cultural superiority gained by industrial and imperial precedence. Indeed, Marinetti’s 
veneration of new technology and impulse to destroy what is “passé” seem more historically 
“modern” as well as adolescent than Lewis’ celebration of ships in Blast.59 Jameson identifies in 
                                                 
58 Janet Lyon discusses Marinetti’s simultaneous disdain for the masses and “rhetoric of contempt which 
conceives and reifies as an oppressive cultural center a nonporous, undifferentiated ‘public.’” Such rhetoric “may be 
understood as the flip side of militant alliances forged at other times around the sign of ‘the people’” (109). 
59 “The intoxication of great speeds in cars is nothing but the joy of feeling oneself fused with the only 
divinity. Sportsmen are the first catechumens of this religion. For the coming destruction of houses and cities, to 
make way for great meeting places for cars and planes” (Marinetti 96). 
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 Lewis’ fiction an affection for the “outdated”: “there thus comes into being a language beyond 
language, shot through with the jerry-built shoddiness of modern industrial civilization, brittle 
and impermanent . . .” (Jameson 86). Lewis claims instead a position beyond Italian futurism, a 
self-consciously “avant-avant-garde” position, from which he can take pride in England’s 
nonchalance toward technology. He thereby revolts against Marinetti’s pretensions to 
“classlessness” and the political efficacy of progressive technology.  
Ayers writes that the technologies of the car and the cinema in particular horrified Lewis 
because of their association with degenerate forms of modernism: “The car is the archetypal 
mechanical prophet of the time-philosophy which it enacts . . . like cinema” (Ayers 183). In The 
Revenge for Love, they are associated with the masses. As the Stamps drive at top speed through 
the Spanish countryside, the landscape visually assaults Margot:  
[T]rees, rocks, and telegraph-poles stood up dizzily before her and crashed down behind.  
They were held up stiffly in front of her astonished eyes, then snatched savagely out of 
the picture. Like a card-world clacked cinematographically through its static 
permutations by the ill-bred fingers of a powerful conjurer, everything stood upon end 
and then fell flat. (314)  
Riding in the speeding automobile is like watching a film. Both experiences disorient the senses 
and jostle an otherwise stable perspective to reduce space to two dimensions (“a card-world”). 
Lewis’ antipathy for technology and the mechanical reproduction of art invested in the 
highbrow’s discriminatory mechanism, allowing readers to express their distinction from the 
merely “popular.” Any politics that pretended to give the masses political representation was 
ominous. From Lewis’ viewpoint, Mussolini, “the schematic juxtaposition of a series of 
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 disconnected stylizations,” is the lamentable product of filmic montage, and thus his “‘style is 
the man,’ of a crowd of men, not one man at all” (Time and Western Man 342).  
For Lewis, the value of fascist “virility” lies elsewhere, in its capacity to negate and 
counteract the greater dangers of effeminacy: secular Christian ideals, the open market, the 
vulgar conflation of art with advertising, the influence of feminism/inversion, and the 
manufactured liberal/revolutionary myth of individual freedom. He endorses not the 
“revolutionary” aspects of fascism that converges with the communist rhetoric of “the people,” 
but rather those that boldly announce its restoration of artistic and political hierarchies. In the 
political sphere, fascism is virile, harsh, and punitive, but an effective and fair organization of 
masses, who, if they were honest, would admit their desire to be managed rather than to be free. 
Thus, from a different perspective, Mussolini also represents not populism, but rather 
“exteriorality, display and make-up,” qualities of the figure of the civilized masculine satirist 
(Time and Western Man 342).  
Lewis preferred continental fascism’s “virility” with all of its problematic imperfections 
over liberal and communist “femininity,” even as late as 1937: “if instead of the really malefic 
“Bloomsburies’, who with their ambitious and jealous cabal have had such a destructive 
influence upon the intellectual life of England, something more like these Vienna Café habitués 
of those days could have been the ones to push themselves into power, a less sordid atmosphere 
would have prevailed” (Blasting and Bombardiering 273). In The Revenge for Love, Victor’s 
identification with Nazism is similarly riddled by violence and artistic insecurity, but his revolt 
against the encroaching chaos of communism and Jews is commended.  
We can also detect The Revenge for Love’s capitulation to fascism in its satirical 
objectification of Margot. As we can see above, Lewis’ preference for fascism was defined by 
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 his animus toward “Bloomsburies,” or what he understood as liberal feminist cultural production. 
In this section, I will show how Lewis’ rejection of feminism merges with a fascist strain of anti-
humanist satire.  
Margot as counterrevolutionary domestic heroine 
Up to this point, Margot’s naïve domestic perception has proven amazingly accurate, 
particularly in her suspicion of Gillian, Abershaw, and O’Hara. In Spain, the narrator’s irony 
deepens in relation to Margot, and the counterrevolutionary face of The Revenge for Love begins 
to emerge.  
A requisite of its counterrevolutionary predecessors is the reflection of surrounding 
national crisis. In Spain, the Stamps find that they represent a downtrodden, déclassé British 
Empire. Throughout the novel, we have followed the Stamps’ financial spiral downward. The 
Stamps’ economic disintegration is simultaneous with the revelation that England no longer 
holds its dominion over Europe and the rest of the world. “The Union Jack had grown to be no 
better than a red rag to a bull to these bitter Dons . . . To be English was no longer honourable 
and important” (262). In this context, The Revenge for Love identifies the “powerful” heroine of 
liberal domestic fiction as a catastrophic element. 
Encouraged in Spain by her readings of Ruskin and Woolf, this normally perceptive but 
passive heroine becomes inspired to assert herself into the play of forces beyond her political 
ken. As a protagonist, she thereby threatens to move the novel’s critique of communism closer to 
the territory of exemplary liberal domestic fiction. But in Margot’s eventual demise, Lewis 
marks the boundaries of “female desire” by indicting her reliance on “feminist” literature both as 
character and reader. Lewis suppresses the subversive possibilities of domestic women in these 
authors’ works. He demotes the progressive domestic heroine’s usual self-appointed agency; the 
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 will and ascendancy that domestic fiction characteristically promises to her simply disappears. 
Margot becomes aware of humanity’s essential beastliness and humiliation, and therefore the 
false hope installed by humanist conceptions of women’s political agency, but too late to save 
herself from the destruction unleashed by her feminist experiment. Although Margot is the only 
true political (because thoroughly apolitical) visionary in the novel, Lewis clearly marks as 
illegitimate her desire to bring thought to bear on action. 
The Revenge for Love imagines the female heroine as ill served by Ruskin’s Sesame and 
Lilies (1865), which promises women’s ascendancy in the private sphere and the fantasy of their 
“secret of exalted birth” (276). Ruskin soothes women’s “inferiority complex” by a “sweeping 
belittlement of the male” (277). Although Margot rejects this belittlement, she is inspired by 
Ruskin’s exaltation of the amazonian “competent mate,” full of womanly “Victorian pugnacity” 
(279-82). Whereas Ruskin’s glorification of domestic women would confine her illusive feeling 
of superiority to the private sphere, pairing his fantasy with Woolf completes Margot’s will to 
take action on Victor’s behalf. Margot repudiates her confinement to the domestic sphere, and 
enters the world of masculine action. Her determination eventually ruins both her and her 
husband.  
Woolf was a major target of Lewis’ own literary criticism—an onus in the world of 
highbrow literary production (and therefore his competition) and a pernicious embodiment of 
feminized modernity who leads the masses to their own demise. Lewis resentfully identified a 
lifelong enemy in “Bloomsbury.” His satirical novel, The Apes of God (1930) concentrated his 
critical animus to lambast the coterie’s degeneracy.60 In Men Without Art (1934), he aligns 
Woolf’s degraded modernism with a neurotic feminist politics informed by the depraved 
                                                 
60 The Apes of God (1934) satirizes the Sitwells.  
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 combination of “sexual inversion” and femininity. In fact, he characterizes most British 
modernist literature, from Oscar Wilde to Virginia Woolf, as a continuous indoctrination of the 
“pleasure-cult” (140). From his vantage point as a more artistically gifted, but comparatively 
publicity-starved artist, Woolf’s neurotic literary practices are simultaneously anemic and 
threatening:  
It has been with considerable shaking in my shoes, and a feeling of treading upon a carpet 
of eggs, that I have taken the cow by the horns in this chapter, and broached the subject 
of the part that the feminine mind has played . .  .  in the erection of our present criteria.  
For fifteen years I have subsisted in this suffocating atmosphere.  .  .  I have defended 
myself as best I could against the influences of what I felt to be a tyrannical inverted 
orthodoxy-in-the-making. (140) 
Woolf is simultaneously a quivering mass and a suffocating interior, a prudish “old maid” and a 
vicious tyrant. Other contradictions abound; Woolf is a cow with horns, and her literary criteria 
are both feminine and erect. Her irreconcilable weakness and viciousness, a combination that 
only the “invert” can fully unleash, jeopardizes art in this disorderly and ruinous world. As a 
sane masculine satirist who must continually face Bloomsbury’s power, Lewis himself becomes 
fearful of the world outside, “shaking in his shoes.”  
In this characterization, Lewis echoes sentiments common in the 1930s British fascist 
press. For the British Union of Fascists, Bloomsbury advocated an “effete” and “anaemic” 
internationalism. Along with Jews, finance capitalists, feminists, and communists, Bloomsbury 
modernists sought to destroy Britain’s true virile tradition. Bloomsbury betrays that tradition 
because as the center of Britain’s cultural and literary reputation, it associates the nation with a 
decadent femininity.  
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 As in Men Without Art, a leading intellectual in the fascist party associates Bloomsbury 
with bourgeois interiors, writing that “some dim recess of Bloomsbury . . . trumpeted forth by 
legions of well-fed bourgeois intelligentsia,” succeeds contrary to all natural conditions of 
growth, creating deformed and neurotic creatures who resemble the cave-dwellers of Plato’s 
allegory. Although the cave-dwellers are fantastically international, they are nevertheless 
feminine and neurotic because they cannot relate to the struggles required by their surroundings. 
Fascism, on the other hand, “will sweep away that cult of ugliness and distortion in art, music 
and literature which is the product of neurotic post-war minds, sickened by long incarceration in 
dim cities” (“Fascism and Culture” 1). 
In a claim that recall Lewis’ metaphor of sexual “inversion,” another fascist journalist 
observes that Bloomsbury intellectuals are feminized “pink pansies,” dreaming and “losing their 
balance” by spinning impractical dreams (“Pink Pansies” 2). The writer of yet another article 
describes a meeting of the British Sexological Society where Bloomsbury’s denizens, a hodge-
podge of “Jewboys, Old boys, Tomboys and Nice Boys” attack Britain insidiously in the form of 
homosexuality (“Sex Appeals”). A logical problem arises here. After all, how can neurotic and 
feckless “pansies” actually harm supposedly tough and virile fascists? One resolution compares 
Bloomsbury to bacterial disease, a threat that attacks through stealth, and inverts power relations 
to weaken the naturally strong; the title of this article is “Sex Appeals to Bloomsbury Bacilli.” 
These metaphoric constellations of sexuality and disease constantly marked British fascist 
propaganda, as we will see further in Chapter 2. Lewis appropriates those constellations to assess 
modernist writers and readers.  
Margot becomes similarly neurotic and powerful through her reading of Woolf. 
“Purchased for five shillings at the local Boot’s,”  A Room of One’s Own cheaply and 
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 seductively misleads the poor (The Revenge for Love 214). Margot is fed a junk diet of 
bourgeois escapism and lured by Woolf’s fantasy into a “highbrow feminist fairyland” (215). In 
this world of uncontrollable “free market” literary standards, the escape that Woolf offers is 
“dope,” appropriately available at the local pharmacy along with actual drugs and other escapist 
literature.61  
A Room of One’s Own induces neurotic nostalgia: “The red rose cries, ‘He is near, he is 
near,” And the white rose weeps, ‘He is late’; The larkspur listens, ‘I hear, I hear’; And the lily 
whispers, ‘I wait.’” (The Revenge for Love 319). The narrator parodies Woolf’s style here to 
demonstrate her nostalgic withdrawal from the contemporary literary task, but confuses Woolf 
with her citation of Tennyson. In A Room of One’s Own, Woolf quotes Tennyson and Rossetti 
to comment on the “illusion” of Victorian poetry: “the illusion which inspired Tennyson and 
Christina Rossetti to sing so passionately about the coming of their loves . . . Why, if it was an 
illusion, not praise the catastrophe, whatever it was, that destroyed illusion and put truth in its 
place” (Woolf, A Room 15). Woolf’s question problematizes romantic nostalgia much along the 
lines of other Anglo-American modernists of the inter-war period, Lewis included. Indeed, it is 
difficult, perhaps even impossible, to perceive such nostalgia in A Room of One’s Own.  
In that essay in fact, Woolf indicts European modernity’s inheritance of a long 
intertwined history of patriarchy and capital. As a corrective, she demands women’s inclusion in 
the University but on feminist terms. Her version of the “outsider” position, very different from 
the garden or drugged oblivion that Lewis imagines it to be, actively opposes and engages the 
“masculine” world. But this is precisely the danger she poses for Margot. Woolf’s so-called 
                                                 
61 In actuality, Woolf’s writing would not have sold at Boot’s. Nicole Beauman writes that “Class 
distinction dictated even the type of circulating library to which a woman belonged. Virginia Woolf did not go to 
Boots but to Day’s or Mudie’s” (10) Lewis’ relegation of Woolf to “the largest circulating library of its kind, with 
over four hundred branches and half a million subscribers” probably means to associate Woolf with 
“undiscriminating” middlebrow readers. 
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 “neurotic feminism” is a serious menace to otherwise peaceful gendered relations. Just as in Men 
Without Art, Woolf is dangerous here because she is so incompetent and unimportant, and 
because her incompetence results in the transformation of women into agents outside the 
domestic scene. Woolf, in Lewis’ mind, provokes a false awareness of systematic misogyny, and 
as she calls for women to take action, turns a neurotic fantasy into political disaster. 
As Margot falls prey to Woolf ’s corruptions, she increasingly occupies the narrator’s 
satirical attention. Reading A Room of One’s Own, she follows a “seductive train of images” 
that induces a drug-like state of forgetting, as if she “had been forcibly liquidated, and had 
followed her day-dreams into their limbo.  For the moment she allowed herself to wonder if in 
fact she was still there at all, visible and in the flesh” (215). Holloway writes that “Humanity has 
arrived in this world of ‘violent puppets’ . . . Margaret is clearly a character who enjoys an 
anastasis from puppetry into humanity” (13). I believe precisely the opposite—that in the second 
half of the novel, she begins to resemble the hallucinatory puppets that had been associated thus 
far with communists.  
The Spain episodes foreground Margot’s capacity for mechanical “thingness.” In a 
grotesque scene, Margot and Victor are seated in a city square, masquerading as tourists to 
deflect suspicion from their gunrunning preparations. When a dwarf, a street performer, playfully 
pretends to be Margot’s child, she recoils in utter horror at his monstrosity whereas the 
“backward public” laughs at and enjoys his antics. For Margot, the dwarf represents a human 
failure, a reduction of the human standard. The dwarf’s inequality should therefore be pitied; 
instead, he exaggerates and capitalizes on his blatant inequality.  
In Men Without Art, Lewis thematizes national differences in humor by highlighting 
these divergent attitudes to dwarves. To the English, dwarves are “‘things’ which should 
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 ‘provoke pity or disgust, instead of laughter.’” The Spanish, on the other hand, “feel perhaps that 
God has made them a present of these hideous oddities to be their sport.” In Spain, the dwarf 
accepts this role “and is quite puffed-up with his own importance and proud of his god-sent job,” 
finding joy in shattering “the illusion of being autonomous and ‘free’” (91-5). Lewis 
wholeheartedly praises this instance of Spanish humor, which calls attention to the ruses of 
humanism. 
Although Margot never learns to laugh at the dwarf, the episode forces her to 
acknowledge their complicity. She recognizes that she too, is sub-human—limited and 
mechanical: “What beasts all human were!! She too—for she would not let herself out. Where 
Victor was, she would always be found . . . There was no use pretending she did not belong to 
this system of roaring and spluttering bestial life of flesh and blood” (The Revenge for Love 267-
8). Margot realizes here that her love is inexplicably dictated by nature. Sexual love is revealed 
as an unavoidable weakness for women that obliterates the façade of human self-determination 
and freedom. She recognizes that humans are fundamentally limited by compulsory natures. The 
“impersonality” of her love further demands her subservience. After this episode, “It looked as if 
it regarded it as quite natural to be there as anywhere else. It belonged to Victor, who was its sun 
and its meridian” (310). She is reduced to an “it” that follows Victor in automatic worship and 
exaltation.  
But because of her reading of Woolf, she confuses this masochistic love for Victor with a 
necessity to act on his behalf. The doll-like Margot who recognizes her “nothingness” merges 
with a delusional attempt to be a feminist agent in the plot. When she finally confronts Percy to 
save Victor, “the two Margots in question had, as it were, coalesced . . . as if the objects of her 
fancy belonged outside and not inside at all. She sought to impose them upon the objective 
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 reality.” Victor observes that Margot confuses private fantasy with public behavior; “in the full 
regalia of her private mind,” she was “sitting down at a café table with old Percy and him and 
insisting upon wearing her nightdress in public” (288). Margot’s mistaken sense of agency, 
however, only serves to push Victor further into the communist scheme, and she dramatically 
loses any authority that she’d had as the paranoid domestic heroine.  
The narrator notes that in her delusion, “she could respond to the song of the magdalen, 
brought to her notice by the latter-day wolves, who had suckled her starved intelligence and fed 
it with Victorian lollypops” (319). Lewis’ satire is unleashed on Margot as a “puppet” and a 
would-be feminist. At the end of the novel, Percy assesses Margot’s voice as “artificial, unreal, 
yet penetrating,” attesting to the irony that presents her agency as both valid (when she serves 
Victor quietly) and invalid (when she takes action on his behalf).  
The full scope of this dual threat finally emerges after the Stamps have accidentally killed 
a Civil Guard and face certain death if caught. Margot realizes her mistake in taking Woolf 
seriously: “[C]alling to mind how she had been induced to forsake the passive role—and to 
march up into the village to engage in action, of all hazardous, foolish things—she arched her 
neck and frowned down at the ground at her feet, removing her eyes from contact with this bleak 
and senseless bustle of objectless matter” (330). Her translation of reading into action had 
triggered a chain of tragic consequences.  
Had she read Lewis’ The Art of Being Ruled instead, the tragedy probably could have 
been averted, for he praises the supreme passivity of women: “Quiescence, obedience, and 
receptivity are required for action, as well as the active factors, just as women and men are 
required to produce a child . . . to be receptive rather than active (to just lie down and couver 
rather than execute) is by no means a humiliating role” (160). Lewis’ injunction to women to 
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 accept the “receptive” role in reproduction in this text nevertheless defies a “return” to the 
nuclear patriarchal family. In fact, he reservedly endorses the deterritorializing effects of capital 
on its structure.62 As I will elaborate in Chapter 2, this dual insistence on women’s subordination 
in domestic labor and the seemingly incongruous rejection of the private patriarchal family ties 
him closely to the practice of fascist domestic fiction.  
Conclusion 
For many critics, the character of Margot develops in the reader a deadly serious 
perception of modern politics as a series of irresponsible, bourgeois trahisons, perhaps even 
Lewis’ own. Ayers argues that “Margot’s voice is the voice of simple, secular love which 
Hardcaster’s communism has abandoned” (185). The Revenge for Love appears as Lewis’ most 
humane work because it seems to reflect his own misgivings about the vicious satirical reduction 
of humans to dead mechanisms. Parker writes that “In contrast to the other characters, who 
express the fixed attitudes of automata, Margot is a detailed portrait of someone in the process of 
developing a greater understanding of her life” (218). Jameson writes with more ambiguity that 
“now for the first and last time, it is from the woman’s, from the victim’s, point of view that we 
are given to witness the deadly onslaught of the aggressive impulse. To be sure, the passive and 
victimized Margot’s marks no transcendence . . . Still, the portrait of Margot is a kind of tour de 
force” (145-6).  
This novel is thus often taken as the marker of Lewis’ departure, momentary or 
otherwise, from fascism. Lewis himself presents this reading in Rude Assignment, quoting an 
                                                 
62 He writes in The Art of Being Ruled, “The object of the capitalo-socialist promoters of the sex war was 
dual. One object was the quite temporary one of discrediting authority, and reducing . . the little father of the family 
squatting rather miserably . .. But the break-up of this expensive and useless unit, the family, and the releasing of the 
hordes of idle women, . . for industrial purposes, was the principal object” (195).  
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 unpublished review that asserts that the Stamps and Percy take “that daring leap from the 
kingdom of dehumanising necessity to the kingdom of freedom, that creative Promethean act by 
which a revolutionist, a friend, a woman, an artist attempt to break the cash-nexus.” The title 
thereby refers to the fact “that creative love the crime of crimes against the system, must be 
crushed out by torture, must be revenged” (234).  
In contrast to these readings, I believe that The Revenge for Love aligns his strain of 
British modernism with fascism, and out of his entire oeuvre, most (not least) effectively 
illuminates the attractions of fascism for Lewis and his readers. To claim that he is here 
renouncing the “political game,” or even “humanizing” Margot, is to ignore the gender and 
sexual codings in his understanding of fascism, and to mystify the political significance of the 
domestic novel overall. These claims enable a critical blindness to the fact that Lewis’ vision of 
“love” rests on a masculinist logic that assumes the priority of racial, gender, and sexual 
inequality. The novel presents fascism, although problematic, as superior politics for modern, 
technologically bound humanity because it appears to forge peace and benefit women who only 
pose a threat to society and themselves when they demand political agency. Instead of “saving” 
Lewis from the grips of fascist thinking, this vision bound him ever more closely.  
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 CHAPTER TWO 
THE BIOPOLITICS OF FASCIST SATIRE 
OLIVE HAWKS’ WHAT HOPE FOR GREEN STREET?  
 The subject of this chapter, What Hope for Green Street? (1946), is a domestic novel by 
Olive Hawks, a prominent member of the British Union of Fascists (BUF). As a BUF 
parliamentary candidate, “Women’s Canvass Organizer,” and speaker for the “Women’s Peace 
Campaign,” Hawks wrote prolifically for the British fascist press throughout the 30s.63 In 1940, 
she rose to the position of Chief Women’s Organizer. That same year, she was interred under the 
National Government’s emergency security measure DR 18B, which incarcerated active 
members of the BUF and citizens of enemy nations residing in Britain.  
 Green Street exposes the effects of inter-war politics and economy on a fictional 
working-class family (parents with five grown children), the Smiths of London’s East End. Each 
chapter focuses on one family member, employing satirical irony on his or her behalf to indict 
the liberal state for conditions like men’s unemployment, women’s sweated wage labor, and the 
degradation of domestic labor. In each chapter, the narrator shifts the satirical focus, however, to 
indict equally each protagonist’s capitulation to bourgeois conceptions of the private patriarchal 
home. By the novel’s conclusion, only the youngest son Bill, a British Union activist, remains 
unscathed by the narrator’s satirical treatment. In fact, his perspective accords with the narrator’s 
as he diagnoses each family member’s stunted aspirations and suggests the corporate state as the 
most effective cure for their individual and collective ills.  
                                                 
63 Hawks wrote What Hope for Green Street while in prison. After the war, she authored three more novels: 
Time is My Debtor (1947), These Frail Vessels (1948), and A Sparrow for a Farthing (1950). In 1951, Hawks co-
wrote an etiquette and guide book for young women, Life Lies Ahead: A Practical Guide to Home-making and the 
Development of Personality. See Gottlieb, Appendix, for more on Hawks’ biography.  
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  Hawks organizes her narrative as a rhetorical catalogue of criticisms; in terms of plot, 
nothing much “happens” in Green Street. Neither do her characters develop in self-knowledge, 
awareness, or complexity as is usual in domestic realist fiction. Instead, Green Street’s characters 
are static types or “mental attitudes” that expose modern inter-war society’s damaging effects on 
the British working class.64 These narrative qualities resonate with what Ronald Paulson calls 
“satiric contemplation” or “the slow walk around the object, through which its various facets are 
exposed—a process which is essentially static and expository” (185). James Kernan also notes a 
conspicuous absence of plot in his discussion of satirical novels: “Satire never offers that direct, 
linear progression which is ordinarily taken as plot. Instead, we get collections of loosely related 
scenes and busyness which curls back on itself . . .” (100). Because Green Street so 
conspicuously incorporates these common satirical features, I present the novel as a satirical 
“survey or anatomy of a vicious society” (Paulson 241). As an “anatomy” rather than a 
progressive narrative, Green Street “dissects” society’s “diseases,” as Northrop Frye explains of 
satirical novels. I propose that as a satirical anatomy, the novel creates an ambiguous political 
commitment; it presents itself as a critical undertaking on working-class domestic women’s 
behalf, even as it proposes radically retrenching their political rights.  
 In Britain, the modern satirical tradition was especially polemical. Gary Dyer notes in 
view of all the modern genres, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century satirists “address[ed] 
themselves to public opinion with the least mediation” (31). Regarding the genre more broadly, 
Frye writes that satire “kinetically” translates literature into a “course of action” and that when 
abused, it degenerates into “emotional propaganda” or “conditioned reflex” (Frye 245, 350). But 
I do not equate fascist literature with overt polemics, nor do I claim that satire is politically 
                                                 
64 Northrop Frye discusses the satire/novel hybrid in which “characters are symbols of social and other 
ideas, like the proletarian novels of the thirties in this century” (312).  
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 suspect because it is “interested.” Rather, I argue specifically that Hawks’ novel creates a 
meeting point between domestic labor and fascist imperialism by fusing two seemingly 
antithetical British satirical modes: “radical political” satire and “conservative Juvenalian” satire.  
Satire and mass politics 
 These two satirical modes arose at the end of the long eighteenth century against the 
background of modern mass politics—the French Revolution, and later, the turbulent bids for 
suffrage expansion and fair working conditions within Britain.  
 Dyer writes that the later form, radical political satire, was marked by “commitment 
rather than mere relativism” (74). Shelley’s Peter Bell the Third (1819) and Byron’s The Vision 
of Judgment (1822) as two literary examples intervene in specific political debates and take “a 
radical stance” on “Catholic emancipation, repeal of the Corn Laws, and liberalization of 
Britain’s rule over Ireland” (Dyer 59). Marilyn Butler also cites radical journalistic satires by 
William Cobbett, William Hone, and Richard Carlile that called for parliamentary reform in the 
midst of “riots, machine-breaking and civil disorders” in the first decades of the nineteenth 
century (143). Particularly important as an event for radical political satire was the Peterloo 
Massacre in 1819 in Manchester, where mass demonstrators in favor of reforming suffrage were 
trampled and fired upon. Following E. P. Thompson, Marcus Wood observes that “Radical 
reaction … was massive and prolonged and generated much satire aimed ironically at the 
military” (213). 
 The unprecedented popularity and populism of satirical dissent were reinforced by two-
penny presses, broadsides, and the liberalization of the press as a whole.65 Furthermore, radical 
                                                 
65 Wood describes “the efflorescence of radical publicity” between the years 1815 and 1822 (3), during 
which there was a “sudden expansion of the print trade, and the rise of the satiric etching in particular, the growth of 
periodical publication and of the children’s book trade. . . .” All had a “direct impact on the production of social 
satire and political propaganda” (4). Dyer, however, attributes the dialogism of radical satire to the governmental 
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 political satires valorized the democratization of cultural production, distribution, and 
consumption as a basic condition of possibility. As a result, they often deployed “multi-voiced 
discourse” and inhabited the language of the “people” to reject the state’s and ruling elite’s 
“univocal style and . . . authoritarian values” (Dyer 68).  
 Given their vulnerability to state prosecution, however, radical political satires often 
refrained from proposing concrete alternatives; political indeterminacy was therefore 
characteristic. Wood observes that in their primary mode as “attack,” “ridicule,” and 
“castigation,” they do not “suggest solutions to the social and economic organization of society” 
(10). Even the political goals of William Hone, often cited as the most influential nineteenth-
century radical satirist, Wood concludes, are “difficult to determine” (Wood 10). Kyle Grimes 
observes that Hone and the cartoonist Cruikshank used parody against “cultural authority” to 
“expose, disarm, and ridicule their pretensions to authority.” Yet he agrees with Wood in 
observing that their parodic satires created not viable alternatives in political terms, but rather a 
“dialogizing counter-movement to the implicit truth claims of all monological discourses” (181-
2). 
 In a radical political vein, Green Street “speaks for” working-class residents of the East 
End, especially culturally and politically underrepresented working-class domestic women. 
Hawks invokes an East End vernacular throughout her text, as in the following: “Er? That’s 
Millie Smiff, old Smiff’s eldest girl, ‘im wot goes dahn to the old ‘Fish and Anchor’” (5). She 
also creates an eclectic pastiche occupying incompatible “political” registers such as socialism 
and religion in her satire of liberal domesticity. Her pastiche, however, shuts down a dialogic 
                                                                                                                                                             
control of the press, citing the Blasphemous and Seditious Libels Act of 1819: “Legal principles . . . encourage 
satiric subterfuge, since satirists can take advantage of the gaps between the authorities’ need to contain dissent and 
the conventions of the law by applying those techniques that distance them from their real meanings: allegory, 
dream visions, interpolated speakers, multi-layered parody” (73).  
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 critique of monolithic political and literary language. In her endorsement of the fascist corporate 
state, she also employs a satirical mode that favors conservative political metaphors of decadence 
and illness against the people. 
 Hawks creates a morally concerned and patriotic narrative persona that runs throughout 
the Juvenalian satirical tradition. Critics have often assumed that conservative satire and 
domestic fiction were antithetical for several important reasons. Some oft cited oppositions 
include: audience (men vs. women, culturally and politically initiated vs. uninitiated), critical 
objects (politics of the state and market vs. morals and personal behavior), persona (patriotic 
moralist vs. domestic woman), genre (poetry vs. novels), and style (tragedy vs. comedy). But 
many critics have recently observed that the oppositions do not hold so neatly. Paradigmatic are 
canonical writers such as Fielding, Peacock, and Austen, but also transitional genres like the 
satirical novel of manners, and transitional practitioners such as Jane Taylor.66  
 Revealing domestic fiction’s sublimation of this politicized genre, Green Street analyzes 
domestic space by lining up and firing at a range of political objects and attitudes. In 
transforming the Smiths from the impetus to the objects of satire in each chapter, Hawks indicts 
working-class authority over domestic space as a hazard to the nation. To dissect contemporary 
decadence, she incorporates literary conventions established by conservative (anti-populist) 
Juvenalian satire.  
                                                 
66 Stuart Curran’s essay describes Jane Taylor’s Essays in Rhyme, on Morals and Manners (1816) as a 
mediation between domestic realism and neoclassical satire. He observes that Taylor’s writing focuses on “the 
domestic establishment as an index of broadly held public values” (Curran 142). In his view, Taylor inhabits a 
satirical persona to “taxonomize [social] ills through traditional satiric means” even as she sought to “restor[e] 
interior spirituality” and anticipated “evangelical missionaries” (Curran 150). Dyer also discusses Taylor along with 
William Combe, John Hamilton Reynolds, and Thomas Hood as writers who prefigured a shift in satirical form after 
the late eighteenth century cult of Sensibility, and later financial crisis of the late 1820s that compelled publishers to 
shift the book market from poetry to novels, or from “‘imaginative’ to ‘realistic’ media” (143). These writers, Dyer 
argues, “domesticated” satire to emphasize reform and comedy rather than “moral castigation” (146): “satire 
conformed to values that were . . . the particular property of the middle class, the Nonconformists or Evangelicals, 
and women” (146).  
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  Invoking the Roman satirist Juvenal as a “patriotic, ‘masculine’ writer . . . in a corrupt 
age,” writers like William Gifford (The Baviad, 1791 and The Maeviad, 1795) and Thomas 
James Mathias (Pursuits of Literature, 1794 – 7) fulminated against the French Revolution and 
the democratic possibilities of mass politics in general (Dyer 51-2). Also important as satirical 
objects were the free market and its cultural effects. Both writers attacked the Della Cruscan 
School of poetry for popularizing women writers and sentimental themes.67 Gifford revolted 
against the commodification of poetry, believing that it contributed to mob rule and detracted 
from national virility. As opposed to “multi-voiced” pastiche, this mode often took the form of 
“first-person oratory and the formal language of heroic couplet satires” (Dyer 97). British 
Juvenalian satire is “earnest” as opposed to radical satire, argues Dyer, and employs a “satirist-
speaker” who “rails alone or is encouraged by a single sympathetic interlocutor” (68).  
 Although adhering to prose narrative throughout Green Street, Hawks also satirizes 
competing contemporary cultural forms that like hers, inscribe themes of male camaraderie and 
women’s domesticity. Often some song, movie, or magazine accompanies the characters’ 
misperception of reality or their apolitical escapism. Hollywood movies and popular music in 
particular deceive women into romantic sentimentality or “softness,” and delude men with 
simulacra of male loyalty and camaraderie.68 Green Street provides a model of reading to show 
that politics is irreducibly grounded in the judgment of ideology and cultural production. 
                                                 
67 Dyer notes of the frequent satirical focus on gender and sexuality, (for example, Charles Churcill’s 
diatribe against homosexuality in The Times (1764)), that “each satirist assumes that this behavior, while frequently 
concealed, is necessarily everyone’s business because he believes it weakens the nation” (102).  
68 Alice delusionally compares her romantic lover to “a hero in a talkie. Every American film had that line, 
‘Let’s get outer here’” (14). She is also tempted into dreamy contemplation by popular music: “‘Stars over Green 
Street,’ she said. ‘Might be a Bing Crosby song.’ She heard the swish of her dress, and looked down, to where it 
billowed under her coat. Life was marvellous” (14). Hollywood films also bring about delusions of male loyalty. 
“Charlie had gone to the cinemas with other boys from Green Street, and seen gangster films. So had his pals, who 
were guys, and their girls, who were dames. Charlie knew all about loyalty, too, from the films” (73).  
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  In fusing these satirical modes, Hawks’ strategy resembles Lewis’ use of satirical irony in 
several respects. As we recall, Lewis satirizes the romance, decadence, and deception of 
contemporary cultural production, foregrounding not only the desperate situation of the inter-war 
working class, but also how that situation is read. Both writers exploit domestic fiction’s satirical 
potential to posit the real, the material, and the ordinary against romantic pomposity. In this 
regard, Hawks, like Lewis, represents fascism as a misunderstood revolutionary political 
“underdog” in competition with the Communist and Labour Parties as a working-class ideology.  
Nevertheless, these writers’ visions of women’s social roles vastly diverge. As we recall, 
Lewis condemned modern women’s accession to political and social authority. Unlike Lewis, 
Hawks represents fascism as an innovative creation of domestic women’s political authority. Her 
rhetoric reveals an acute awareness of the fact that women had gained the right to vote. In this 
respect, her advocacy of fascism is much more doctrinaire. In acting as a platform for “official” 
party slogans, Green Street echoes BUF rhetoric that addressed British women as “nationalized” 
citizens, and thus their ability to articulate demands from the state as a political mass.69 The 
corporate state, Hawks suggests, would provide domestic women unprecedented agency by re-
organizing the home, workplace, and socius according to their “true desires.”  
In line with much nineteenth-century domestic fiction, Hawks identifies those desires 
with domestic labor, especially reproduction, consumption, and the enculturation of children. 
British fascism valorizes a gender division of labor that would have intensified women’s 
confinement to domestic labor. While the seductive fallacy tempts us in this regard to compare 
British fascism with an older Victorian separation of women from political and economic 
enfranchisement, it actually sought to establish the corporate state in lieu of the private 
                                                 
69 Light observes that the inter-war period “mark[ed] for many women their entry into modernity” (10).  
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 patriarchal family as an arbiter of domestic labor’s social value.70 In fact, Hawks proposes 
fascism’s superiority by casting a satirical eye on liberal domestic fiction’s subordination of 
women to a “private sphere” disengaged from practices of what she calls the “social instinct.”71 
She dismantles the “private” nature and goals of domestic desires, obliterating the domestic 
woman’s apolitical stance and interior location. The significance of women’s physical and social 
reproduction of the family does not reside in the formation of civilized individuals and functional 
private patriarchal families. She suggests instead that women’s domestic labor is “liberated” only 
if the state recognizes its social, economic, and political value.   
 In discussing Hawks, therefore, I reveal a dimension of British fascism that overtly 
politicizes women’s domestic labor, and thus better than Lewis accounts for enfranchised 
modern women’s attraction to fascist party politics.72 I also highlight Hawks’ reliance on the 
discourse of “biopolitics” to suggest a statist route for domestic women’s agency. In calling 
attention to this difference, I do not imply that Lewis’ satire is “less fascist.” Alice Yaeger 
Kaplan illuminates how fascist parties profited from incoherently quoting conflicting political 
and cultural sources. This incoherence, which she describes as fascism’s rhetorical “binding” 
                                                 
70 Ann Ferguson, for instance, claims that historical fascism attempted to return to the practices of 
nineteenth century “husband patriarchy”: “Failing a fascist takeover of state capitalism, the New Right will not be 
able to reconstruct the patriarchal nuclear family of the nineteenth century. Families of choice, viz., social families 
with alternate egalitarian structures, are here to stay” (175). 
71 Regarding imminent war, Bill contemplates his neighbors’ fate: “What shelter, when death should moan 
from the sky, for the innocent people beneath, crushed together in those few cramped square miles? Only death in 
the colossal crash of a bomb, to end life in suffering—dying as they had lived, for the self-same economic system, 
with its inevitable frustration of the social instinct, accepting all about them as an inevitable and inescapable rule of 
life” (119). 
72 According to Martin Durham, not merely images of motherhood, but “modern” womanly images were 
deployed to attract women interested in transgressing the boundaries of acceptable feminine behavior (Durham 49). 
Hawks’ pamphlet, Women Fight for Britain and Britain Alone, incorporates women directly under the heading of 
revolutionary youth: “Young girls, fired with the idealism of youth, have set themselves to share the hardest tasks of 
a revolutionary Movement” (2). Ex-suffragette Norah Elam urged, “From those days of heroic struggle seems now a 
far cry. . . Look back those of you who doubt these words, to the day when that fight was at its height: when women 
of sensitive nature left their sheltered homes to stand beside their working sisters . . .” (Elam 14). 
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 mechanism, made it appear to transcend and conciliate the loaded political and class oppositions 
that drove other parties.73 We can see in Lewis’ and Hawks’ divergent attitudes toward women 
and politics the breadth of British fascism. This breadth makes visible the fascist reliance on 
satirical modes of domestic discourse across conflicting intellectual and political investments. 
More significantly, Hawks’ work allows us to perceive British fascism’s unexpected roots in a 
biopolitical discourse that also grounds modern liberalism. 
Biopolitics and satire  
 Jacques Donzelot describes biopolitics as “the proliferation of political technologies that 
invested the body, health, modes of subsistence and lodging—the entire space of existence in 
European countries from the eighteenth century onward” and “encompassed all the methods for 
developing the quality of the population and the strength of the nation” (6). Michel Foucault 
further defines biopolitics as a form of governance that “tends to treat the ‘population’ as a mass 
of living and coexisting beings who represent particular biological and pathological traits” 
(“Birth of Biopolitics” 71).  
 The bulk of Green Street casts a biopolitical and satirical eye on liberal capitalist 
distinctions between the public and private spheres. Hawks’ novel as a whole inhabits the 
chronotope of the home, but introduces two departures. First, she effaces the “private” nature of 
the domestic scene. The home and the nuclear family are always and already integral expressions 
of larger communities and populations. The East End, London, the nation, and the Empire are 
constant references for the Smiths’ family troubles. Moreover, her representations of home 
incorporate the rhetoric of health and disease. Accordingly, the novel opens and ends not with a 
                                                 
73 Kaplan observes, “fascism works by binding doubles, a process that leads to persistent blindness to the 
fascist machinery in theories that insist on deciding between two parts of fascism.  Is fascism modern or 
antimodern?  Is it revolutionary or conservative, left or right” (24).    
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 family scene, but with vignettes that capture the East End’s unsanitary conditions. Here is the 
novel’s first sentence:  
Upon the grey East London street rain was falling, not heavy enough to wash pavements 
and gutters clear of the trodden bits of paper, vegetables, and squashed cardboard box, 
and to carry the filth to the drains; but lightly upon roof and coster’s barrow, upon 
pedestrians moving at a slow, half-aimless pace, upon the costers themselves, intent on 
selling their wares before the weather got bad. (5)
Levels of cleanliness or dirt help the reader judge the state of home, urban, and national life. 
Modern British satire in the Juvenalian tradition had already inscribed these concerns as literary 
matter, drawing analogies “between moral and physical sickness” (Paulson 195). According to 
Paulson, Smollett similarly condemned modern urban society signaling “moral corruption” by 
depicting “garbage in the streets” (192). In his work, “Bodies, houses, cities, and the whole 
nation are organisms that are sick or conducive to sickness . . .” (Paulson 196). In Green Street, 
the working-class community is constantly marked by exhaustion and filth. It suggests in line 
with this representation closer biopolitical attention to the nation’s poor.  
 Michel Foucault describes the central concern of biopolitics as “the problems presented 
to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings 
constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race . . .” (“Birth of 
Biopolitics” 73). A marker of the modern liberal transformation of the socius and political 
discourse, biopolitics also undergirds fascist modes of “population management,” paradoxically 
mobilized for war and genocide in the name of “survival.” Foucault reminds us that fascists 
enacted genocide not in the name of the sovereign, but rather the “population’s” health since 
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 under biopolitics, “power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and 
the large-scale phenomena of population” (An Introduction 137). He writes,  
It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have 
been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed.  And through a turn 
that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly 
toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates 
them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. (An 
Introduction 137)  
 Hawks contributes to a genocidal biopolitical rhetoric by actively incorporating domestic 
women. In so doing, she addresses anxiety around the modern family’s seismic transformations.  
 In the liberal paradigm of the private patriarchal family, the domestic sphere explicitly 
gendered authority. Mothering, as Ann Ferguson explains, “was conceptualized . . . as a chosen 
vocation, one that required specialized skills (moral perception, intuitive and emotional 
connection)” (Ferguson 168). The father, considered “the head of the household . . . organised 
male, female, and child labour” (McDonough and Harrison 38). Many feminist critics agree that 
the private patriarchal family as a “productive unity” reached its peak in the late nineteenth 
century just before women’s massive entry into the wage labor market. Thereafter, male 
authority diminished in the family as a result of the eclipse of the family wage. Female authority 
was likewise effaced in the rapidly changing status and shape of domestic labor.74
                                                 
74 Tim Mason notes in relation to German fascism that the Nazis advocated the image of the large 
patriarchal family, but only as a ploy to appease populations in reaction to alienating processes of rapid 
industrialization and bureaucratization. Meanwhile, the original functions of vestigial family structures virtually 
disappeared as Nazi welfare and educational institutions overtook them. Provocatively, he further claims, “Whatever 
the utility to the economic structure of capitalism, the family may be on the way to becoming an anachronism” 
(“Women in Germany 1925-1940: Family, Welfare and Work.  Conclusion” 32). 
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  Jacques Donzelot in The Policing of Families shows us specifically how the long-range 
biopolitical challenge to parental authority grounded these modern transformations of the 
patriarchal family.75 On one hand, the gradual effacement of patriarchal authority highlighted the 
“family and transformations as a positive form of solution to the problems posed by a liberal 
definition of the state” (Donzelot 53). One result was domestic women’s greater public authority. 
Donzelot notes how the figure of the domestic woman intersected with the modern prestige of 
medical and psychological authorities in the development of biopolitics, an affiliation that 
eventually helped women win political rights.76 The biopolitical undermining of the patriarchal 
family “was not effected without the active participation of women. In working-class and 
bourgeois strata alike—albeit by quite different means and with different results—women were 
the main point of support for all the actions that were directed toward a reformulation of family 
life” (Donzelot xxii).  
On the other hand, biopolitical logic also enabled fascist state intervention. Inter-war 
fascism blended two modern socio-political movements that addressed the crisis of the 
patriarchal family in particular, revealing their hidden proximity. The “populationists” sought to 
“restore authority of man,” strengthen the nuclear family, and confine women to “reproductive 
and domestic activities” (Donzelot 177). The neo-Malthusian movement of the early twentieth 
century also regarded the crisis of the patriarchal family, but called instead for the supremacy of 
                                                 
75 Donzelot writes, “By the terms of the new [family] law, the ancient and monolithic authority of the father 
gave place to a dual regime, which took the form of a simple alternative: either the system of tutelage, or that of the 
contract. The former is for social categories that combine a difficulty in supplying their own needs with resistances 
to the new medical and educative norms. In essence, tutelage means that these families will be stripped of all 
effective rights and brought into a relation of dependence vis-à-vis welfare and educative agents” (xxi).  
76 “This was an alliance profitable to both parties: with the mother’s help, the doctor prevailed against the 
stubborn hegemony of that popular medicine of the old wives; and on the other hand, owing to the increased 
importance of maternal functions, he conceded a new power to the bourgeois woman in the domestic sphere. It 
became evident as early as the end of the eighteenth century that this alliance was capable of shaking paternal 
authority” (Donzelot 20).   
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 the mother, “greater public control over reproduction,” and brought medicine, hygiene, and 
public policy into close alliance (Coward 85).77  
Their propaganda engendered some proto-fascist and fascist justifications of state 
intervention in the family and reproduction. Rosalind Coward notes that British eugenicists were 
particularly indebted to neo-Malthusians for theories of “selective limitation” since they directly 
confronted “urban overcrowding, unemployment and the terrible conditions under which many 
working-class people lived.” As solutions, they suggested population limits, especially “selective 
limitation which sought to deny the possibility of reproduction to ‘degenerates’” (Coward 85). 
Hitler quoted from both groups’ propaganda in Mein Kampf. Consequently, populationists 
applauded the work for emphasizing children’s well-being, and the neo-Malthusians praised 
Hitler’s denouncement of venereal diseases and endorsement of new marriage laws. Donzelot 
observes, “[T]he traditionalist, legalist, and familialist tendency and the innovating, 
medicalizing, and socialist tendency both implied an interventionist, coercive pole that welded 
them to one another” (187).  
 Hawks mobilizes biopolitical discourse in both “feminist” and fascist ways. Although she 
insists on domestic space as the primary site of women’s agency, Hawks diverges from the 
model of the private patriarchal family important in liberal domestic fiction as a mediation 
between women and the state. In Green Street, she suggests women’s instinctual need to perform 
domestic labor, but challenges the separation between public and private spheres so prized as a 
feature of liberal domestic fiction. Instead, she proposes domestic labor’s immediate value for 
the state, nation, and Empire. 
                                                 
77 The original Malthusian movement from the 1840s to 80s, Coward notes, had urged the “theme of 
population” to push European imperialism (85).  
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  The novel launches a satirical critique of the patriarchal family from the very first page. 
There, Green Street announces its cancellation of domestic fiction’s traditional comic resolution 
in marriage. The wedding of Millie Smith marks not the individual’s ideal integration into the 
community, but rather the reification of social relations. Alice, Millie’s sister, hopes that the 
neighbors are “impressed by the glamour of the occasion” made possible by “three large, glossy, 
hired cars” and “six motor-cars” (5, 7). The wedding undermines the East End neighborhood’s 
potential class solidarity and abjectly absorbs commodified middle-class values. The critical 
representation of the wedding and its appearance at the beginning of the novel sets the satirical 
tone of the entire work. The family under liberal hegemony remains a constant satirical object 
throughout. As Hawks’ “anatomy” progresses, we find that unhealthy individual and collective 
conflicts arise from the cultural and political valorization of the private patriarchal family. 
 In the next section, I foreground Hawks’ satire of masculinity in this context. Hawks 
emphasizes men’s isolation from each other in their obligation to the nuclear family, and 
connects that isolation to the poverty of political language. Party politics, rather than paternity, 
becomes the ultimate guarantor of manhood in a fascist paradigm. 
 Green Street directs a satirical revolt specifically against Victorian notions of patriarchal 
supremacy. This “revolutionary” representation also accounts for some modernists’ attraction to 
fascist modes of critique.78 In later sections, I will show how fascist rhetoric nevertheless re-
                                                 
78 F. T. Marinetti, for instance in his piece “Marriage and the Family” writes, “The family functions badly, 
being a hell of plots, arguments, betrayals, contempts, basenesses, and a relative desire on everyone’s part for escape 
and revolt. Jealousy at knife point between the mother and her elegant, beautiful daughters; a contest in greed and 
wastefulness between conservative father and his playboy son” (77). Wyndham Lewis observes that feminism’s only 
positive accomplishment was the acceleration of the patriarchal family’s decay: “Since the great masses of the 
people are not likely to be in a position to prolong the family arrangement based on an individual ‘home’ (marriage, 
and the family circle to which the European is accustomed), it will be abolished. That is the economic fact at the 
bottom of ‘feminism.’ . . It is an economic adjustment primarily: after that a great deal of relief from responsibility, 
and from a too constant conjugal tête-à-tête, is to be laid to its credit” (The Art of Being Ruled 201-2).  
79 
 constructs the gendered nuclear family according to a patriarchal and biopolitical logic of social 
relations.  
A Revolt against/for Fathers  
 The BUF’s time and energy demands on its male members often clashed with its own 
advocacy of “family life.”79 A short dialogue in one BUF publication urges fascist women’s 
patience as the Party increasingly devours their husbands’ time. One wife complains to another 
that “Faschy” (the BUF) is the chief rival for her husband’s affections. Her friend urges her that 
they should “not mind being Fascist widows” (“Fascist Widows” 6). Julie Gottlieb, an historian 
of British fascism, notes, “[T]he prototype for the New Fascist Man would be anathema to 
family life . . . Certainly it was in the interest of the man to protect the family unit, but his public 
duties took him far away from the ancestral home, and left him the minimum of time to fulfil 
fatherly functions” (106-7). Green Street satirizes the patriarchal organization of the domestic 
scene for sequestering men from politics. 
 Mr. Smith had once been politically active, agitating his neighbors on the Labour Party’s 
behalf. But disappointed by the Labour MPs’ capitulation to moneyed interests, he has ceased 
those activities. He admits that Labour’s entry into “the system” (Parliament) led to their failure 
to achieve adequate measures for the nation’s working class: “Look at the difference between 
Keir Hardie, telling them off straight and fine, and Ramsay MacDonald. Butter wouldn’t melt in 
‘is mouth today. He was Prime Minister, that was why. National Government. Wonderful name. 
Fine label to stick on a piece of black treachery” (50). Mr. Smith represents a political generation 
that has failed the working class, a fact he is well aware of, and to which he nevertheless resigns 
                                                 
79 Leila Rupp also notes this tension in Nazism,  “[T]he glorification of the Mannerbund and male 
comradeship conflicted with the stated desire to make men into good fathers. The idea of returning the father to the 
family had no place in a society which taught its boys, as the Labor Service did, to ‘die laughing’.” She observes 
that the party’s activities, and eventually the Nazi state “took from the family many of its functions and regimented 
men, women, and children into separate organizations, which demanded a large expenditure of time” (369-70). 
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 himself. Thereafter, he has turned inward to private domestic life: “In the evening, sit by your 
own fire, smoke your pipe. At the week-end take a walk in the park and see the neighbours; a 
man beholden to none” (51)!80 His home functions as a strictly private haven that enables his 
escape from political responsibility. Working-class men, the novel suggests, diminish their 
political efficacy and intellectual gifts in the pressure to provide for the family.  
Each child wonders what their father “could have been” had they not been born at all.81 
Bill wonders, “Had his father ever realized how narrow and restricted his own life had been? 
Surrounded all his man’s life by growing children, always a new baby squalling, and only the 
kitchen and the bedroom to choose from . . .” (125). Deep sympathy drives Bill’s censure of the 
family’s cramped domestic quarters and his father’s inability to fulfill “a man’s life.” In fact, Bill 
regards the BUF as a continuation of the Labour Party’s original revolutionary impetus and its 
libratory rhetoric of struggle.82 An ambitious BUF activist, he promises to uphold nationalist 
working-class interests, and to finish Labour’s mission by redefining “manhood” outside the 
family context. He explains to his father that the BUF are “looking for the idea of a finer, happier 
                                                 
80 At the novel’s conclusion, Bill analyzes the “downfall” of Labour: “They’d been let down, the fight had 
gone out of the working class when MacDonald formed the first ‘National’ Government. They had never forgotten 
that betrayal to the very Money Power which the original Labour Party had arisen to confront. Thus was fifty years 
of work betrayed. What wonder they said cynically they’d trust no one in the future, but live each man to himself 
and his family” (128). 
81 Alice contemplates her father’s missed opportunities: “Perhaps he felt himself a cut above being a porter 
at Smithfield, where all day he carried bits of animal carcasses about. What a life! Perhaps when he was young, he 
had looked higher . . . but had found no way up. If he had education, if he had not had to go out at eleven to support 
his mother, now long dead, he might have been a different man” (36). Jenny similarly wonders, “[H]e might have 
got further if he hadn’t had us lot to fend for. Just think of it—twenty-four years old, he marries, and from then on 
it’s kids all the time . . . How could Dad ever better himself, when he’d always to think of us kids? Couldn’d take no 
risks, or chuck up his job to go after another at the other end of the country, because he was tied to us—he dared not 
risk losing his couple of quid a week, or whatever it was then. No wonder Dad’s what he is, worn out. Never had no 
real life, as I see it” (109). 
82 Mr. Smith compares BUF and Labour propaganda himself: “Some of Bill’s books was full o’ long 
words; queer subjects, too, property, rents, surplus value, the national debt, consumption crisis . . . [S]ome time 
back, ‘e’d tried to read the like stuff for himself. In the old Labour days, of Keir Hardie and good old George 
Lansbury, Ben Tillett, and John Burns” (98). 
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 Britain. Just like Keir Hardie did, Dad, and you too, before the cares of the family came upon 
you.” 
The satire shifts dramatically, however, to indict Mr. Smith’s fundamental conservatism, 
obsolescence, and rigidity when the BUF marches through their neighborhood one Sunday. Mr. 
Smith’s desire for a quiet afternoon at home deliberately shuts out and even actively 
misapprehends the struggle in the streets. As the marchers parade through Green Street, 
victimized and limping with “blood on their faces,” a brick is thrown through the Smiths’ front 
window (58). Although anti-fascist ruffians were responsible for the damage, Mr. Smith 
misdirects his rage and yells at Bill, “What right have they got to come banging around on a 
quiet Sunday afternoon, making disturbances? Provocation, that’s what it is. Without ‘em, my 
witherin’ winder wouldn’t be blinkin’ bust, would it? ‘Ow’s that for your eddicated mind, my 
lad” (59)? Mr. Smith dismisses fascism as an illegitimate political practice, explicitly doubting 
the BUF’s commitment to “care for poor people” (98). Bill corrects his father “quietly” and 
reasonably, reminding him that in actuality, not fascists, but communists have shattered the 
boundaries between politics and home life: “Is that quite fair . . . They didn’t throw it, Dad” (59). 
Moreover, Bill corrects his father’s implicit association of the BUF with foreign influences by 
appeasing his patriotic feelings. The BUF are true Englishmen, Bill explains: “The streets are 
free, Dad. That’s liberty, isn’t it? An Englishman’s free to do what he likes.”  
Mr. Smith plays a dual satirical role here. On one hand, he is the impetus for Bill’s 
satirical anatomy of family life, and on the other, he is an anti-intellectual buffoon who 
misidentifies the true source of political violence. That duality enables Hawks to attribute Bill 
with several incompatible qualities: he is moved by sympathy against the patriarchal nuclear 
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 family, and he is intellectually superior to his father (“eddicated”) in identifying the communists 
who truly invade family life.  
A Revolt for/against mothers 
 Similar character bifurcations arise in the novel’s much more expansive satire of 
marriage and motherhood under private patriarchy. Green Street suggests that the nuclear family 
creates a solid barrier between women and the state, and thereby damages their health and that of 
their children. Hawks satirizes current political and economic circumstances by revealing their 
detrimental effects on domestic space and working-class women’s maternal role. In the next 
several sections, I foreground the novel’s radical political quality. Hawks’ pastiche incorporates 
feminist socialist and liberal registers to appear directed on women’s behalf. I show how this 
pastiche ultimately dissolves to invoke the corporate state as a superior mode of domestic 
organization. 
 In advice to her daughter, Mrs. Smith regrets having too many children too early: 
“[B]eing saddled with a lot of kids while you’re still young is poor work for a woman. Take my 
advice, Alice, and don’t let him spring it on you too often . . . It’s their nature, even the best of 
‘em, to want to set a woman” (35). Rather than recounting the joys of motherhood, she 
emphasizes the difficulty of maintaining a family, being pregnant in poor conditions, and 
withstanding infant sickness and mortality.  
 Jenny, the Smiths’ youngest daughter, echoes Bill by similarly condemning the limits of 
her mother’s life within the private patriarchal family: “I wonder if she thinks it’s worth while to 
have had seven children—two dead, and the others Millie, Charlie, you, Bill and me. Was we 
worth it? Was we worth wearing out all her life for, Alice? If so, it’s time we all got better ideas. 
The old ones aren’t good enough” (110). As she explores the possibilities of women’s agency in 
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 the contemporary moment, Jenny expresses her dissatisfaction with women’s roles in the prolific 
family under liberal democracy.83 In their laments, Hawks calls attention to the failure of 
parliamentary politics to address the degrading circumstances of domestic labor. In addition, 
Hawks acknowledges married working-class women’s aspirations beyond submitting to their 
husbands’ sexual demands. In both these critiques, Hawks echoes progressive socialist 
representations of domestic labor under liberalism. The satire eventually turns again, however, to 
confront Marxism’s failure to address domestic women. In correcting that failure, the novel 
suggests a fascist alternative.  
Domestic labor was a problematic concern for orthodox Marxism, and often regarded as 
irrelevant to and distant from the focus on the exploitative production and exchange of 
commodities.84 Friedrich Engels’ The Origin of the Family, as an exceptional touchstone for 
feminist revisions of Marxist analysis in this regard, insisted that the domestic mode of 
production was indispensable for the reproduction of capital, although prior to and distinct from 
systems of capital. Rather than dwelling on the revolutionary significance of domestic labor, 
however, Engels advocated women’s mass entry into the wage labor market: “[T]he necessity 
and the manner of accomplishing the real social equality of the two [sexes], will appear in broad 
daylight only . . . when both of them will enjoy complete legal equality. It will then be seen that 
the emancipation of women is primarily dependent on the re-introduction of the whole female 
                                                 
83 There were different tactics, of course. At times, British fascist propaganda followed the lead of German 
and Italian fascist regimes in their emphasis on “traditional” motherhood. For instance, Anne Seelig-Thomann, an 
apologist for Nazism, explained to a BUF readership that Hitler “made German women believe once more that the 
family is the essential unit of the State, and in it the mother is the living symbol of national survival through her 
raising of healthy children. Motherhood and womanhood recovered their old meaning and glory” (52). 
84 Mary McIntosh explains that “There has been a considerable debate about the analysis of the part played 
by this domestic labor in the daily reproduction of the husband’s labour power. Much of this has revolved around 
the question of whether domestic labour is productive or unproductive for capital and the implications for the class 
location of housewives” (268).  
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 sex into the public industries” (Engels 90). In his critique of the patriarchal family’s 
subordination of women as domestic laborers, Engels suggests women’s “proletarianization.”  
Much more recently, feminist socialists have taken a different tack, explicitly calling 
attention to the foundational nature of domestic labor to capital. Rosalind Coward for instance 
suggests that domestic labor is “paradoxically, both the forefront of political and theoretical 
concerns, and simultaneously, inadequately theorised” (187). Correcting that inadequacy, some 
have insisted on domestic labor’s productive capacities. On one hand, it appears to produce a 
use-value for immediate consumption. On the other hand, many have argued that it indirectly 
reproduces labor power as a commodity, and hence exchange value.85  
Ann Ferguson for instance elaborates on the concept of “sex/affective production” to 
explain the value of domestic labor as the “production of children” under capitalist regimes. Her 
term helps “conceptualize the production and reproduction of people in family and kinship 
networks” as an explicit capitalist demand. She further elucidates its historical and cultural 
nature by explaining that “each mode of sex/affective production will have its own distinctive 
logic of exchange of the human services of sexuality, nurturance, and affection” (155). 
Ferguson’s purpose in exploring domestic labor’s foundational and historical nature is to 
dismantle the gender division of labor. In Green Street, Hawks also calls attention to the 
foundational status of domestic labor using socialist and feminist rhetoric, but in order to justify 
the gender division of labor. The narrative addresses the inter-war exploitation of women as 
wage laborers in a socialist paradigm, but ultimately suggests intensifying their domestic 
identity.  
                                                 
85 Lise Vogel characterizes the orthodox Marxist understanding of domestic labor: “the products and 
services that result from this work are consumed directly and never reach the marketplace. In Marxist terms, these 
products and services have use-value but no exchange value” (17). She adds that “housework only appears to be a 
personal service outside the arena of capitalist production. In reality, it produces not just use-values for direct 
consumption in the family, but the essential commodity labor power—the capacity of a worker to work” (19-20).  
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 Hawks criticizes the assumption that women’s entry into wage labor necessarily 
“liberates” them in the inter-war period. Alice Smith works in a chain restaurant as a waitress but 
longs to escape its drudgery. In a conversation during a break at work, her co-worker Mabel 
Billings discusses the waitresses’ typical income and expenditure. Circumstances are desperate 
and recurring:  
I usually manage to knock up thirty-eight bob, with the tips, but look at what it costs to 
live! Ten bob for me room, another ten for me grub . . . Then you have to buy your 
uniform dress on the never-never . . . And then there’s fares . . . Mine come out three and 
six a week . . . Then there’s unemployment and health insurance—another half-crown. 
Oh, and I forgot the laundry charges for our caps and aprons. And stockings, because 
they wear out so with all this rushing about. That’s thirty bob easy—probably more. (27-
8) 
Mabel’s account of her earning and spending distinctly recalls George Orwell’s accounts of 
unemployed men’s weekly budgets in The Road to Wigan Pier (1937) and Down and Out in 
London and Paris (1933).86 Mabel, however, exposes the harsh difficulties of urban working 
women, an exploited group that Orwell and other prominent socialists of the period tended to 
ignore and thereby helped to render invisible. In addressing her coworkers, Mabel exposes that 
failure in socialist thought: “Exploitation will always go on so long as we don’t keep together. 
That’s what’s wrong with the working class—especially the women. No solidarity . . . We’ve got 
                                                 
86 See Beatrix Campbell’s Wigan Pier Revisited: Poverty and Politics in the 80s (London: Virago Press, 
1984) for a critique of Orwell’s masculinism. Gottlieb also notes that “British fascists were not alone in observing 
this attack on masculine pride and dignity during the 1930s, and a wide range of social critics—such as J. B. 
Priestly, George Orwell, E. Wright Bake and the Pilgrim’s Trust—recorded this aspect of men’s experience of life 
on the dole. The BUF went beyond merely chronicling this psychological phenomenon of male demoralization, and 
called for a crusade to rescue British manhood. In this general atmosphere of an onslaught on individual and 
collective masculine identities, the BUF’s cult of masculinity was less an unrestrained bid for male dominance than 
a stop-gap ideological measure for male survival in the age of the Means Test” (124). 
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 to find the spirit to stick together, even at the cost of going through it” (28). She and the other 
servers are constantly exploited but remain stranded by dominant political and cultural 
representations. The BUF press similarly depicted women’s wage labor adapting socialist criteria 
to expose their exploitation. The BUF’s policy of “Equal Pay for Equal Work” for instance 
promised to abolish women’s sweated wage labor. The Chief Woman of Propaganda, Anne 
Brock Griggs, explained that “lower or sweated wages for one section of the community will 
drag down the standard for others” (Griggs 164). 
The fascist solution, however, confronts the dead end of women’s wage labor very 
differently from socialist feminist critique. Hawks suggests counteracting women’s exploitation 
in the workplace by leaving it. Marriage would be the ideal reward for the bleak years in the 
restaurant and mode of escape from wage labor, but it is difficult to achieve in the lean inter-war 
years and constantly eludes the waitresses’ grasp. The waitresses are thereby forced to consider 
the ubiquitous possibility of renumerating their sexuality outside marriage. Sally, another server 
advises Mabel to “find yourself a boy friend and live in sin.” Mabel quips, “[B]elieve me the sin 
wouldn’t be counted up against me in Heaven” (28). Alice herself is forced to prolong her 
engagement because of her fiancé’s meager resources. She laments that his unemployment has 
squelched her own dreams: “We were going to get married. I was going to work for a while until 
we’d saved a bit, and then . . .” (37). The chapter that focuses on Alice suggests male economic 
solvency and the family wage in the context of marriage as the best route for female authority.  
At this point, Jenny’s and Mrs. Smith’s critiques of marriage seem to contradict the 
suggestion that it could counteract Alice’s degradation in wage labor. But Green Street 
distinguishes marriage under liberal democracy, in which women toil for the nuclear family 
alone, from marriage as a practice whose value for the state is unmediated by the husband/father. 
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 Although Green Street begins its satire by calling attention the economic value of women’s 
domestic labor in a socialist register, it quickly recontextualizes that labor by moving it outside 
an economic paradigm. Hawks (and official British fascist rhetoric as a whole) justifies the 
confinement of women to unpaid domestic labor by shifting the family into the paradigm of the 
corporate state and the British race. Aligning women’s desire with domesticity, Hawks’ satire of 
private patriarchy retains a reactionary essentialist identification of women’s desire with 
domesticity.  
The 1936 propaganda pamphlet Fascism for the Million promised that once the corporate 
state was established, domestic women would gain political representation for their special 
interests: “[W]omen not engaged in ‘gainful’ occupation, but who perform the important work of 
looking after the home and family, will elect their own representatives, nominated and chosen by 
themselves” (30). Hawks in her 1939 pamphlet, Women Fight for Britain and Britain Alone, 
promised furthermore that “from the modern system, womanhood and the nation alike will 
benefit” (3). Elaborating on domestic issues such as Housing, Social Policy, Health, Religion and 
Education, and Peace and Progress, Hawks promised not only the corporate state’s benefits for 
the home, but also the reverse—unprecedented political activism for those who had been “falsely 
protected” from the state by the conceptual and practical boundaries between public and private 
spheres. Having abolished such boundaries, the fascist state would introduce the domestic 
woman to the corporate state’s expansive duties and rewards. Gottlieb observes, “The very same 
skills and feminine discernment they applied to making a success of their housekeeping were 
seen as transferable to state level” (103). 
In the chapter that focuses on the Smiths’ oldest daughter Millie, Hawks similarly effaces 
the materialist nature of her satirical analysis by investing domestic labor with national and 
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 imperial value. In its satirical anatomy of the Millie’s life, the ideal context for domestic labor is 
neither private nor economic, but rather biopolitical.  
Fascist Reproduction  
Millie has escaped a life of wage labor in a laundry by marrying her former supervisor. 
Her marriage to Herbert encloses her in a world of atomized single households. In her suburban 
detached home, Millie does not interact with her neighbors or her surrounding community as had 
been her custom in Green Street: “She was proud of her tidy home, and its garden. She was 
proud of her husband’s regular income—of the security it gave. But the silence struck home to 
her heart, the blankness and the silence, the quiet in which she was alone” (67). In its failure to 
provide more than mere economic security, the middle-class home sheds its appealing veneer. 
Millie “knew in her heart that she wanted more than all that” (61). 
Millie perceives that motherhood would cure her loneliness and fulfill her need for a 
more social and active life. “Surely it was strange that when she let her thoughts stray like this—
on the dullness of life, and her stuck-up neighbours, and marriage not being quite all she’d 
expected, and what would it feel like to have your own baby sleeping there, in her cot” (61)? But 
since her husband Herbert had contracted gonorrhea from a prostitute as a young man and 
subsequently undergone “furtive self-treatment,” he is unable to father a child. Her right to 
reproduce has been unjustly cancelled by a typical middle-class sexual rite of passage. Middle 
class-marriage appears to atomize women most effectively by fraudulently devaluing their 
reproductive capabilities. 
Medical authority, however, values Millie’s physical and social capacities rightly. Only 
her doctor sympathizes with her loneliness by articulating the value of her body in a biopolitical 
paradigm of race and nation. He insists that only “selfish modern young women” practice 
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 contraception, and bemoans his patients’ usual attitude toward motherhood: “Fine healthy 
bodies, that ought to have mothered fine children . . . One wonders, when one thinks of the 
homes of some of my patients, where the garage is full and the cradle is empty! What’s going to 
come of it? Extinction! Race suicide! The fit won’t bear children, and the unfit breed” (62-3)! 
Middle-class Englishwomen who practice birth control seek a selfish, degenerate freedom that 
leads them astray from their sexual authenticity and the nation’s reproductive needs.  
 Foucault describes the modern production of “discourse about sex . . . supported and 
relayed . . . in the first place, by a ‘public interest’” as a paramount feature in the biopolitical 
transformation of the socius (An Introduction 140). Furthermore, modern “juridical and medical 
control of perversions, for the sake of the general protection of society and the race,” helped the 
deployment of sexuality “spread through entire social body” (122). The “supervision of health” 
through the proliferation of sexual discourse went hand-in-hand with “disciplines of the body 
and regulations of the population” (139).  
Hawks’ own literary compulsion to sexuality effaces the exaltation of the “couple” in 
middle-class monogamous marriage. So central in mainstream domestic fiction, the romance plot 
here perniciously hinders the production of children and the subsequent biopolitical 
aggrandizement of women in the state. Green Street suggests instead that married women 
relinquish their primary responsibility to husband and private family. Rather than through her 
monopoly on “heart and home” as in classic liberal domestic fiction, Hawks’ domestic woman 
demands supremacy in reference to national population and health.87 Mothering duties intimately 
entail the “survival” of nation and race. Hawks’ domestic rhetoric pre-empts the spiritual and 
                                                 
87 Armstrong notes, “By attributing political and emotional authority to the male and female respectively, 
the figure [of sexual exchange] inscribes the political within the male character and then contains both within heart 
and home” (51). 
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 moral focus on the mother and replaces it with an overtly sexualized paradigm: “The strong, 
simple passion of Millie, the desire of her body for children, electrified her and the atmosphere 
round her. She felt the strength surge from her toward him like a wave. But it was all in vain. 
Herbert’s denial was rock-like, and on it her womanhood shattered” (68).  
 Hawks also severs the bonds between motherhood and the private sanctity of marriage by 
valorizing illegitimate children. The Smiths happily raise their son Charlie’s illegitimate 
daughter, Poppy, even though Charlie himself is expelled from the family. “The child didn’t 
seem to know yet what a cloud she stood under. Her wide blue-eyed gaze wasn’t shadowed by a 
thought that she should be ashamed of herself” (57). While Hawks’ satire certainly condemns the 
notion of sexual liberation for the modern individual, we can nevertheless place it on a 
continuum with anti-patriarchal sexual “revolution.”88  
 Millie in the beginning of her chapter is depicted as a victim robbed of her reproductive 
capacity. The narrator’s satirical irony suddenly shifts direction, however, just as in Mr. Smith’s 
case, to transform her into a satirical target. As Millie resentfully disengages from maternal 
desire, she becomes an emblem of a thoroughly commodified middle-class womanhood:  
When neighbours invite us to lunch or to tea, I look at their furniture, their carpets, their 
decorations. I get lots of ideas. I see how they dress. I read all about it in magazines—
‘For the Smart woman,’ ‘Make Up Discreetly.’ When I think of how little I used to know 
of such things, I can see how well I’ve come on. I’m no fool. I can learn . . . The house is 
                                                 
88 Gottlieb discusses the BUF’s toleration of children outside of marriage, noting the distinction between 
fascism’s sexualized “racial thinking” and “a more antiquated nationalist emblem of the mother as the guardian of 
morality.” She cites Rosalind Raby, a British fascist propagandist who “[t]aking her cue from Italian provisions for 
maternal and infant welfare, and the Nazi state’s tolerant attitudes towards illegitimate births in order to spearhead a 
racial and demographic revival . . . promised that under a British fascist government, ‘the unmarried mother will be 
given the opportunity to earn an honest living for herself and her child’”(100). 
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 my child—and this garden, my wedding ring, my safety. I’ll keep them safe . . . her lips 
tightly compressed to a firm line. (71-2) 
Millie’s replaces her desire for children with a desire for commodities. According to the satirical 
logic here, commodification destroys nation. In this respect, the satirical anatomy of Millie’s life 
echoes conservative satirists, who in the late eighteenth century likewise drew an opposition 
between responsible government and feminized practices of consumption. Tom Fulford explains 
that many satirists provided a “reactionary reading of the capitalist culture of consumption, and 
of the political leaders who profited by that culture” (17).  
 Yet Hawks and the BUF endorsed consumption where it operated according to a fascist 
logic of imperial autarky. To endorse a mode of consumption that accords with fascist 
biopolitics, Hawks bifurcates consumption and Empire employing a binary logic of race and 
gender. Alice Yaeger Kaplan notes that in addition to binding oppositions, the fascist also “split” 
the effects of modernity employing racism to “separat[e] what he feared from what he desired by 
projecting all he didn’t understand in modern life onto the Jews, all that he wished to recuperate 
in modern life onto the fascist state” (24). In Green Street, “masculine” modes of consumption 
and imperialism strengthen the nation, whereas Jewish consumption and “Oriental” imperialism 
irrevocably damage it. In the next section, I show how Hawks’ satire strategically confounds the 
predominant logic of consumption in liberal domestic fiction.  
Fascist Consumption 
 BUF plans to transform the British Empire into an autarchic economy centered on the 
simultaneous stimulation and control of consumption. These plans addressed a growing public 
concern with cheap Asian labor. The rhetoric represented Asia primarily as a site of productive 
competition rather than as a space of mystifying cultural “otherness”; the East threatens the West 
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 because Orientals resemble beasts of burden and machines. Although orientalist, British fascist 
rhetoric tended to “de-exoticize” Asia. Mosley for example claimed that corrupt  
Western finance has provided the loans which have equipped the East with equal 
machinery to the West, and has hired the Western technician to teach the Oriental to 
perform the simplified tasks of mass production with modern mechanical technique at a 
third of the wages and for longer hours of monotonous toil than white labour can endure. 
The result has been a stream of sweated goods undercutting British products on the 
markets of the world. Their deadly effect can be observed in the cold statistics that show 
the decline of Lancashire and Yorkshire exports under the attack of rising Japanese 
exports and the vast increase in Indian sweated products.” (Tomorrow We Live 25-6)  
 Green Street also invokes the trope of the Oriental to criticize global capital from a 
perspective of national purity. It thus condemns the imperial project where it creates means for 
assimilation and internationalism. A British colonist soon departing for Hong Kong is 
characterized as having “dark slanting eyes” as he flashes a “French postcard” to Jenny Smith 
(116). Through a kind of reverse osmosis, Hong Kong affects the colonial subject who no longer 
legitimately claims a British cultural identity. Similarly, James Graham and Thomas 
Rowlandson, late eighteenth-century conservative satirists criticized the British colonization of 
India comparing British consumers with the languid Orientals from whom they bought their 
wares, and claiming that colonial consumption “turned Londoners into pampered buyers, 
conspicuous consumers of the foreign” (Fulford 17).  
On the other hand, British fascist propaganda advocated the consumption of domestic 
(English) goods in imperial markets. The following is typical of the BUF’s entreaties to 
consumers:  
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 With but a few shopping days left to Christmas, it is the duty of every British man and 
woman seriously to consider how important it is that the increased spending which 
usually attends this Christian festival shall be used to the benefit of our own people . . . 
Therefore, since our British shopkeepers have ranged against them the power of finance, 
restrictive legislation and unfair competition, it is the duty of their fellow-countrymen to 
give them the full benefit of their Christmas spending, taking trade to British traders. 
(“‘Buy British’ Crusade” 17) 
Moreover, the BUF emphasized British consumerism as a mollifying solution to the 
heated inter-war antagonism between capital and labor. Alexander Raven Thomson, the author of 
The Coming Corporate State, explained that each of the fascist state’s twenty-five corporations, 
to be comprised by major British industries and services, would also represent consumers, who 
would contribute to major contractual and state decisions and help defuse potential enmity 
between capitalists and laborers: “There will be represented on the Corporation employers, 
workers and consumers. Each group will be given equal representation and equal power, and 
may not be outvoted by the other two. The sane functioning of the nation as a whole can only be 
attained by collaboration between the various industrial factors, not by their mutual hostility” 
(Thomson 5). Nevertheless, Thomson pronounces the fascist anxiety around consumption, 
making sure to note that the nation-state itself would be regarded as the “best fitted to nominate 
the consumers’ representative” as the “ultimate consumer in the case of most products” (6).  
 Hawks accordingly distinguishes degenerate forms of consumption from sound 
nationalist forms. Analogous to the “Orientalized” imperialists of conservative satire, Jewish 
figures function as the feminized scapegoats for commodity culture’s deterritorializing 
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 international forces.89 In the BUF press, Hawks herself agitated against Jews in an article entitled 
“Work for Women: Representation as Buyers”:  
This Movement intends to end for ever the menace of price-cutting, introduced, together 
with other unfair methods of trading by the Jews, and to give the small trader the power 
to face the bigger man upon his own ground. Chain store extension will be forbidden . . . 
Through a National Investment Board, capital will be available at a low rate of interest 
for the extension of business. It will no longer be lent abroad, as countless millions are 
today. (Hawks, “Work for Women” 8)  
In their paranoid understanding of the market, British fascists believed that “Jewish finance” and 
“financial democracy” encouraged the consumption of foreign goods in “Jewish owned multiple 
chain stores.”90 These forces supposedly created a chain of exploitation by lowering English 
working-class wages and spreading “internationalist” (communist) values.  
Shopping thereby acquires world historical importance in the fascist imagination, and is 
depicted in terms of its biopolitical potential to create or destroy national health. In Green Street, 
Hawks juxtaposes several consumer types to distinguish between healthy and hazardous 
consumption. To do so, she employs domestic fiction’s traditional association of surface and 
materialism with degenerate aristocratic femininity, but substitutes Jewishness for the 
aristocracy. In the process of defining autarkic modes of conspicuous consumption, she justifies 
genocide. 
                                                 
89 After 1936, the BUF heightened its production of anti-Semitic propaganda, and augmented membership 
there, home of approximately one-third of the total Jewish population in Britain. Everywhere else in England, 
however, the issue lost support rather than gaining it “Anti-Semitism was a disaster for Fascism in Britain” writes 
Andrew Thorpe (55). 
90 In The British Union Quarterly Jan. – Mar. 1938, for instance, an anonymous author writes, “If you 
believe that a whole race should be punished for the sin of some of its members, I admit that the expulsion of the 
two million Jews in New York would not be an excessive punishment for the harm done by Jewish finance to the 
English race in America . . .” (37-8). 
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 Domestic Consumption  
Rita Felski argues that the multi-faceted and often contradictory meanings associated 
with modern consumerism depended largely on the discourse of gender: “the consumer was 
frequently represented as a woman . . . the category of consumption situated femininity at the 
heart of the modern in a way that the discourses of production and rationalization examined 
previously did not” (61). Gendered moral qualities were attributed to the consumer, partly 
depending on her class position: 
On the one hand, consumption was presented as a necessity, indeed as a familial and 
civic duty for the middle-class woman . . . Such discourses framed women as the passive 
beneficiaries or victims . . . of a new inexorable imperative of capitalist development. Yet 
on the other hand, the growth of consumerism was seen as engendering a revolution of 
morals, unleashing egotistic and envious drives among the lower orders and women, 
which could in turn affect the stability of existing social hierarchies. (Felski 65)  
As a result, the “consuming woman” in much nineteenth-century domestic fiction potentially 
jeopardized the womanly virtues of “modesty, frugality, and innocence” (72). At the same time, 
active consumerism could also be linked to national health: “[T]he expansion of commerce was 
greeted by many as a mark of progress, benefiting the consumer and contributing to the 
economic health of the nation . . .” (68).  
Nancy Armstrong also observes that in eighteenth-century domestic literature, 
consumption was a major component of womanly duties. Conduct books contrasted middle-class 
“moral” consumption to the aristocracy’s conspicuous display of the body:  
A woman was deficient in female qualities if she, like the aristocratic woman, spent her 
time in idle amusements . . . [S]uch activities always aimed at putting the body on 
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 display, a carry-over from the Renaissance display of aristocratic power. For a woman to 
display herself in such a manner was the same as saying that she was supposed to be 
valued for her body and its adornments, not for the virtues she might possess as a woman 
and wife. (Armstrong 75) 
The intent of middle-class consumerism markedly diverged from aristocratic display “to combat 
the evils of the aristocratic standard of taste with an alternative standard . . .” (82). Armstrong 
explains that the figure of the domestic woman “moralized” consumption by establishing “a 
certain quality of domestic life” (85-6). The domestic woman translates (her husband’s) income 
into household commodities to comprise “a field of information organized according to the 
categories of domestic economy” (84). In this world of signs, you could judge “a man’s net 
worth” and “also his wife on a psychological scale” (87). As we will see in Chapter 3, Bottome 
follows these guidelines for coding consumption in The Lifeline. There, the aristocracy’s 
outdated furniture and décor signal decrepit practices of domestic economy and in turn, their 
cruel political deviations. The Mortal Storm pushes this mode of reading as well, conveying the 
bourgeois family’s civilized tolerance in a dining table full of “glass and silver” and covered by a 
“fine and spotless” tablecloth (Bottome, The Mortal Storm 71).  
Felski observes that realist novels in the late nineteenth century continued to push the 
moral model of consumption that required women to express their own regulation of desire 
through economy, but increasingly focused on the dangerous exhilaration associated with their 
consumption.  For instance, Emile Zola’s The Ladies’ Paradise signals the unleashing of “female 
desire” by affiliating consumerism with sexual frenzy. Felski observes, “In a condition of sensual 
delirium, dazzled by the allures of the commodities spread out before them, they abandon 
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 themselves to the pleasure of shopping, a pleasure explicitly depicted as a sublimated expression 
of sexual passion” (Felski 69).  
Hawks’ model of domestic consumption deliberately challenges the terms that undergird 
these moral depictions. Green Street satirizes the middle-class woman for her de facto degenerate 
consumption. When Millie marries Herbert, as we have seen, her class position shifts and for the 
first time, she can enjoy an unfamiliar world of abundant commodities. In her case, commodities 
assert class hierarchy and create distance from her (more authentic) working-class origins. Millie 
trivializes womanhood’s grave obligations, closing the domestic space off from the community 
at large. Rather than enriching it, bourgeois women’s consumerism attenuates the domestic 
scene’s social significance by maintaining an illegitimate class hierarchy within the nation. To 
distinguish between typical middle-class consumption on one hand, and autarkic consumption on 
the other, Hawks projects the problematic anti-social qualities associated with consumption onto 
Jewish women.  
Sadie Aaron, Charlie Smith’s Jewish love interest, is marked as an insatiable consumer, 
an “octopus” and “beautiful sea-devil, a si-reen” more familiar with London’s spaces of 
conspicuous consumption than any of his East End acquaintances (81).91 Her personality merges 
with two commodities in particular, a “low, flash sports car” and silk stockings. In their first 
encounter, Sadie convinces Charlie to embark on a life of petty crime by crossing “one silk-
stockinged leg over the other . . .”; after that, “he’d felt himself nailed” (74). Using commodities 
to put herself seductively on display, Sadie replaces the “aristocratic” consumer of traditional 
domestic fiction. 
                                                 
91 Note that Hawks associates Sadie with “monstrous” sea creatures, which resonates with a wider fascist 
imagination of women as “floods.” Klaus Theweleit explains that these images reveal the fascist’s fear of the 
disintegration of men’s bodily boundaries: “What fascism promised men was the reintegration of their hostile 
components under tolerable conditions, dominance of the hostile ‘female’ element within themselves. This explains 
why the word ‘boundaries,’ in fascist parlance, refers primarily to the boundaries of the body . . .” (434). 
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 In Sadie’s case, that consumption is not merely immoral, but potentially deadly. “[B]itter 
and selfish—he saw her again, as at first . . . She was dressed in clothes that screamed their 
smartness, a cigarette staining her fingers, her dark eyes, with the long lashes, taking him in, 
weighing him up” (73-4). She treats Charlie as a possible commodity and accordingly threatens 
to devour him. A defensive strike against her would be perfectly within order. Charlie predicts 
that she will finally be murdered, strangled with “a couple of silk stockings round her neck” (22). 
The image is “just” because it would reveal the truth; Sadie is a reified commodity who 
constantly threatens to transform Charlie and others into the same.  
 Hawks further disrupts consumption as an established field of information by installing a 
new ideal of female “exteriority” and introducing a new confounding use of commodities as 
signs. In a Christmas shopping scene, Mrs. Smith notices a “sickly small girl” who buys a pair of 
silk stockings. She had obviously “been saving her weekly pence, and now came to buy her 
Christmas gift for her Mum. Bless ‘er little ‘eart, thought Mum, hurrying on” (87). Conspicuous 
self-sacrifice replaces the regulation of desire as consumption’s moral end.  
 Emphasizing the value of compulsive spending toward this end, Mrs. Smith purchases an 
extravagant gift for her husband. At the beginning of the excursion, she is compared to “a spare 
fig, thin and bowed, grey with work” (85). But her purchases do not parsimoniously reflect her 
family’s economic status. Mrs. Smith is soon mesmerized by luxurious silk pajamas, and buys 
two pairs for her husband without hesitation: “At the stall, she said afterwards, ‘Something 
seemed to come all over ‘er like.’ Then and there she opened her purse and handed the money 
without hesitation to the man, paying over just what he asked. She walked home in a kind of 
daze. For the first time in her life she had spent her money rashly. Her pulses beat fast” (88). 
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  Her loss of rationality, in Hawks’ terms “rashness,” “daze,” and a fast pulse, arises from 
the sense of “equality” bought with consumerism. Mrs. Smith uneconomically exercises the 
privilege of wealthier women in ignoring the pajamas’ cost. Spending “rashly” is thus a “moral” 
act whose exhilaration should presumably be made available to the working class. Green Street 
calls attention throughout the narrative to the injustice of displaying tempting commodities to 
those unable to acquire what they see. “Alice devoured with her eyes the latest fashions, as 
displayed alike in the great stores beyond her purse, and in the ‘guinea shops’ which she had 
once or twice been able to patronize in moments of tremulous luxury” (19). In these scenarios, 
working-class consumption of luxury goods equalizes the classes by sabotaging hierarchical 
display. Green Street glorifies pleasure in the commodity and the act of purchasing as politicized 
revolts against class hierarchy. 
Hawks further disrupts bourgeois consumer coding in Mr. Smith’s reaction to his wife’s 
gift. Mr. Smith’s pleasure in its extravagance is obvious: “He strutted and pranced and behaved 
in a ridiculous fashion. Yet all so tenderly, letting Mother see that he liked them” (89). This 
comic show “masculinizes” luxury by overcoming its association with aristocratic femininity. 
The luxury commodity also loses its association with Jewishness and vulgar “material” concerns 
by directly stimulating family affect.  
Such representations of consumption contribute to fascism’s self-representation as the 
only political party that could meet the British working class’ economic needs and transcend an 
“economistic” approach (contra the Communist Party). Green Street’s narrator claims fascism’s 
ability to combat economic disparity and feed “human love” at the same time: “One day the 
sensitive spirit of human love would cease to be frayed by those hard, material conflicts, 
assaulted by poverty and fear-ridden nerves. Until then, life was a makeshift of hope and 
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 frustration. Until then--human beings would be born; they would suffer; they would die. No 
more” (124). Better organization, not merely money, is the primary desideratum. The narrator in 
Green Street insists, “[I]t wasn’t money that was wanted for the poor. Not money, as money, but 
economic security; a security which could only be built on a new social order, with a new code 
of education for the body and the mind” (126).  
This combination of commitments, far from proposing a mystical escape from politics, 
addresses an audience disillusioned with the mundane business of parliamentary politics, as well 
as those unfamiliar with political practices. In this confusion of political naiveté and political 
acuity, Hawks recalls Lewis, whose naïve domestic figure Margot Stamp possesses an 
unexpected political visionary quality. Nevertheless, Hawks suggests a kind of “women’s 
politics” inconceivable to Lewis by intimately connecting women to policy. Fascism suggests in 
place of the patriarchal private sphere a statist public patriarchal solution to the British 
individual’s gendered aspirations.  
In the next section, I show that Hawks’ re-evaluations of domestic labor eliminate the 
sexual contract between husband and wife to install a contract between the domestic woman and 
the state. This substitution requires the father’s removal from domestic organization. The fascist 
son’s triumph over the father, and his guidance of the mother over her domestic labor emerges in 
Green Street as the central feature of the fascist domestic scene. 
Anti-patriarchal Patriarchy 
As we have seen, Hawks’ invocation of biopolitical discourse articulates domestic 
women’s authority in line with a medical representation of reproduction and an autarkic 
representation of consumption. In the chapter that features Bill, Hawks suggests that the 
centrality of domestic labor to the state requires the fascist son’s guidance.  
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  The prominence of the youthful, “anti-patriarchal” male in fascist rhetoric has been well-
noted.92 The theme of missing, tyrannical, politically mislead, and corrupt fathers, often standing 
in for Parliament or established political parties, emerged repeatedly in BUF publications, which 
were full of revolutionary fervor against fathers. For instance, we find the following angry tirade 
in the publication Blackshirt:  
[W]e despise you for your values; we laugh at your beliefs; we thank you for the one 
great truth you have taught us—that you are awful fools. …  We wait for you to open up 
the arsenals, for you have taught us, Daddies, how to use the guns. All over Europe are 
rising up the generation of the men who were bred so well in war; with liquid fire for 
mother’s milk, and bombs for cricket-balls. They know only their own unity, and they 
have only their own belief in the disciplined insurrection of their generation . . . (“Youth 
in Flames” 2)  
Gottlieb explains that the BUF “prioritized relationships . . . between male comrades, united in a 
brotherhood” suggesting a militaristic youthful social dynamic in which the “younger male was 
charged with the mission of insurrection against his elders” (107, 113). In light of this 
encouragement of a brotherly “revolt” against fathers, she asks, “Can patriarchy exist where 
fathers have been rendered impotent” (113)? She concludes that the adolescent “gang” mentality 
of British fascism was male-centered yet anti-patriarchal.  
The materialist feminist term “public patriarchy,” however, helps us to see how 
patriarchal relations of power could strengthen even as the social role of the private patriarchal 
                                                 
92 Russell Berman writes: “A brilliant connection links the fascist critique of patriarchy to the matriarchal 
moment of the oceanic feeling that accompanies the technology of mass media and the rejection of the written 
culture of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie” (xxii). Juliet Flower MacCannell also notes in The Regime of the 
Brother: After the Patriarchy that “The Holocaust is the key historical event that forces a re-vision of the modern 
symbolic as a post-Oedipal frame. That is the fact of the calculated, planned disruption of the civilizing and 
protective side of Oedipal order effected by fascism” (14).  
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 family was waning. Carol Brown argues that twentieth-century public patriarchy “does not 
benefit from individual men’s continuing control . . . Husbands are no longer needed to maintain 
. . . the continued reproductive labor of women. Husbands may even be a hindrance. . .” (245). 
Public patriarchy regulates and masters women’s bodies even as the shape of domestic labor 
radically changes, and as its locus shifts away from the home: “public schools, hospitals, and 
nursing homes” and “‘mothering’ maintenance work (e.g., sewing, mending, cooking, gardening, 
nursing children and old people) are now no longer done primarily at home by mothers” 
(Ferguson 172). In this section, I argue that Hawks’ satirical treatment of Mrs. Smith in 
particular exposes fascism’s “revolution” as “anti-father” but nonetheless public patriarchal. 
 Bill’s commitment to fascism is a direct consequence of his observation that liberal 
democracy renders national health impossible. 
William Smith, of Green Street, shop assistant, saw himself as one struggling against all 
the evils of an obsolescent system of financial democracy, whereby distressed areas, 
unemployment, desolated agriculture, the slow sapping of British virility, were perpetual 
and inevitable. And very soon this obsolescent system must either collapse, and civil war 
break out; or it must go to war to preserve its export markets. (120)  
The insurgent son is motivated to revolt in order to liberate the domestic scene from the open 
market, and the mother from her husband’s tyranny. After Mr. Smith’s death, Bill accedes to his 
rightful place and proceeds to rectify his father’s corrupt domestic organization as “the man of 
the household, chief breadwinner, support of Mum and Poppy. . . Outwardly calm, in reality 
dazed, he took up the job” (121). Unlike his father’s, Bill’s political vision encompasses not only 
his own family, but also spirals outward to encompass the neighborhood, nation, and Empire.  
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 Bill’s role in his father’s eventual demise is implied in his mother’s prayer after Mr. 
Smith suffers a heart attack: “Spare my son Bill remorse that ‘e’ll feel that ‘e’s killed ‘is Dad. 
Bill’s innocent, Gord, I promise you” (98). While the prayer acknowledges Bill’s part in his 
father’s illness, his mother’s approval also absolves him of guilt. Her complicity in his 
abrogation of her husband’s authority is established as she votes with Bill for a BUF candidate in 
the council elections: “All these years I’ve voted like Farver. Now I says to meself, let Bill ‘ave 
‘is turn for a change” (101). Of course, this complicity between mother and son tempts us to read 
the fascist narrative of state transformation as a regression to pre-Oedipal sociality. But looked at 
from a richer feminist materialist perspective, the role of patricide here is to expand the reach of 
patriarchal statist control, not to unite the son with his mother’s affection, nor even to “return” 
the state to an unterritorialized, pre-patriarchal utopia. The son’s role henceforth is not to form a 
new couple with his mother, but to mediate between family and the state.  
Bill’s party interests are plainly devoted to domesticity. The concrete needs of the 
family—rent, public health, and conditions of reproduction—motivate his politics, and he would 
presumably guide the family as a representative of, and liaison with the state.93 In this way, 
Hawks’ satire of paternal authority appears in a radical political mode, on women’s behalf, and 
on behalf of the urban working class as a whole. Bill attempts to bring women’s domestic labor 
out of the passive, and into the active support of an autarchic imperial economy.  
At the same time, the son’s role as conduit reveals a double edge that cuts ironically 
across the mother’s naiveté. Mrs. Smith understands Bill’s mode of political analysis only on a 
concrete level, observing that he has “seen families turned out into the street, and it seems to 
have turned ‘is stomach, or something, I dunno. And ‘e comes back with tales of the ‘ouses with 
                                                 
93  Bill attempts to connect his mother to the BUF by asking her, “‘Then you saw the article I wrote about 
housing? Then, Mum, if you read it, you do understand, don’t you, Mum?’ pleaded Bill” (101). 
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 their doors falling off and their windows all done up with cardboard” (65). Mrs. Smith cannot 
articulate her desires and concerns in traditional political terms, and so doesn’t fully grasp how 
the BUF’s seizure of political power would benefit her. She sees only that it is her duty to vote 
for his candidates. Although she is clearly complicit in Bill’s political arrogation of his father, 
her participation in the political process is indirect, and appropriately, the narrator views her with 
wary irony. Her comprehension is incomplete and radically inferior to Bill’s: “or something,” 
she says, “I dunno.” The satirical representation of Mrs. Smith’s intellectual incapacity implies 
that domestic women cannot deploy the necessary authority over domestic organization.  
Accordingly, Bill knows more about food production and distribution than any of the 
women in his family. “In his party’s weekly paper,” Bill discovers that “white bread was made of 
flour from which all the goodness had been taken away by the big miller combines and trusts, for 
the sake of selling the wheat-germ as cattle-food” (105). The nation’s health depends on buying 
from those producers whose interests are ultimately the “British people.” English consumption is 
a duty of racial survival, health, and population, not simply of one’s own family. The fascist 
son’s guardianship over food consumption appears to serve the family’s and the nation’s best 
interests.  
This appearance of the regenerative, rebellious, and reasonable “man of the people” and 
savior of working-class women’s desires relies on explicitly biopolitical terms. The terms Hawks 
employs here, lifted straight from the BUF press, are remarkably similar to those the Juvenalian 
satirist Smollett used to depict “a nightmarish, kaleidoscopic vision” of modern London, where 
“bread is turned into ‘a deleterious paste’ in order to make it whiter, veal is bleached, greens are 
colored, soil is produced artificially, and the poultry is more quickly fattened.” According to 
Paulson, this tradition indicts the “terrible proliferation” of modernity, in which “great aimless 
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 crowds of people” in chaotic movements threaten to “engulf all that remains of value and order” 
(192).  
 The novel’s conclusion best illuminates this satiric persona, where the narrator’s voice 
becomes inextricable from Bill’s. Their satirical irony is profoundly ambivalent toward the 
working class, both speaking on their behalf and indicting their morbid disavowal of fascism. 
They echo the pedestrians at the novel’s beginning who have “petrified into part of the streets, 
pavements, walls of East London” (11), and are half dead from political apathy: “From the 
double box on which he [Bill] stood and harangued, he looked into grey, lined faces. There was 
no fight left in them, after years of eating just enough to keep going, but not quite enough to 
fortify courage and spirit—a mere endurance in apathy, without hope but not hopeless, just—
static” (128). As in Lewis’ texts, the deanimated crowd blurs the boundaries between human and 
inhuman. The people of Green Street become part of the landscape; they too have become 
society’s detritus. 
Conclusion 
 Rhetorically, Hawks’ writing depends on satirical ambivalence to provoke, and indict, its 
readership. Satire, in which political critique combines with aesthetic pleasure, renewed itself in 
inter-war British writing as a whole. We can detect resonances between Hawks’ inorganic 
crowds and those that appear in high modernist writing. Eliot, Lawrence, and Lewis all invoke 
the modern crowd’s fundamental lifelessness.  
 Both Hawks and Lewis incongruently represent fascism in a radical political vein, as the 
“liberation” of domestic women from the private patriarchal family, by satirizing what they 
consider to be decadent practices of gender and sexuality. These similarities are remarkable, and 
warrant a reading of fascism’s broad investment in literary satire. The fusion of satirical modes 
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 may be central to British fascism’s revolutionary-counterrevolutionary rhetorical strategies. The 
combination of these modes allows fascism to appear as a revolutionary critique of the state on 
behalf of women and “the people,” even as it proposes a counterrevolutionary, anti-democratic 
installation of the corporate state. In retrospect, we can detect how the BUF’s claims to “speak 
for” domestic women would have ultimately silenced them. Hawks’ fusion creates the specific 
political equivocation that characterizes a fascist appropriation of modern mass politics. 
 In the next chapter, I will discuss Phyllis Bottome who mobilizes liberal feminism to 
attempt anti-fascist biopolitical articulations of women’s agency. I argue that she fails to provide 
a sufficiently critical practice of modern domestic fiction. Virginia Woolf, the subject of Chapter 
4, ironizes domestic fiction’s biopolitical ends from within its own terms, enabling a feminist 
analysis of nineteenth-century domestic literature as a prefiguration of twentieth-century British 
women’s immediate investment in imperialism through their domestic identity. Moreover, she 
diverges from satire to problematize any literary political representation of “the people,” and 
suggests instead practices of an anti-fascist “outsiders’ society.” In this way, Woolf counters not 
only fascist domesticity, but also the failures of British liberalism.  
107 
 CHAPTER THREE 
PHYLLIS BOTTOME 
LIBERAL ANTI-FASCISM 
 In this chapter, I explore the liberal characterization of fascism in Phyllis Bottome’s 
domestic novels The Mortal Storm (1938) and The Lifeline (1941). Bottome, a bestselling 
novelist in the 1930s and 1940s assesses fascism in the media of domestic realism and 
psychology. Both novels exemplify liberal domestic fiction’s ability to resist fascism’s 
investment in the state and women’s reproductive sexuality. The patriarchal family in these 
studies takes center stage—as the seed of fascism’s sexual ideology and its paradoxical cure.  
 Bottome, trained by the psychiatrist Alfred Adler, resonates with other critical 
explorations of fascist sexuality and gendering, especially psychoanalytic writings that 
foreground fascism’s official insistence on the authoritarian family, most notably those of 
Sigmund Freud, Herbert Marcuse, Wilhelm Reich, Theodor Adorno, and Max Horkheimer.94 Her 
writings also have much in common with later historians and cultural critics in the 1970s who, 
drawing on this tradition, instigated overtly feminist critiques of fascist sexuality, its relationship 
to patriarchal families, and its valorization of women’s chastity. Writers like Maria Antoinetta 
Macciochi and Tim Mason launched sharp critiques of official fascist regimes and their basis in 
European domestic ideologies. This critical line finds valuable extensions in works by Klaus 
Theweleit, Julia Kristeva, Leila Rupp, Claudia Koonz, Martin Durham, and Julie Gottlieb. 
                                                 
94See Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, trans. Vincent R. Carfagno (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1983); Herbert Marcuse, Eros And Civilization; A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1966); and works by Adorno and Freud cited later in this chapter.  
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  Fascist misogyny was in fact also a major theme of much inter-war British feminist 
domestic fiction.95 Phyllis Lassner writes that, “By the time fascism was taking hold in Europe, 
with its emphasis on women’s childbearing and caring roles, many British women writers came 
to fear that its radical conservatism accorded only too well with traditional attitudes at home” 
(12). Many novelists including Ethel Mannin, Sarah Campion, Sally Carson, Katharine 
Burdekin, Phyllis Bentley, Sylvia Townsend Warner, Carmel Haden-Guest, Irene Rathbone, and 
Ruth Adam, like Bottome often worked within the domestic fiction genre, warily foregrounding 
the reinvigoration of domestic ideology after World War I.96  They wrote in “the language of 
caregivers and protectors,” yet critically, for “the safe haven they imagine . . . reflects an idea of 
home and homeland that does not comply with . . . prevailing domestic ideologies” (Lassner 11). 
Today, these writers have nearly disappeared from literary memory. Lassner observes that “To 
be a radical woman writer in subject rather than form, to choose a female for a protagonist, to 
center the conflict in the family, to examine the effects of the public on the private . . . are not the 
ways to establish a literary reputation . . .” (240).  
Like these other radical women writers, Bottome profited from the new publicity 
apparatuses that were based increasingly on market responses and journalism as opposed to 
academic or other highbrow criteria.97 She was well aware of this position’s advantages and 
                                                 
95 Barbara Brothers notes that “numerous . .. women writers in the thirties who depicted in their novels the 
dangers of fascism and who attempted to communicate to the English-speaking world what was happening in 
Germany in the 1930s” (260).  
96 Andy Croft writes about the politicization of the romance novel in Ethel Mannin’s anti-fascist Comrade 
O Comrade (1947). Barbara Brothers mentions the following works: Sarah Campion’s Duet for Female Voices 
(1936); Sally Carson’s Crooked Cross (1934), The Prisoner (1936), and A Traveller Came By (1938); Katharine 
Burdekin’s dystopian novel Swastika Night (1934?); Phyllis Bentley’s Freedom, Farewell (1936); Sylvia Townsend 
Warner’s short story collection A Garland of Straw (1943) and After the Death of Don Juan (1938); Carmel Haden-
Guest’s Give Us Conflict (1935); Stevie Smith’s Novel on Yellow Paper (1936); Irene Rathbone’s They Call it 
Peace (1936); and Ruth Adam’s War on Saturday Week (1937) (260). 
97 Anthea Trodd notes that the proliferation of book clubs, literary journals, and magazines created an 
“[a]lternative professional world of marketing [that] was much more accessible to women than the world of literary 
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 drawbacks. In her autobiographical memoir, The Goal (1962), she describes the ambiguous 
evaluation of such writers at that time. When she returned to London after having lived in 
continental Europe for many years, and having achieved market success in the U.S., she felt 
alienated from the high modernist British literary scene.98 Success in the serial market and as a 
best-selling author did not by any means guarantee acceptance in London’s highbrow literary 
circles.99  
Indeed, Bottome’s style is conspicuously realist, and we can trace her genealogy to the 
commonplaces of Victorian fiction. Her novels often employ formulaic settings (castles of the 
European aristocracy, and the country house) or adapt the inter-war period’s popular genres 
including spy and detective fiction.100 Nevertheless, her practice of domestic fiction assumes its 
great flexibility and capacity for political articulation, and discredits the belief that the 
middlebrow necessarily instills political conservatism. Despite her distance from critical success, 
her career shows us that the “middlebrow” could articulate a type of cosmopolitan political 
                                                                                                                                                             
committee-rooms, and, as publicity outlets diversified, many women writers relished their emergence from 
obscurity” (37-8).  
98 Bottome writes, “My publishers I had never seen; and as for my reviewers, I did not even know their 
names if I was lucky enough for them to know mine” in The Goal (127). In fact, her work caught the attention of 
writers as politically and artistically diverse as Ezra Pound and Daphne duMaurier. When Bottome met Ezra Pound 
at a party of Rebecca West’s, he seemed willing to take her on as a cause, as he had done with other “unknown” 
writers. Bottome recalls of Pound: “I think that I might have definitely moved into the circle of my contemporaries, 
guided by Ezra, except for three deciding factors”—her mother’s illness, her best friend’s needs as an invalid, and 
her own struggles with tuberculosis (The Goal 40). A lifelong friendship with Pound ensued, but one purposefully 
lacking professional rapport. See The Goal 15-40 for an account of the early friendship between Bottome and 
Pound. For Bottome’s literary criticism on Pound as well as an account of his influence on her writing, see the 
chapter on Pound in Phyllis Bottome, From the Life (London: Faber and Faber, 1944) 70-82. Her collection, Best 
Stories of Phyllis Bottome (1963), was prefaced by Daphne duMaurier. 
99 “But in America thirty years ago” she continues, “a British author, known through seven years of serials 
in the Century Magazine, was a celebrity” (Bottome, The Goal 127). 
100 Level Crossing (1936), Danger Signal (1939), Survival (1943), and Under the Skin (1950) are all 
detective novels informed by psychiatric investigation. The Perfect Wife (1924) and Windlestraws (1929) are set in 
country houses. Jenny Hartley observes “how much there is in common between the spy novel and domestic fiction. 
That great tradition of women’s fiction, the heroine with the buried life, is on familiar ground in the spy’s world of 
double lives, disguise, surveillance and divided loyalties” (92). 
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 perception important for feminists, and a paradoxical mobility not available to high modernist 
writers.101 Taking liberal domestic fiction to its anti-fascist limits, Bottome uncovers systematic 
violence in the genre’s characteristic settings and political foundations.102 Her feminist 
articulation of liberal domestic ideology, furthermore, stages the embattled ground of 1930s and 
40s European politics.  
Bottome revises women’s agency inside and outside the home, insisting on its 
significance for social and political well-being in a cosmopolitan rather than national frame of 
reference and to reform the liberal split between public and private spheres. She thereby reveals 
liberalism’s generous accommodation, its ability to make room for women as domestic laborers 
and sex-affective producers in the family, as well as a feminist articulation of women as 
professionals in the public sphere with explicit authority in social policy. She suggests women’s 
entry into biopolitical positions of power as medical authorities to emphasize fascism as the 
destruction of humanist conceptions of the individual and family.  
                                                 
101 She explains, “Yet I cannot but think myself fortunate never to have become a stereotyped British 
intellectual. I should have lost my main advantage as a writer: that, throughout a constant change of countries and 
milieus, I have kept in touch with every profession other than my own and so have never lacked differences of 
subject and surroundings. I have lived in seven different countries and often shared their immense upheavals and 
disasters. Classes have no special significance for me; nor have I found that my best friends needed to be 
intellectuals” (Bottome, The Goal 40). 
102 For instance, Old Wine (1924), a cross-class romance, depicts the decay of Austrian society and its 
cultivation of anti-Semitism after World War I. Her novels also educate the reader in the relations between English 
and continental politics, and in at least two cases, in the politics of the Empire’s periphery. Under the Skin (1950) 
recounts the continuation of systematic racist violence and exploitation in the Caribbean after decolonization. See 
Under the Skin (London: Faber and Faber, 1950) and the short story “The Oblation” in Walls of Glass (New York: 
The Vanguard Press, 1958), both set in the British West Indies. Windlestraws (1929) is set in an aristocratic country 
house in southern England, but compares the cultural remnants of feudal chivalry to the modern systematization of 
rape. In this novel, feudal misogyny appears as fascism’s foundation. In it, the English aristocrat Reggie embodies a 
feudal attitude that sympathizes with continental fascism. The protagonist, Jean, his secretary incredulously asks him 
whether or not he believes that “force” is progressive. He replies, “Force naturally . . . but I don’t want to cure 
Progress. Force helps it along. Look at Mussolini—fine progressive chap Mussolini -he’s getting those dirty Italians 
as hard as nails. Pity we haven’t a Mussolini or two in London. What we want is a man with drive to him—get 
people on the move” (Windlestraws 43). 
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 Set in Munich, The Mortal Storm depicts the misogynist Nazi subjugation of the half 
Jewish protagonist Freya Roth. Under the regime, the university halts her promising medical 
career. Meanwhile, her Nazi half-brothers forbid Freya’s flowering relationship with a 
communist peasant, Hans Breitner, and eventually murder him. When she discovers that she is 
pregnant with Hans’ child after his murder, she must make a decision loaded with feminist 
significance. As the daughter of a Jewish father, whose medical scientific ability Freya herself 
possesses, and an “Aryan” mother with roots in the German aristocracy, Freya is given a choice: 
to escape to England or the U.S. under perilous conditions and pursue her education, or to “pass” 
as Aryan under the protection of her mother’s contacts and her half-brothers. She decides to 
pursue medicine, leaving her child behind with Hans’ family. 
 The Lifeline’s (1946) protagonist, Mark Chalmers, is an Eton schoolmaster in the late 
1930s. Because his best friend Reggie works for Britain’s Foreign Office, Mark is personally 
obligated to act as a British intelligence liaison in Nazi-occupied Austria. Working undercover as 
a manic depressive inmate at an Austrian asylum, Mark learns to identify fascism as a 
pathological psychological condition. Accordingly, Mark learns that the best way to counter 
fascism is through equitable marriage and liberal education informed by moral psychology. As 
part of his new resolve to rid British elite culture (especially the public school) of its fascist 
elements, he falls in love with the psychiatrist in charge of the asylum, Ida Eichhorn—a strong 
woman deeply committed to the anti-fascist underground movement.  
These novels advocate sound private families and individualism as the best defenses 
against fascism. Moreover, they suggest women’s accession to professions that accord with their 
domestic authority—health and psychology. My purpose in this chapter is to show that despite 
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 her powerful feminist anti-fascist logic, Bottome’s “biopolitical” critique of the fascist state 
misperceives fascism’s own grounding in biopolitical rhetoric.  
Michel Foucault has described how the “birth of biopolitics” coincided with the growth 
of liberalism, which rationalized and “place[d] at the center of its concerns the notion of 
population and the mechanisms capable of ensuring its regulation” (“Security” 67). This modern 
nexus often took a radical form throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
distinguishing itself from the “traditional right of sovereignty.” Foucault writes, “The ‘right’ to 
life, to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, and beyond all the 
oppressions or ‘alienations,’ the ‘right’ to rediscover what one is and all that one can be, this 
‘right’ . . . was the political response to all these new procedures of power” (An Introduction 
145). In the twentieth century, of course, liberalism continued to be mobilized against tyrannical 
dictatorships. Foucault writes that “liberal rationalization starts from the assumption that 
government . . . cannot be its own end” (“The Birth of Biopolitics” 74).103 Liberalism thus 
creates a “polymorphous” tool to criticize “the reality: (1) of a previous governmentality that one 
tries to shed; (2) of a current governmentality that one attempts to reform and rationalize by 
stripping it down; (3) of a governmentality that one opposes and whose abuses one tries to limit.” 
As such, liberalism comprises “a sometimes-radical opposition” (“The Birth of Biopolitics” 75). 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, feminist literary critics have described British domestic 
fiction’s revolutionary and counterrevolutionary manifestations. As a genre, it spans the 
“polymorphism” of liberalism in relation to mass politics and the state. Vis-à-vis fascism as a 
                                                 
103 In the same essay, Foucault urges us “to see in liberalism a form of critical reflection on governmental 
practice. . . The question of liberalism, understood as a question of ‘too much government,’ was one of the constant 
dimensions of that recent European phenomenon, having appeared first in England, it seems--namely, ‘political life.’ 
Indeed, it is one of the constituent elements of it, if it is the case that political life exists when governmental practice 
is limited in its possible excess by the fact that it is the object of public debate as to its ‘good or bad,’ its ‘too much 
or too little’” (77). 
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 form of governance, Bottome inscribes liberal domesticity’s most radical capacity. But I argue 
that her writing nevertheless obscures fascism’s own adherence to modern disciplinary power. 
Both novels rest on the assumption that the patriarchal family is the origin and basis of 
civilization, and that fascism insanely deviates from this basis to engender homosexuality at the 
level of national and imperial administration. I argue that they radically obscure fascism’s own 
reliance on patriarchal relations of power, and more ominously, reduplicates its pathologizing of 
homosexuality. 
Anti-fascist capitalism 
In both novels, Bottome understands fascism as a violation of civilized individualism and 
the nation-state’s ability to guarantee individual freedom. The bourgeois family resists by 
cultivating a progressive sense of individuality and social responsibility. In this section, I show 
how her novels rehearse a classic bourgeois revolutionary critique. Employing bourgeois 
domestic fiction’s “revolutionary” register, she diagnoses fascism as the residual traces of feudal 
economy and a regressive feudal deviation from universal humanist values. In this 
representation, Bottome’s works insist on the continued primacy of capitalist development and 
bourgeois leadership of the nation.  
In The Mortal Storm, fascists annihilate the private individual. In its place, they induce a 
feminized mass and create a machinic masculinity; both forms of perversion escape from the 
individual’s mandate to social responsibility. Freya’s Nazi half-brother, Emil von Röhn, for 
instance declares that “there are no private lives—not even our own. We are simply parts of a 
machine—and move, or should move, like a smoothly-running piston—any speck of dust or grit 
has to be ruthlessly cleared away!” The fascist individual loses the human capacity to reason, and 
thereby “become[s] a gesture,” merely a fascist salute (107). Fascists in crowds dramatically 
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 enact this mechanical transformation, standing “solemnly—as if all were pulled by the same 
invisible string, ten young men and half a dozen girls sprang to their feet, and stood as if God 
were present . . .” (174). This rhetorical invocation of machines directly counters the literary 
political ends of Lewis’ invocation and provides us with a by now classic critical reading of 
fascism’s violation of individualism and consciousness.  
 Bottome’s truly original critical force, however, lies in her identification of cultural 
microfascisms that existed long before official fascist regimes—the cultural valorization of 
militarism and the chivalric suppression of women. In both novels, Bottome compares fascism 
with aristocratic attitudes toward women. For example, an ineffectual aristocrat in The Mortal 
Storm relishes the installment of the fascist regime as a return to feudal chivalry: “Soon you 
could kick the proletarian riff-raff off the pavements with impunity and see women only where 
they belonged, at the cooking-stove or in your bed! Where was the virtue of not thrashing your 
wife or your groom, if you’d be punished for it—if you did? Noblesse oblige was good enough 
for Ulrich von Maberg” (180). Sophie Maberg, an aristocrat who later capitulates to fascism after 
marrying a Nazi, epitomizes fascist femininity by lacking the capacity to make individual 
decisions without the mediation and approval of men and by valorizing security over social 
responsibility: “She had decided suddenly to throw in her lot with Freya’s, because there hardly 
seemed any other chance of drawing Olaf’s attention to herself. Instantly Sophie saw that she had 
acted rightly, for Olaf looked at her with marked approval . . .” (90).  
In The Lifeline, the portrait of an Hungarian aristocratic family theorizes affinities 
between feudalism and fascism in an overtly economic paradigm. The Bezzeghys are “natural 
Nazis” who believe that concentration camps and “medieval methods” of torture are appropriate 
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 punishments for proponents of the “Red Peril” (214).104 Nazism comes naturally to them because 
they cultivated feudal elitism and selfishness for many generations (207). Accustomed to luxury, 
and having grown morally degenerate and decadent as a result, they are unwilling to reinvigorate 
their wealth through “healthy” means. This unwillingness to work is most apparent in the state of 
their possessions:  
All the furniture and utensils of the castle had once been the best of their kind and were 
now long out of date, shabby, chipped or inconvenient, but often of some real intrinsic 
beauty or value. These sifted layers of bygone tastes and wishes had a haunting quality as 
if they retained like a secret cipher, passed on from generation to generation, a message 
only understood by the Bezzeghys themselves. (209) 
Revealing more than the Bezzeghys’ mere inability to keep their domestic home up to date, their 
obsolete “furniture and utensils” signify an economic parasitism that necessitates a tyrannical 
mode of household organization. Their household is completely disconnected from the 
community around them and reflects no social interest. Moreover, their anachronistic manners 
and possessions create a dead language communicable only between family members. Living 
purely on self-interest, the Bezzeghys enact a type of social neurosis.   
In both works, Bottome invests the traditional bourgeois task of “destroying” the 
aristocracy with an anti-fascist goal. Marx writes in The Eighteenth Brumaire that the task of 
“setting up modern bourgeois society,” required first the destruction of “the feudal basis to 
pieces” (16). Originally, the bourgeois revolution adapted theatrical guises of heroism to “glorify 
the new struggles,” and “magnify the given task in imagination” (16). After the bourgeoisie were 
                                                 
104 The Gräfin explains to Mark, “[I]f there were not the Nazi system there would be the Red Peril! A 
thousand times rather Hitler and all his rigours than the rising tide of the Common Man’s Universe—with all its 
rights.”  
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 established, that is, after the revolutionary moment, the monumental register was abolished, and 
their triumph normalized to a domestic scale: “When the real aim had been achieved, when the 
bourgeois transformation of English society had been accomplished, Locke supplanted 
Habakkuk” (17).  
 In Bottome’s recapitulation of the bourgeois revolution, however, the domestic register 
does not re-establish the bourgeoisie’s triumph. Instead, she implies that a pernicious feudal 
aristocratic influence, namely their inability to adapt to liberal capital, has persisted into the 
twentieth century as a seed of fascism. The narrator observes in The Mortal Storm that “the 
feudal system had lasted a good deal too long; and now was retarding growth” (87). In her 
criticism of the aristocracy, domestic realism—the anti-romantic, everyday characterization of 
the middle class—lays the necessary groundwork for anti-fascist, anti-feudal heroic 
revolution.105 The domestic register therefore does not “reduce” the bourgeois revolutionary task, 
but rather “elevates” household organization into a heroic one.  In turn, anti-fascism becomes an 
everyday responsibility with monumental importance.  
In The Lifeline, the peasants take this task to heart, and act as a foil to the Bezzeghys’ 
refusal to labor or contribute to the market. Their spiritual and mental health, the fruit of their 
economic indispensability, also makes their anti-fascist stance as natural as the Bezzeghys’ 
tendency toward fascism. Father Planer, an Austrian peasant, for example explains to Mark his 
impetus for being anti-fascist: 
[T]he Nazis take my corn to buy themselves guns to fight England and France. No man’s 
goods belong to him now, nor a man’s sons, nor even his daughters—as for his soul—to 
                                                 
105 Vineta Colby describes the terms of domestic realism operating here: “It is bourgeois and anti-romantic . 
. . glorif[ying] the solid values of home and family. . . It emphasizes the importance of compromise, cooperation, 
and common sense both in the individual’s private life and in his public life, as he functions in the social community 
in which he lives and works” (212). 
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 hear these Nazis talk you would think their souls belonged to Hitler. And who is Hitler? 
Here in Austria we know who Hitler is. It is a pity that we hatched him—but at least we 
know what we have hatched. He got no white collar from us!” (63) 
Because their economy is attached so closely to the earth and invested in useful goods, the 
peasants refuse to acknowledge the Nazis’ corrupt translation of corn into guns. Moreover, 
despite their closeness to the processes of nature, the peasants can be trusted to guard as well the 
processes of civilization by keeping watch over the middle class (“He got no white collar from 
us!”). 
Here, Bottome’s text severs the traditional bond between the peasantry and aristocracy, 
who formed a corporate unit under the feudal economy. In lieu of that dyad, she merges the 
peasantry with the (paternal) bourgeoisie. In the liberal revision of the patriarchal corporate 
fantasy, the peasants have adapted nicely to modernity, assimilating themselves as laborers 
within a liberal capitalist economy whereas the aristocracy is wholly anachronistic and therefore 
superfluous. Although the peasants still labor under a ruling class, they identify with that class 
more sympathetically. This series of displacements and replacements leads to a specific liberal 
assertion—that fascism deviates absolutely from socio-economic modernity. In this fantasy, 
fascism appears eccentric to capitalist systems of production and exchange—a blatant fallacy 
exposed as such by anti-fascists such as Antonio Gramsci, Walter Benjamin, C. L. R. James, and 
Stephen Spender, not to mention fascists themselves such as Mosley and Marinetti.  
Anti-fascist revisions of liberalism 
Nevertheless, Bottome’s critique of fascism cuts both ways. She defines fascism as a 
deviation from the capitalist rhetoric of the private individual, but also turns her attention to the 
liberal capitalist exclusion of women. She disarticulates the confinement of women to 
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 domesticity, arguing that the private sphere is a responsibility of both sexes. In this way, 
Bottome revises classic terms of English liberalism and social contract theory for feminist anti-
fascist purposes. Ultimately, however, she retains a defense of the gender division of labor and 
aligns women’s interests with the patriarchal family—a paradox that indicates another liberal 
misdiagnosis of fascism. 
In The Second Treatise of Government (1690), the English touchstone for social contract 
theory, John Locke theorizes that two kinds of social relations—society based on natural law, as 
well as authentic political society—both demand the authority of the father.106 The father in both 
instances regards the members of his family, including his wife, as extensions of himself, and so 
cares for them as his own property, i.e., as he would his own body or goods. Since the father’s 
self-interest mingles so intimately with his motivation to rule, paternal legislation is “naturally” 
benevolent. Political society arose originally, he explains, when grown sons who wanted to 
cultivate their own property negotiated among themselves and gave consent to the father to 
arbitrate over disputes (43).  
Locke emphasizes consent as a key necessity of political society. The patriarchal ruler 
acquires consent ultimately because his subjects know that he considers them as extensions of 
himself. He writes, “young societies could not have subsisted; without such nursing fathers, 
tender and careful of the public weal, all governments would have sunk under the weakness and 
infirmities of their infancy, and the prince and the people had soon perished together” (64). He 
thereby speculates on a peaceful establishment of political sovereignty. In political society and 
                                                 
106 The idea that political society arises naturally from family associations is a feature of social contract 
theory in general. Johannes Althusius in the early seventeenth century, considered the first theorist of social contract 
theory, writes, “Human society develops from private to public association by the definite steps and progressions of 
small societies. The public association exists when many private associations are linked together for the purpose of 
establishing an inclusive political order.” Social Contract Theory, ed. Michael Lessnoff (New York: New York UP, 
1990) 33.   
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 its social contract, the individual similarly concedes his “natural rights”—the right to protect his 
own property, and the right to punish interference. Political society eventually transcends the 
family as a type of natural society in Locke’s theoretical fiction.  
Nevertheless, the family continues to remind developed political societies of natural 
necessities. Humans demand parental care for an extended period of time, and in turn, parental 
cooperation for “the continuation of the species” (44). The family as a type of society, and the 
marriage relation within it takes unequal rights as a given premise: “But the husband and wife . . 
. will unavoidably sometimes have different wills, too; it therefore being necessary that the last 
determination—i.e., the rule—should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the man’s share, 
as the abler and the stronger” (46). Locke distinguishes between the public, political society and 
the private family and thereby accounts for a glaring disparity. While consent of the ruled is 
necessary to legitimate the sovereign in the public sphere, the husband/father possesses an a 
priori, “natural” sovereignty in the private sphere. 
In this account of the institutions of marriage and family, women consent to a limited 
exercise of rationality and self-interest, as well as an inferior position in political society. 
Feminist philosopher Diana Coole explains of Locke’s account, “women seem to be excluded 
from full citizenship, while their tacit consent to political association appears to be both 
inevitable and irrelevant due to their (subordinate) positioning in the private sphere” (195). 
Classic liberalism’s sexual politics posit the father’s supreme authority in civil society and the 
private sphere of the family by holding women’s physical and mental weakness as an 
unquestionable premise.  
The Mortal Storm selectively modifies several key elements in this classical liberal 
account of civil society. Although Bottome accepts Locke’s basic premise that benevolent 
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 patriarchy cultivates consent, she calls into question several of his conditions. Her modifications 
confront fascism’s reiteration of liberalism’s patriarchal insistence on women’s “right” to be 
“protected” in light of their relative weakness. Nevertheless, Bottome retains “paternal 
benevolence” as a necessary feature of democracy. In so doing, the novel reinforces patriarchal 
relations of power despite its significant challenges.  
In The Mortal Storm, Bottome insists that the home is a microcosm and foundation for 
political virtue, not its “outside” or a momentary stage in its development or as a reminder of 
human limits.107 Although she agrees that women need protection and must defer to male 
authority, she revises the “tenderness and care” of patriarchal rule of the commonwealth so that 
they include direct “feminine” participation in the state. In this reversal, Bottome employs an 
Hegelian criticism of the liberal state’s “empiricism.” Coole explains its potential “feminist” 
dimensions: “Hegel . . . would also see the familial moment and its lessons of altruism and 
community as vital to the state, alongside the egoism contributed by (male) civil society” (197). 
Like Hegel, Bottome implies that the state should not “merely” exist as an empirical guarantee of 
universal rights. Unlike Hegel, however, she insists that the family should not be superseded by 
the rational state; rather, when headed by a benevolent patriarch, it continues to work as an ideal 
model for political virtue.  
The Mortal Storm distinguishes between brutal and benevolent patriarchies to reinforce 
this point. In the contrast between the dead, abusive patriarch (von Röhn) and the living, 
benevolent one (Johann Roth), Bottome corrects Locke’s assumptions that consent to paternal 
                                                 
107 This function is also clear in The Lifeline, where the protagonist Mark Chalmers, as an underground spy 
who helps transport Jews out of Germany, encounters the domestic image of nations: “He thought of each country 
not as separate entities any more but as millions of small homes like the one he was in, where families could make 
happiness out of their personal relationships and spread their knowledge into a unity of human brotherhood” (259). 
The nation is a conglomeration of families. As such, the family has an explicit political authority to define the limits 
of conformity as well as of individuality. 
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 benevolence is “natural” in the family.108 The Roths are actually an amalgamated family. 
Amélie, Freya’s mother, had been married to an abusive German aristocrat, von Röhn, with 
whom she’d had two sons, Emil and Olaf. After von Röhn’s ignominious death, she’d married 
Johann Roth, a Jewish Nobel-decorated medical researcher, and had their children Freya and 
Rudi. The first patriarch engenders fascism, whereas the latter basing his rule on a consensual 
model engenders civilized individualism. Before the advent of the Nazi regime, the Roths had 
led a harmonious family existence despite cross-class and cross-racial dynamics. When Emil and 
Olaf join the Nazi youth, however, they begin to identify with their dead father’s brutal military 
legacy, and accordingly rebel against Johann Roth’s benevolent rule.  
The Roths challenge the degradation of wives’ and daughters’ positions within the private 
patriarchal family. Several scenes foreground Amélie’s contradiction of Johann; for instance, she 
protests his decision to prohibit the communist Hans Breitner from visiting their home: “At least 
let there be one roof in this land under which a woman has the same rights as a man, and knows 
herself to be equally valued. If my boys do not already know this—let them learn it now—and if 
I cannot trust them to be fair to their sister, let me know that upon this point they are not 
trustworthy” (55). Johann, we are told in turn, “expected his children to be independent of advice 
and gave his help more in the nature of a stimulating word or glance than by showing any 
willingness to share a child’s responsibility” (58). The “true” family, not to mention a good 
political society, relies less on “self-evident” biological ties and more on contractual 
understandings between spouses, and between children and parents. Bottome extends the father’s 
need to establish consent in the family, particularly with women and children.  
                                                 
108 Amélie reminds Emil and Olaf that, “We have been a happy family, in spite of the fact that we are 
divided by different strains of blood and race. I want to you to ask yourselves this: ‘Have these differences ever hurt 
you; until now?’” Bottome challenges the idea of a family that “naturally” binds together because of the same 
“blood and race” (The Mortal Storm 63). 
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 The Nazi vision of the individual as a “part in a machine,” on the other hand, dissolves 
“consent” as a legitimate attribute of the state. Fascist degradation and complete subordination of 
women in the family dramatically contrasts their model. Emil declares that “girls . .. are 
answerable to their family, and the family is held responsible for them” (113)!  
To the Roths, Nazi brutality creates the need for urgent feminist protest. This protest 
includes promoting women’s agency outside the family. Johann explains fascism’s degradations 
of women to Freya in the following way:  
[S]ince they believe in force rather than persuasion, and women have less force than men, 
the Nazi regime must be, to that extent, antifeminine. Physical inferiority is always 
stressed rather than relieved by a militaristic rule; so that it would not surprise me to find 
that the half of the human race that produces and trains the other half, will be once more 
degraded! One must not forget that many women will like it better. For one pets what one 
degrades; and one has to support what one has enfeebled. Many women who have not 
tasted the joy and rigour of freedom, prefer to be petted and supported; but not those who 
have ever worked successfully. For such women the Nazi regime will be very unpleasant 
indeed. (14) 
In this explanation, Johann shuttles between incompatible assessments of women regarding their 
“weaker” status. The liberal critique here sutures irreconcilable definitions of women as political 
subjects, and bypasses the real need to define the relationship between liberalism and fascism.  
First, Johann implies that women naturally need protection, which democratic 
governments based on consensus would provide. Second, Nazism imposes this weakness onto 
women as an external force; it is therefore not a natural condition at all. Third, women had been 
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 enfeebled by an outside force before the installment of Nazism; those who willingly accept the 
Nazi regime do so because they already are familiar with its brand of chivalry.  
 In line with the shifting assessment of women’s “weakness” above, the novel represents 
the liberal bourgeois family as a form of governance that accommodates both the patriarchal 
insistence on women as the weaker sex, and their capacity to undertake the burdens of political 
and economic subjectivity. The Roths value girls and women not only for their reproductive 
capacity, but also as civilized individuals. They recontextualize maternity to fulfill both the 
paradigm of the patriarchal family and women’s social agency outside their reference to the 
husband. Amélie explains to Freya about her decision to have more children after re-marrying, 
“Your father, too, had always wanted children, so that I knew I was giving him his heart’s desire; 
that made me happy; but perhaps most of all what makes the pain of childbirth worth while is 
that a woman feels like an artist when she produces a child” (10-11). Freya and Amélie as 
mothers both amalgamate families and hybridize races as political, not solely private, acts. Even 
as a daughter, Freya, already racially and culturally “hybrid” embodies a future Europe whose 
national boundaries are less important than the sexual. Moreover, the two politicized roles of 
motherhood in the novel—complicating bloodlines and nurturing Jewish children—imagine the 
female body as a potential force against the Nazi state. Both acts reverse the Nazi discourse of 
blood and maternity in which the role of the “Aryan” mother is to keep the nation’s blood free 
from Jewish “contamination,” and to proliferate the racially pure nation.109
                                                 
109 The Marriage Loan Program of 1933 rewarded “Aryan” women for leaving the workplace, and 
subsequently for bearing children.  From 1934, Nazi youth had to salute women who wore “mother badges” that 
attested that they had borne five children or more.  The Nazis further silenced feminist articulations of maternity by 
taking over the control of women’s reproduction (abortion as well as birth control were outlawed in 1933). See the 
following on official and unofficial Nazi declarations on maternity: Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland: 
Women, the Family and Nazi Politics (New York: St. Martin’s, 1987); Timothy Mason, “Women and Nazi 
Germany, Part 1,”  History Workshop 1:1 (Spring 1976)  74-113; Timothy Mason, “Women in Germany 1925-1940: 
Family, Welfare and Work. Conclusion,” History Workshop 1:2 (Autumn 1976) 5-32; Leila Rupp, “Mother of the 
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 Although Bottome’s critique impressively acknowledges both fascism’s brutal 
repressions and deceptive temptations, it fails to acknowledge that the liberal patriarchal 
definition of agency also requires the subjugation of women precisely under the guise of 
“protecting” them, and so necessarily obfuscates private patriarchy’s basis in women’s unpaid 
domestic labor.  
As Patricia Mann argues in her critique of liberalism, Micropolitics, “the public agency 
of the liberal individual presupposes an incorporated male family self” (137). The liberal account 
of civilization’s origin in paternal benevolence masks its ultimate guarantee of paternal control. 
Bottome therefore does not reconcile so much as contradict the goal of liberal equality for 
women by retaining the basis of the patriarchal family. By representing fascism as a seduction of 
women through the promise of security, affecting those who seek to justify their sequestered 
roles in the family, Bottome cloaks the fascist articulation of women’s public agency through 
their domestic identity. As we saw in Chapter 2, the BUF employed similar representations of 
women’s fundamental domestic interests in attempts to advocate the benefits of the corporate 
state for women. Therefore, Bottome’s liberal reconciliation, while it effectively addresses 
fascism’s repressive apparatus, cannot address its real ability to deploy similar articulations of 
women’s agency.  
 In valorizing patriarchal relations of power, Bottome resonates strongly with a 
psychoanalytic interpretation of fascism as an anti-patriarchal revolt. In the next section, I 
compare Bottome’s analysis with Freud’s in order to foreground its abjection of women. 
Psychoanalysis and Anti-Semitism 
                                                                                                                                                             
Volk: The Image of Women in Nazi Ideology.” Signs 3:21 (Winter 1977) 362-379; Jill Stephenson, Women in Nazi 
Society (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1975). 
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 In Moses and Monotheism (1939), Sigmund Freud links the mass attraction of Hitler to 
individual psychology, accounting for fascism’s success by assuming the individual’s persistent 
desire for the father, and his/her simultaneous revolt against patriarchal reason.110   
[T]he great majority of people have a strong need for authority which they can admire, to 
which they can submit, and which dominates and sometimes even ill-treats them. We 
have learned from the psychology of the individuals whence comes this need of the 
masses. It is the longing for the father that lives in each of us from his childhood days . . . 
The decisiveness of thought, the strength of will, the forcefulness of his deeds, belong to 
the picture of the father; above all other things, however, the self-reliance and 
independence of the great man, his divine conviction of doing the right thing, which may 
pass into ruthlessness. He must be admired, he may be trusted, but one cannot help also 
being afraid of him. (139-40)  
In this account, fascist anti-Semitism arises in turn from “the jealousy which the Jews evoked in 
other peoples by maintaining that they were the first-born, favourite child of God the Father” 
which “has not yet been overcome by those others . . .” (116). Freud claims that in revolt against 
Judaism, Nazism enacts a “return of the repressed,” the patricide that undergirds civilization. 
Civilization, based on “a tremendous father imago,” installed the capacity for reason, deductive 
thought processes and a “higher level of spirituality” through a “Mosaic prohibition” against 
graven images of God. Both Nazism and Christianity revolt against patriarchal civilization in 
their regression to magic, mysticism, and superstition (140). 
                                                 
110 In Moses and Monotheism, Freud writes, “If we accept the continued existence of . . . memory traces in 
our archaic inheritance, then we have bridged the gap between individual and mass psychology and can treat peoples 
as we do the individual neurotic” (128). This project recalls that of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego 
(1922) where he asserts that “it may be possible to discover the beginnings of its [the social instinct’s] development 
in a narrower circle, such as that of the family” (5). 
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  Bottome’s analysis differs from Freud’s in two respects. In her account of patriarchal 
civilization’s beginnings, she relies on a classical liberal theory of political society, which as we 
recall, insists on the father’s survival and establishment of consent rather than patricide. Thus 
Bottome disavows Freud’s emphasis on the father’s capacity to instill antagonistic fear and terror 
in his children as an impetus for their obedience. Moreover, whereas Freud believed that 
Christianity was a “thin veneer” for a “barbarous polytheism” that valorized maternity rather 
than paternity, Bottome emphasizes the continuity of Christianity and Judaism (Freud, Moses 
117). According to Johann, the “persecution of the Jews by Europeans—is . . . a revenge because 
one of our sons has given them a religion that they wished to accept—and have failed to 
practice! It is a very dangerous thing to have an idea that you will not practice. It might well 
make anyone angry with those from whom the idea came” (167).  
 Both writers, however, understand fascism as the result of agonized relationships with 
fathers. Olaf and Emil translate their private resentment against Freya and Rudi as Johann’s 
chosen and favorite children into an admiration for Hitler as a father-substitute. Both critics’ 
analyses, moreover, take for granted the child’s belief in the father’s omniscience and provision 
of security. Johann’s words and later his memory instill the security that enables Freya to 
overcome personal and political obstacles throughout the narrative: “She was his flesh and blood 
child; the blood that raced through her heart and brain was his blood; the eyes that looked at her 
now with love and wisdom, had created her out of that love and wisdom. If they took her father 
from her, she would lose the roots of her being” (118).  
 Finally, Bottome like Freud privileges Judaism for patriarchal civilization. Johann 
explains that to be Jewish is  
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 to be strong with a strength that has outlived persecutions . . . wise against ignorance, 
honest against conspiracy, harmless against evil, industrious against idleness, kind 
against cruelty! It is to belong to a race that has given Europe its religion; its moral law; 
and much of its science—perhaps even more of its genius—in art, literature, and music . . 
. You have no country but the world, and you inherit nothing but wisdom and 
brotherhood . . . (65)  
 These strategies conform to narratives of liberation that enact reversals as literary and 
political tools for the better distribution of power. Nevertheless, they both align civilized modern 
individuality with the acceptance of patriarchal relations of power. From this perspective, the 
relegation of women to biological and affective labor cannot be understood as systematic 
subjugation. In representing fascism as an offense against patriarchy, Bottome’s strategy relies 
on the transparency of contractual relations, opening itself to the charge that “negotiation” with 
patriarchal relations already implies the impossibility of articulating outside of its terms.  
 In Bottome’s and Freud’s accounts, the liberal patriarchal leadership of the family 
grounded in Judaic roots founded civilization. From this ground, Bottome enacts a discourse of 
universal (rather than nationalist) brotherhood, love, and humanity to foreground fascist 
nationalism and deification of the state as subversions of the social contract. Liberal patriarchy 
thereby acquires a timeless status, finding affinity with the scientific pursuit of Truth.  
 In the next several sections, I foreground Bottome’s reliance on scientifically sound “bio-
power” (that finds a natural affinity with Social Democracy in the political sphere) to endorse 
bourgeois political leadership as a necessary feature of anti-fascist critique. The Mortal Storm 
and The Lifeline both conflate the bourgeoisie with medical and psychiatric authority. Nazism, 
on the other hand, is represented as an offense against medical science. This offense is 
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 particularized in the Nazis’ prohibition of Johann’s work in medical research. He informs Freya 
that the Nazis forbid him to “advise the government, as I have done in the past, in the erection 
and administration of state hospitals,” nor can he plan “hygienic improvements for great cities. 
Also I cannot train any more students through the university . . .” (120). In deep contrast is 
Amélie’s abusive first husband who “died not of wounds heroically acquired in battle, but of a 
disease that he had merited” (178). Freya is urged “to learn science so that you may practice 
truth” by her father (160). Civilization’s progress is gauged by the effective scientific 
management of populations. The value of medical authority, conflated with the liberal middle 
class, effectually moves liberalism to a position seemingly “beyond” politics and is thus rendered 
impervious to critique.111  
 In the process, Bottome obscures fascism’s irreducible modernity, and the complicity of 
modern science in its development. Moreover, in articulating a “biopolitical feminism,” 
Bottome’s mode of advocating women’s political agency paradoxically accords with Olive 
Hawks’. Both of Bottome’s fictional protagonists fulfill the roles of wife or mother, but also 
those of doctor and psychiatrist, professional roles that expand women’s sex-affective labor and 
maternal agency into biopolitical agency. In Freya, Bottome accommodates women’s appeal to 
the explicitly economic and political agency of the modern subject, and their fulfillment of the 
maternal role. In Ida, she creates an interface between domestic surveillance and women’s 
political agency.  
 Both authors push a logic of gender that insists on women’s nurturing roles, and 
associates women’s domestic labor with medical/psychiatric authority and national health. They 
                                                 
111 As Freya notes, such men as Johann, a Nobel prize winner in medical research are “beyond politics” 
since “All humanity owes him a debt” (82)! Even his dedication to Social Democracy is qualified as he explains, “I 
am not interested in politics. . . I watch what people do, and if their activities seem to me useful to mankind, I should 
be glad to associate myself with them—as activities . . .” (121).   
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 articulate the value of that labor not in terms of the private family, but in a biopolitical paradigm, 
on the level of races, nations, and classes. Domestic women can articulate their value by aligning 
themselves with medical authority sanctioned by specifically British imperial goals. 
Biopolitical Feminism 
The inter-war period was for the feminist movement in Britain surprisingly turbulent 
considering the strides that feminists had made just after World War I. By 1938, the date of 
publication of The Mortal Storm and the year in which The Lifeline is set, all adult English 
women were legally enfranchised (1928), the Eligibility of Women Act (1918) had provided 
women’s first entry into parliament, and the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act (1919) had 
opened the professions to women. In addition, many laws in the 1920s were passed to improve 
women’s control over their place in the family, including “divorce on equal grounds (1923), 
equal guardianship of children (1925), widow’s pensions (1925) and the right to legitimise a 
child by marriage to the father (1927)” (Beddoe 134).
In spite of these progressive laws, private interests often imposed their own gender 
boundaries. After having been educated or employed during World War I, women were often 
forced out by new “unofficial” measures (outside the state’s direct influence) that barred married 
women from working. After 1928, when all adult women were granted the vote, and with the 
advent of new birth control methods, the feminist movement began to experience the pressure to 
pinpoint a widespread cause other than suffrage. According to Jane Lewis, the “old” feminists 
who had rallied around the dual issues of suffrage and the professions (a.k.a. “equalitarian” 
feminists) clashed with the “new” feminists of the interwar period, who instead emphasized the 
need for state recognition and compensation of women’s maternal services to the state and the 
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 national economy (a.k.a., “difference feminists”) (Jane Lewis 230-1). Deirdre Beddoe, a feminist 
historian, elucidates these factions:  
‘[O]ld feminists’ like Lady Rhondda and Winifred Holtby . . . regarded feminism as 
being about equal rights and were therefore opposed to any form of special protective 
legislators for women in the workplace. The ‘new feminists’ such as Eleanor Rathbone, 
Mary Stocks and Maude Royden concentrated on the special position of women as 
mothers; their platform was primarily the welfare of women at home and the main aim  . . 
. was to bring about ‘family endowment,’ or family allowances. (136)  
No longer able to find consensus due to their divergent emphases on labor and sexuality, the 
movement splintered starting in the 1920s (Beddoe 136).112 In The Mortal Storm, Bottome 
creates possibilities for consensus across feminist factions, reconciling “old” (equalitarian) and 
“new” (difference) feminism through the figure of woman doctor.  
 The liberal patriarchal home in The Mortal Storm has the capacity to protect women from 
sexual vulnerability, but also nurtures women’s labor outside the home. As Freya’s mentor, 
Johann enthusiastically encourages her economic agency, her education, and the challenge she 
poses to a gender-exclusive profession.113 At the same time, Bottome limits the equality implied 
                                                 
112 Nevertheless, feminist solidarity in anti-fascism was one unifying concern that “could cross party lines 
and that were recognizable on a national level” (Beddoe 143). In England, feminists of various political orientations 
produced journalism, travel narratives, and fiction to warn readers about fascism’s misogyny. Maroula Joannou, 
‘Ladies, Please Don’t Smash These Windows’: Women’s Writing, Feminist Consciousness and Social Change 
1918-38 (Oxford: Berg, 1995) explores the literary tactics of socialist feminists, who had organized on an 
international scale against fascism. In fact, most organized groups for anti-fascism were communist or socialist 
based.  Seline Cooper, the British delegate to the 1934 Women Against War and Fascism conference in Paris, was a 
correspondent for the Daily Worker and the Daily Herald, reporting on the specific effects of repression in Nazi 
Germany on women.  See Jill Liddington’s The Life and Times of a Respectable Rebel: Selina Cooper (1864-1946) 
(London : Virago, 1984) and Sue Bruley, Leninism, Stalinism, and the Women's Movement in Britain, 1920- 1939 
(New York: Garland Pub., 1986).   
113 Koonz writes that in the late 1920s, there were between two and three thousand women physicians 
Germany who represented “5.4 percent of the profession” (144) and that “American feminists gazed with admiration 
at their German sisters” (45). Directly relevant to the narrative of Freya Roth is the fact that many women’s 
organizations were Nazified in the early 1930s: “In Bavaria, women physicians explained . . . ‘We have always been 
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 by women’s accession to economic and political agency by representing medicine as a 
profession that also attends to women’s sexual difference as mothers. Bottome challenges the 
division of labor in the public sphere and insists on women’s contribution, but this agency is 
based on the nurturing qualities that are their natural forte. As mothers, women are supposedly 
suited to labor that has a strongly affective dimension, from caring for farm animals, to caring for 
patients.114 As a potential doctor, Freya absorbs competing ideas of women’s agency in the inter-
war era. Medicine, according to Johann, is “a singularly suitable profession for a mother, and 
being a mother quite an asset for a doctor” (11)!  
 In the next section, I show how Bottome’s biopolitical valorization of women and the 
family rests on an imperial and homophobic logic that is explicit in The Lifeline. There, Bottome 
suggests in line with domestic literature the notion of the body as a site of individual 
surveillance. I argue that it reproduces the discursive means for violence through the deployment 
of sexuality by entrenching a set of homosocial criteria for anti-fascist thinking. By identifying 
fascism as a manifestation of homosexuality, Bottome’s rhetoric ultimately entrenches a 
heteronormative defense of the British Empire. 
Anti-fascist homophobia 
The Lifeline (1946) focuses on the basic conditions and causes of fascism that also 
flourish ominously in liberal democracies, tracing the economic and sexual causes of fascism 
                                                                                                                                                             
more rooted and closer to nature, and therefore more instinctively race-conscious than elsewhere in Germany’ . . . 
Married women physicians lost their right to practice; and by 1935, women physicians (like Jewish physicians) 
could no longer receive payments from the state-sponsored health-insurance system” (144).  
114 Frau Breitner’s motherhood contributes to her apt management of her farm, especially in her ability “to 
rectify the inequalities of nature” (Bottome, The Mortal Storm 144). 
132 
 further back to an even more fundamental condition—mental illness.115 Bottome presents 
fascism as a psychological pathology that flows across national boundaries into the British 
Empire. In the concomitant “cure,” she submits fascism to modern disciplinary power.  
Bottome’s psychological analysis of fascism in The Lifeline taps into the problem of 
agency in a new world order after World War I, increasingly based on finance capital, growing 
global competition, and a falling British Empire—events that seemingly determined one’s 
livelihood across the class spectrum in Britain. In addition, women were pressuring the labor 
market and the state with new demands, and colonies were increasingly threatening massive 
revolution, radically changing the limits of liberally defined agency.  
The continuing prestige of psychology in the inter-war period assured many of their 
agency across the political spectrum. On the Left, it allowed an optimistic view of the political 
and economic efficacy of continual personal improvement and self-control.116 On the Right, the 
preoccupation with mental health was linked directly to the drive for profit. Robert Graves and 
Alan Hodges note in their history of the 1930s that the National Institute of Industrial 
Psychology (founded in 1921) determined, “what kind of factory conditions would promote 
healthier and happier minds in workers . ..  The aim was to consider the worker, the machine, 
and the task as one unity not only to discover how to improve the worker’s health and his 
enjoyment of work, but at the same time to increase his output” (208).  
In the literary field, the ongoing exploration of the “psyche” and mental health, 
undertaken by figures such as I. A. Richards and T. S. Eliot, often struck a “balance” in “the 
                                                 
115 In The Goal, Bottome remembers seeing Hitler before his rise to power: “I often thought, even then, that 
if only Hitler and Mussolini had been brought in time to Seif’s Clinic, history might have rewritten itself. . . We 
noticed that he never had a friend to share a meal or asked a comrade to sit down at his table with him” (194). 
116 “Amongst the literate classes this was the age much more of Freud than of Marx. . . . Center stage was 
the individual and it was the question of individual destiny that dominated both modernists and popular writers 
alike” (Bloom 20). 
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 inner exploration of psychic forces and the denial of outward (social) presence” (Bloom 27). 
Bottome, in contrast, transforms the literature of psychology into a guarantee of explicitly 
political agency, suggesting that the Empire needs primarily to redefine imperial “manliness” on 
the level of the individual as the willingness to extend agency to “reasonable” women in order to 
survive. Like Lewis, Bottome’s imperial imagination links political agency to masculinity.  
As a devoted student of Adlerian psychiatry, Bottome believed that a liberal education 
that directly posed “social interest” as the ultimate goal of self-interest (instead of vice versa) 
could revolutionize western civilization (Bottome, Alfred Adler 205). According to Bottome, 
Adler, who had once been a student of Freud, turned against psychoanalysis, eventually 
believing that “the Freudian form of psychiatry was without moral safeguards, and must result in 
antisocial types of human beings” (Alfred Adler 273). He and Bottome agreed that Freud’s 
concept of the death drive served to justify the Nazi perversion of culture despite Freud’s 
ostensible opposition to fascism (Alfred Adler 66).117 Bottome’s understanding of Adlerian 
practice consequently underplays its affiliation with psychoanalysis and turns to the “conscious” 
task of re-education, and therefore shares more with the nineteenth-century asylum’s psychiatric 
practices and methods than with the later discipline.  
In her representation, the humanism of Adler’s practice suggests that the fully developed 
and civilized subject, the “whole human being,” must carry out three main responsibilities—
work, love, and social contact. To achieve the ultimate goal, the subject must “bring himself into 
line with others” (Alfred Adler 301). In part, the treatment demands conformity to a nuclear 
family; the desire for fatherhood or motherhood proves the individual’s normal development. 
                                                 
117 Bottome seems to have in mind Freud’s text Civilization and its Discontents, which repeatedly 
highlights Europe’s technological drive and its capacity for genocide in the name of civilizational progress: “Men 
have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their help they would have no difficulty in 
exterminating one another to the last man” (104).  
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 The family thus provides the crucial early education and the final destination that defines the 
(gendered) individual in the context of a larger social and political community.118 In her work, 
Bottome specifically employs Adlerian practices to re-master fascism’s destruction of individual 
accountability.  
In his history of mental illness in Europe, Madness and Civilization, Foucault discusses 
the nineteenth-century European asylum’s complex understanding of madness. The asylum 
combined an emerging positivist psychiatric understanding of mental illness—a belief in the 
“innocent determinism” of physical causes—with a moral judgment of the ill subject’s guilt. 119 
The asylum and the invention of psychiatry as medicine in the nineteenth century, Foucault 
further claims, were important components in the development of disciplinary power: “the 
madman . . . in the interior of that disease of which he is no longer guilty, must feel morally 
responsible for everything within him that may disturb morality and society, and must hold no 
one but himself responsible for the punishment he receives” (246). Although not “guilty” of the 
madness, the mad subject must nonetheless constantly survey him or herself to prevent any 
outward manifestation of madness. To facilitate that exercise of self-awareness and punishment, 
the asylum was arranged as a place of self-observation through work: “This movement by which, 
objectifying himself for the Other, the madman thus returned to his liberty, was to be found as 
much in Work as in Observation” (247). In this arrangement, the mad subject submits to “a 
minority status”, or the status of  child since the refusal to cooperate and work was regarded as a 
failure of maturity rather than a deliberate revolt. The mad subject did not have such a “right to 
                                                 
118 Bottome describes homosexuality as a “lack of courage” and the “avoidance of greater obligation” 
(Alfred Adler 160). 
119 “Physical therapeutics tends to become, in the first half of the nineteenth century, a cure devised by an 
innocent determinism, and moral treatment a cure wrought by a culpable freedom. Psychology, as a means of curing, 
is henceforth organized around punishment” writes Foucault (Madness and Civilization 182). 
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 autonomy, and can live only grafted onto the world of reason” (252). Reason was projected onto 
the asylum structure as a parental authority.120  
In The Lifeline, madness transgresses civilized moral citizenship, and so eludes the 
community’s demand for individuation. “To be mad was merely a patient’s unfortunate choice; 
not a doom; and for a moment—a brief, wistful, ecstatic moment—the wind of their freedom to 
behave like other people swept over each patient’s consciousness” (93). Fascism is a form of 
madness because it too bypasses this patriarchal education of reason.121 Fascism appears then as 
a curious combination of the failure to individuate and to conform. The liberal task vis-à-vis 
fascism is therefore to educate the subject in the pleasures of conforming to “socially” based 
reason and to balance these demands of reciprocity with individual freedom. Because this task is 
primarily pedagogical, consensus, or the voluntary submission to the asylum’s rules of authority, 
achieves the cure that force cannot. Liberal consensus is necessary to transform the insane 
because the subjects must be made to want conformity in order for the “cure” to be successful.122 
The sane, as a paradoxical contrast, are willing to be pedagogically re-formed.  
As if to emphasize this definition of the human, the novel contains multiple scenes that 
depict Ida’s Lipizzaner horses that (who?) behave “just like humans” (104). In fact, when the 
                                                 
120 In the asylum, “the entire existence of madness . . . was enveloped in what we may call, in anticipation, 
a ‘parental complex.’ The prestige of patriarchy is revived around madness in the bourgeois family. It is this 
historical sedimentation which psychoanalysis would later bring to light, according with through a new myth the 
meaning of a destiny that supposedly marked all of Western culture and perhaps all civilization, whereas it had been 
slowly deposited by it and only solidified quite recently at the turn of the century, when madness was doubly 
alienated within the family—by the myth of a disalienation in patriarchal purity, and by a truly alienating situation in 
an asylum constituted in the family mode” (Foucault, Madness and Civilization 253).  
121 Felix Mannheim, Ida’s assistant, declares that “Nazis are out to destroy individual responsibility, which 
is sanity—madness is individual irresponsibility—so the Nazis must believe in madness” (Bottome, The Lifeline 
126)! This is clear in her non-fictional writing as well. Bottome writes, “Adler saw that the field of responsibility 
was being restricted by the totalitarian states that he fought most ardently for intellectual liberty” (Alfred Adler 200).  
122 Felix thus describes to Mark the best way to cure Nazi brutality: “[I]n a world where all men were 
courageous and prepared to accept personal responsibility for the laws they live by—such a brute would know his 
scope so limited that he would find it an advantage to give up his cruelties” (Bottome, The Lifeline 182). 
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 Nazis finally discover these illegally kept animals, the horses and the humans take turns saving 
each other. The episodes provide Bottome with the opportunity to expand on why an education 
based on coercion produces the insane and the inhuman. In contrast to Lewis’ appraisal of the 
human as beast in his “de-personification” of Victor, Bottome extends the qualities of the 
“human” to the beast. “A hint of coercion, the faintest pressure of an alien will, and Emerald 
flurried himself into complete confusion” (105). Throughout these assertions, the force necessary 
to achieve that delicate balance between individuality and conformity, to produce the desired 
normative individual, to confine the subject, and to make labor compulsory in a capitalist relation 
is rendered invisible by the overall trajectory of “self-improvement” and self control. The 
asylum’s confinement and implicit threats of punishment, i.e., its own practices of coercion are 
simultaneously erased.  
Self-surveillance achieves the perfect integration of freedom and responsibility, the poles 
of liberal agency. In Ida’s asylum, the patient achieves freedom by accepting the responsibility to 
behave like “other people,” an acceptance that can be measured, tracked, and rewarded. To be 
free is to conform but without the feeling of compulsion—perhaps even to find ecstasy in 
conforming. “[T]hough this was a hospital where improvement was expected, it was also a re-
training in moral values . . . Each patient had offered him, some for the first time, the chance to 
acquire habits of decency; and the instinct of contributing towards a community which largely 
provided for its own needs” (93). The asylum, as a microcosm for civilization, reforms patients 
so that they can (and must) exercise their own sense of individual responsibility, which is defined 
as the willingness to repay “debts” to the asylum’s self-reproducing economy. To become sane 
in the eyes of the asylum is automatically to come into an economy of debt, promise, and 
punishment. The insane are rewarded or punished according to their visible acknowledgment of 
137 
 this debt. Psychiatric education meets its goal by producing “whole human beings,” that is, by 
producing paying and laboring bodies according to the economic community’s needs.  
Consider the similar moral diagnoses of two very different neurotic conditions. The first 
describes homicidal mania: “A homicidal maniac is only a man who wishes to wipe out his debt 
to life, by destroying life itself, instead of by paying his debt” (94). The second describes 
depressives: “They wanted a universe on the cheap—the expectations of a spoiled child had 
made them believe that they could always have the smooth with the rough . . . They wouldn’t 
shave, feed themselves, wash or speak. Theirs was the sit-down strike against living” (95). 
Reminiscent of the Bezzeghys, both maniacs and neurotics refuse to work, or to conform to 
expectations of self-care that allow the community to run. The spoiled child and the worker who 
strikes come under the sign of immaturity in the adult world of economic self-sufficiency. They 
benefit from the economy in which they reside, the family and the workplace, but irresponsibly 
refuse to contribute back.  
In her rhetoric, Bottome suggests that fascism opposes the nexus of capitalism and 
modern disciplinary power. Michel Foucault describes a disciplinary “type of power" coincident 
with and useful for, among other institutions, modern armies, the development of labor-power, 
the capitalist division of labor, and the discipline of psychology. He describes discipline, 
furthermore, as “comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of 
applications, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology” (Discipline 215).  
One of domestic fiction’s tasks in the nineteenth century, of course, was to thematize 
disciplinary power and the subjection of the individual to constant examination.123 In Northanger 
Abbey, for example, Jane Austen ironically calls attention to the permeating and diffuse 
                                                 
123 See Nancy Armstrong’s Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel for a Foucauldian 
reading of nineteenth-century domestic fiction’s thematization of disciplinary power. 
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 surveillance over the private home that makes liberal capital possible. Henry Tilney chastises 
Catherine Morland for imagining private despotism in the midst of modern domestic 
surveillance: “Remembering the country and the age in which we live . . . where every man is 
surrounded by a neighbourhood of voluntary spies, and where roads and newspapers lay 
everything open? Dearest Miss Morland, what ideas have you been admitting” (172)? Whereas 
Austen poses the real possibility that disciplinary power is no guarantee against older, more 
traditional forms of patriarchal tyranny, Bottome poses domestic surveillance as a safeguard 
against tyrannical fascism. 
As Bottome adapts this disciplinary nexus of psychology and capital, she aligns liberal 
economic agency with masculine reason and reciprocity, and fascism with the lack thereof. In his 
discussion of the disciplines of psychology and capital as mutually supports, Foucault highlights 
their preoccupation with “excess,” and the lack of regulation and self-governance whose 
breaches are associated with childhood and femininity. In the fascist character, the madman 
Michel Salvator, Bottome closely associates fascism with femininity.  
Michel Salvator, Ida’s former lover, is an insane feudal aristocrat who believes that he is 
a werewolf. Ida keeps him locked in a cage in the residential part of her asylum, which had 
actually once been his castle. Mark’s gothic encounter with Michel allows him to disavow a 
fascination with (and similarity to) him. Whereas Bottome aligns masculinity with self-
discipline, she merges the feudal aristocracy’s economy of force—dependent on the display of 
sovereignty—with femininity.  
Mark first encounters Michel Salvator as a painted portrait in the asylum upon his arrival: 
[H]e found himself looking into the fierce eyes of the handsomest man he had ever seen. 
It was a most speaking and emphatic portrait. The man was very tall, thin and elegant; he 
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 was dressed in a moss-green hunting costume with a fur collar which set off the almost 
incredible beauty of his features. His eyes were dark, luminous and fierce; they seemed to 
command the room and everything in it. Even his painted semblance was full of life. It 
was the same life as that of the wild things in the forest creeping through the long 
preserved, stuffed animals, into the heart of the Schloss. (76)  
Michel’s clothes accentuate his beauty and put the male body on display. His eyes are “fierce,” a 
description used twice to imply that Michel’s power requires his visible presence. He is also a 
hunter, intimately connected to nature’s brutality and force. This is beauty and power meant for 
simultaneous display and domination—an economy of power that is eccentric to bourgeois self-
surveillance. Foucault describes that economy as the “spectacle” of force, dependent on the 
display of the sovereign body as well as “medieval methods” of public torture and execution: 
“Traditionally, power was what was seen, what was shown and what was manifested, and 
paradoxically, found the principle of its force in the movement by which it deployed that force” 
(Discipline 187).  
Bottome connects Michel’s archaic organization of power to fascism by posing their 
common foundation in deviant sexuality. He had once directly supported Hitler and profited 
from the association, but his psychological affinity for Hitler runs even deeper (282). Michel’s 
narcissism had also been a direct barrier to his ability to engage in normal heterosexual relations 
with Ida. She explains to Mark that, “He worshipped himself . . . that is why I learned to despise 
him” (281). Moreover, he is unable to reproduce a family. Ida continues, “He could not marry 
me, because he was vowed to celibacy---a convention among the Habsburgs for one of their 
archdukes in each generation” (280). 
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 Ida explains that Michel and Hitler both desire to “rule omnipotently by getting rid of all 
moral restraints” (283). This desire is perceivable in their sexuality; Michel and Hitler both 
“looked upon women as prey” (284). Furthermore, their actual weakness and insecurity gave rise 
to this desire for omnipotence, and ultimately translated into political sadism. Despite Ida’s 
protests, Mark suspects that she still loves him, which prevents their union in marriage. She 
therefore dispels his fear by giving him a glimpse of Michel’s true insanity, the excess that 
traditional psychiatric discourse attributes to women.  
Michel is revealed to be a “great, shaggy, hair-grown figure” (282) locked in a cage and 
reminiscent of a figure in another domestic novel: the madwoman Bertha Rochester in Charlotte 
Brönte’s Jane Eyre (1848).124 “At the further end of the hall there was a gigantic cage and in this 
cage, Michel Salvator ran to and fro on all fours, very nimbly and tirelessly in spite of his age, as 
if he were the wolf he now thought he was” (282). Michel is inhuman—a werewolf who preys on 
human flesh, and is insanely disconnected from human emotion. Just like Bertha, he has gone 
mad from moral decadence. Here, Bottome invokes Victorian psychiatry and its concerns about 
“the realm of excess: with the workings of insanity and nervous disease” (Shuttleworth 11). But 
she transfers “the unstable constitution of female identity” to fascist men (Shuttleworth 11). 
Michel’s aristocratic displays of force, and his domination of women, she implies, had all 
covered his actual lack of control and feminine excess.  
In Michel, Bottome anticipates Theodor Adorno’s analysis of the fascist man’s sexuality 
in Minima Moralia. Adorno too diagnoses fascism as a psychological condition. In the fragment 
entitled, “Tough baby,” he specifically refers to the presence of the damning features of male 
                                                 
124 Compare to Brönte’s passage: “The maniac bellowed: she parted her shaggy locks from her visage, and 
gazed wildly at her visitors” (315). 
141 
 domination (sadism) and “effeminacy” (masochism) in the totalitarian man, concluding that this 
combination is produced by the agonizing repression of homosexuality.  
At the root of their sadism is a lie, and only as liars do they truly become sadists, agents 
of repression. This lie, however, is nothing other than the repressed homosexuality 
presenting itself as the only approved form of heterosexuality . . . In the end the tough 
guys are the truly effeminate ones, who need the weaklings as their victims in order not 
to admit that they are like them.  Totalitarianism and homosexuality belong together. (45-
6) 
The sadist exterior veils the masochistic interior to “hide” or “mask” effeminacy. The 
homosexual ceaselessly organizes this polarity in which he represses and hides the “weakling” in 
himself. The act of self-repression channels insecurity into sadistic aggression or a “tough 
mask.”  
For Bottome, the key critical task is to counteract this corrupt conflation of gender 
pathologies in order to bring the fascist male to enlightened self-discipline. The process of 
yielding this “domestic masculinity” reverses the formation of the “tough baby’s” sadistic 
masculinity. Whereas the fascist male experiences and subsequently disavows masochism, the 
domestic liberal male must internalize domestic femininity before he can become a responsible 
individual or a “secure” man whose debilitating need to “lie” will disappear. Mark must 
therefore distance himself from Michel’s inhumanity, just as Jane’s domesticity triumphs in its 
very difference from Bertha’s monstrosity. He must therefore chastise his original admiration for 
Michel’s beauty, and develop his ability to perceive his “cruel beauty” as a sign of moral and 
political corruption. 
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 Thus, Mark temporarily poses as the bourgeois heroine, namely Jane Eyre, in his shocked 
discovery of aristocratic decrepitude and madness. He must first be Jane, the bourgeois heroine, 
in order to become the true master of the Schloss because the responsible patriarch internalizes 
the domestic heroine’s self-sufficiency, and care/protection of the home. He thereby makes his 
own literary function surface, which is to bring elite English men (as one of their representatives) 
under the mantle of liberal domestic ideology. Ultimately, the aristocratic male that he must 
“tame” into domesticity is himself. Mark thereafter transforms his initial fear of women and 
heterosexual domesticity into love and respect. In the process of disavowing his fascination with 
Michel, Mark also overcomes his own “inability” to unite in heterosexual marriage with Ida. 
Marriage, in turn, acquires the status of political resistance as their reciprocal and 
complementary love carves out a haven of normalcy within the totalitarian state. In representing 
fascism as a sexual disorder, Bottome places heterosexual marriage in the position of the 
“repressed” in the face of homosexual culture. 
Liberal Virility 
Bottome emphasizes the fascist repulsion to middle-class domesticity even more strongly 
in her characterization of the Nazi, Rennenkampf, a homicidal maniac and Mark’s “fellow 
inmate” at the asylum. Rennenkampf is of a species of “men, who are no longer men,” or “men 
who had lost their way home” (The Lifeline 290-1). He closes himself from re-education, and 
has no capacity for assimilating to individual and domestic responsibility. Bottome sums up 
Rennenkampf’s domestic ideology in the following:  
Austrians were both too romantic and too complicated in their sex affairs, it was all part 
of their fanciful mildness which had to be cleared up. Mark found that Rennenkampf was 
really fond of his own mother and sisters; they were his devoted and willing slaves . . . 
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 Some day his sisters, who were both younger than he was, would marry his comrades. He 
would himself one day marry a comrade’s sister, of the same type as his own. (189)  
Bottome emphasizes Rennenkampf’s emotional incapacity, and just as in characterizing Michel, 
his “primitive” approach to sexuality. He dismisses “romance,” “fanciful mildness,” 
“complication,” and conventional marriage as solely feminine affairs. In the act of trading sisters, 
however, the marriage deed is transformed instead into a masculine activity that binds two male 
comrades together as family. Unable to relate to women outside of his own family, he perverts 
the exogamous structure of middle-class domesticity.  
Rennenkampf’s character is reminiscent of Klaus Theweleit’s account of Nazi 
homosociality, in which a “sister swap” between fellow military men quarantines women’s 
perceived dual capacity for destruction and contamination. Although through this exchange, 
heterosexual “love” creates a domestic situation of sorts, it occurs in a controlled environment in 
which the actual relation occurs between men. The resulting domestic relation combines incest 
and homoeroticism. Theweleit writes, “Through the identification with a comrade, a legitimate 
sexual connection to the writer’s own sister is created. As for the homoerotic, the brother is loved 
through the medium of the sister. Both men, brother and husband, are united in her . . .” 
(Theweleit 124-5). In Theweleit’s conclusion, as in Bottome’s, this systematic exchange of 
women creates merely a simulacrum of a family that exchanges women in order to “relate” to 
men.125  
Mark’s own past sexual history carries traces of this corrupt exchange. The only woman 
he’d ever been “in love” with before Ida had been his cousin’s wife—a situation that had 
frustrated him and ultimately resulted in his own destructive insecurity. Bottome suggests here 
                                                 
125 See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire (New 
York: Columbia UP, 1985) for an exploration of this dynamic in nineteenth century British literature. 
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 elements of fascist sexuality in British elite male culture, questioning the sexual practices within 
a liberal democracy as well as those of official fascist regimes.  
With Rennenkampf, once again, Mark must undergo a painful disavowal of the fascist 
male given his similarity to him. At first, noting the “complete fusion between Rennenkampf’s 
thoughts and his acts,” Mark prefers the company of Rennenkampf over that of Felix because he 
considers the first to be a better specimen of manhood.126 In contrast, Felix admires “women who 
can say ‘No’ when they do not mean ‘Yes’” and “books that are dangerous.” He is also unable to 
play games or sports, and manages his favorite horse in a “disturbingly slack” way. Mark 
initially rejects Felix because he cannot “live up” to either Nazi or Eton standards of manhood 
(195).  
After Rennenkampf murders Felix, however, Mark is shocked into the conviction of 
Felix’s real superiority: “He felt as if he had helped to kill Felix, because he had admired 
Rennenkampf” (200). Mark finally sees his own alliance with fascist sexual deviation when is he 
forced to pinpoint Felix’s strength: “Why was this sense of guilt and insecurity in some men and 
not in others? Felix had not had it though he had every reason to feel baffled and insecure” (288). 
The signs of masculinity shift in Mark’s mind from the display of ferocity to the sense of one’s 
own value and “security.” In the process, he disavows Nazi inhuman virility and comes to 
admire the dead Felix, whose own love and respect for Ida had proven his authentic masculinity.  
Mark learns that he had judged poorly when he enthusiastically admired the fascist men 
and rejected Felix’s “lack” of manhood. But rather than ridding himself of such futile exercises 
in comparative masculinities, he re-invents the habit to conclude that Felix was the “better man” 
after all. In other words, Bottome retains a masculinist paradigm to define political legitimacy. In 
                                                 
126 “The image of Rennenkampf—naïve—sincere, disciplined—was still strong in his mind. He could not 
help sometimes comparing him favourably with his easy companion [Felix]” (200). 
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 Bottome’s sexual and psychological analysis of fascist and imperial masculinity, the markers of 
manhood include domestic and formerly considered “feminine” qualities of mind. Some “signs” 
of homosexuality, such as care and respect for women, and athletic inability become signs of 
heterosexual masculinity. Nevertheless, she retains the basic homosocial structure of perception 
in order to launch her critique of European elite education.  
In the difficulty of Mark’s journey toward an equitable marriage, Bottome suggests that 
British imperial education dangerously precludes an extremely important skill necessary for 
imperial rule—a properly “heterosexual” manliness. Eton had taught Mark to deal with crisis of 
whatever sort adequately, and had armed with an essential military attitude.127 “Wasn’t that, 
Marked asked himself almost savagely . . . enough? Enough to hold England—enough to hold an 
empire safe? . . . he could tackle every difficulty he had yet met, except one—that of falling in 
love—adequately” (43) Bottome suggests that Mark’s inability to fall in love with and marry a 
woman, however, had been much more than a personal pathology. It had affected the entire 
Empire by being deliberately left out of the elites’ educational process. 128 Only through 
                                                 
127 Bottome actually goes as far as directly comparing the ideology of the English public school and 
Nazism. As soon as Mark reluctantly accepts his spy assignment, he questions the training that had led to this point: 
“Hitler airily stated that an English public school was the best training-ground for Nazi doctrines. Certainly the 
Herrenvolk delusion was at the basis of both, though to Mark himself it was more than a delusion. But the 
direction—the training—hadn’t, he told himself, the fantastic Nazi aim. The Nazis wanted a boy that would toe their 
line—the College wanted a boy that would toe his own. Yet was not the College too special, too privileged to be 
quite sane” (The Lifeline 41)? See footnote 7.  
128 Bottome troubles the “schoolboy” code of Eton, and defamiliarizes the nationalism created by World 
War II. The Eton masters are forced to confront the efficacy of their “code” in its sexual and class exclusivity. 
Although Mark does not understand until much later, the Headmaster at Eton tells him before Mark’s spy 
assignment: “[S]omebody has got to rule an empire. We have got one—and it takes ruling. But I admit there may 
have to be new ways of ruling. We may have to change what we teach—and even the spirit of our teaching. We may 
have to open up the school—and have a different kind of boy let in on us. We must be on the lookout for the right 
kind of stuff, and not suppose that it’s all confined to any one class” (Bottome, The Lifeline 48-9). Near the 
conclusion of his assignment, Mark remembers those words: “He saw green velvety fields with the sun playing on 
white figures in a rhythmic dance. The chief’s face came back to him in the old shining friendly room against a 
background of books. Suddenly Mark knew that he would find his life work again, and yet that it would be wholly 
different, because the pattern had been broken up. It was no longer rigid. Beneath it a new stream ran” (Bottome, 
The Lifeline 309). 
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 equitable marriage does the man achieve the otherwise elusive “security” that inoculates him 
from homosexuality and the lure of the fascist man. Normative heterosexuality and the security it 
engenders, on the other hand, are signs of psychological health that prevent personal and political 
cruelty against women and (feminized) racial others in the imperial arena.  
Bottome thereby entrenches the perceived boundaries between homosexual and 
heterosexual men as an indispensable tool of political analysis.129 Insofar as Mark can only find 
true “security” and a sense of his own value by marrying Ida, and insofar as he gains social 
maturity only by shifting his gaze from men to one woman, Bottome employs the same 
homophobic discourse as the fascism she criticizes, albeit less violently.  
From the liberal viewpoint, fascism appeals to homosexuals and women, whereas liberal 
politics require Christian heterosexual men. As one anti-fascist activist explains, “A Christian is 
either a Christian—or he is not real—he is not real as a man! . . . ‘Nor in my opinion can a man 
be real unless he is a Christian” (115). Reggie, a British foreign policy maker, echoes this 
sentiment when he remarks of Germany’s transition to fascism: “Why does a big, sound, 
prosperous people like the Germans go all whoozy over a Viennese house-painter, kept by 
women—who can’t paint” (39)? Hitler is both a seducer, making his constituents “go whoozy”, 
and an object of seduction, “kept by women.” Germany, in turn, laid itself open to seduction as a 
mass of women. In these scenarios, women and men who behave as women are ultimately 
culpable for the acts of “fascist seduction.” We must presume that reasonable Christian manhood 
avoids women’s usual passive insanity and political irresponsibility.  
                                                 
129 Bottome joins Adorno, Freud, and Theweleit in her variation on a theme: fascism is the failure to 
individuate. All of these critics also investigate a commonplace association of fascism and homosexuality. See 
Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia. Reflections from Damaged Life, (45-6); Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and 
the Analysis of the Ego (123); and Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies (339). 
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 As Barbara Spackman explains, metaphors of rape and seduction are common to fascist 
cultural production and many critiques of fascism. By bringing gender to bear on politics in this 
way, women can only be invoked as the victims of rape, or irresponsible citizens who are 
“seduced” into a hypnotic, irrational, and potentially fascist politics. There is no way in this 
paradigm to analyze fascism’s appeal to men who seek to validate their “heterosexual 
masculinity” in the political arena, nor its appeal to women as political subjects.130
Furthermore, in Bottome’s view, those women who resist fascism can do so only because 
they can become “men”—responsible political agents who elude the trap of “femininity.” Only 
by accepting qualities already associated with political agency and marked as masculine –“self-
control,” “presence of mind,” individualism, self-sufficiency, and reason—do exceptional 
women become responsible and worthy of reward. In his first encounter with Ida, Mark can only 
perceive her difference from other women: “She was, Mark saw with disapproval, as she came 
nearer, exactly the kind of woman he didn’t like. Her thick untidy ginger-coloured hair was cut 
close to her head . . . she had not painted her lips . . . Her figure was wiry and without curves; she 
had no allure; no poise” (24). Furthermore, her physical and psychological courage annoys him 
at first, cutting short his chivalrous desires: “[W]hat the men both minded most, was their 
complete powerlessness to protect her. It was in fact as if the only weapon any of them had at the 
moment was Ida’s self-control and presence of mind” (132). Through the course of the novel, 
Mark reeducates his desire to be attracted to this “new woman.” Even in Bottome’s feminist 
revision of marriage, however, women as a group are associated with political eccentricity.  
                                                 
130 Spackman observes, “Critics often trope the texts they analyze, repeat the structures they claim to 
demystify, or participate unwittingly in the problems they aim to elucidate. Such is the case with an ideologeme that 
recurs with disturbing frequency in studies of fascism: the scenario of the rape of the masses. This scenario 
functions, I would argue, to perpetuate rather than criticize the fascist rhetoric of virility” (24).   
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 Bottome staves off the image of imperial decadence in this attempt to bring the best and 
most loyal of all classes and the genders together toward a beneficent British rule. She juxtaposes 
English with Nazi masculinity to defend a new form of elitism and imperial sovereignty in the 
postwar era. As she awaits the Empire’s materialization of its ideal capacity, her liberal critique 
of Empire insists on the original and morally sound intentions of the ideal Britain to assure its 
position of superiority.  
In this fantasy, Bottome projects an imaginary geopolitical position for England in the 
postwar period—a moral, if not economic, leadership over Europe in cooperation and alliance 
with the US. Lassner observes of her writing,  
In full recognition of Britain’s history of oppressing women and aliens, Bottome insists 
that . . . unlike the intractable Nazi polity, Britain is malleable, subject to the liberal 
pressures of a commonsense decency . . . If this sounds suspiciously like a Whiggish 
belief in progressivism, Bottome’s embrace of Others is far too radical in its insistence on 
immediate action. (223)  
We cannot doubt that Bottome undertakes the liberal critiques of fascism sincerely and in 
the midst of monumental “crisis,” but it is also this gravity that creates the deadly risks of a 
liberal anti-fascist project. The problem, of course, lies in the indissociability of military, 
industrial, and financial power on one hand, and the ability to dictate “morality” on the other. 
Bottome’s attempt to transform the Empire into a global moral leader clashes with her attempt to 
de-emphasize its attachment to a sense of military and economic superiority.131  
Conclusion 
                                                 
131 Historically speaking, the delusional belief in Britain’s moral, economic, and martial global leadership 
lasted well into the 1970s, during which it withdrew from Western European international power politics by 
claiming independence as a world power. Therefore, in Bottome’s case, the liberal criticism of domestic fascism—in 
both senses of this term—was already “belated.” 
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  During the 1930s, Bottome was alarmed by British attitudes toward Nazism. When she 
returned to England after living in Nazi-occupied Austria, she noticed the complacency of public 
attitudes and the Cabinet: “The fate of six million Jews was in the balance. I simply could not 
believe in the easy nonchalance of London . . . I found myself, except for a few unimportant 
friends sharing my opinions, a premature anti-Nazi and as such highly unacceptable.”132 
Bottome’s fiction, however, erases the ambivalence of British middle-class liberalism to 
advocate Britain’s leadership in an “apolitical” definition of Western civilization.  
 That when the war began, she wrote propaganda for Britain’s Ministry of Information 
should therefore come as no surprise. Her non-fictional account of the Blitz—Mansion House of 
Liberty (1941)—provides a moral defense of Britain’s right to Empire: “Liberalism has been—
and perhaps still is—the only quality England possesses that has won the acclamation and trust 
of any other part of the world than the part she has—not always in a liberal spirit—occupied” 
(230).133 Although we may detect a note of hesitation in this defense—a moment that 
acknowledges the British Empire’s ethical failures—Bottome allies “Britain” with humaneness 
rather than with the bare fact of domination and force. Bottome’s novels elide the Empire’s 
preservation of “illiberal” force by achieving a monolithic image of fascism. By the 1940s, her 
work firmly fits a nationalist rubric that strategically prizes British imperial global leadership as 
the sound alternative to fascist imperialism. 
 In terms of sheer publicity and rhetorical force, Bottome was more valuable than any 
“highbrow” critique of fascism, including Virginia Woolf’s. Now largely out of print, her works 
                                                 
132 Bottome, The Goal 258. 
133 In The Goal, Bottome writes, “[F]or the last twenty-five years I have held myself in readiness to speak 
whenever the need for it arose and once, during the 1939 war,  I actually carried out the two activities 
simultaneously, speaking for the Ministry of Information for Britain during the bombing, while I was writing at the 
same time for America a book on the war called Mansion House of Liberty and in England Formidable to Tyrants” 
(230). 
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 were consistent bestsellers in the American and British markets during her lifetime. The Mortal 
Storm was eventually made into a Hollywood film starring James Stewart (1940).134 Re-
animating the “libratory” function of domestic fiction, Bottome’s cosmopolitan myth of 
consensus facilitates the detection of fascist elements in British liberal democracies. But her 
works elide fascism’s dependence on the very terms of imperial masculinity that Bottome 
endorses. 
 As the patriarchal incorporation of the family begins to disperse after World War I, 
Bottome’s fiction desperately reasserts its form in order to retain the integrity of liberalism. In 
the next chapter, I argue that Woolf’s simultaneous critique of fascism and patriarchal liberalism 
provides a far more thorough and radical analysis of twentieth-century politics.  
                                                 
134 Jenny Hartley writes “Bottome’s politicised love story was highly successful, the first novel to appear as 
a Penguin Special” and reprinted the novel three times in nine months. In 1940, The Mortal Storm was made into a 
film. Anthea Trodd writes, “The success of Bottome’s combination of topical comment and traditional romance was 
reconfirmed in 1940, when the film adaptation, directed by Frank Borzage, was among the first Hollywood 
productions directly addressed to the European situation” (99). 
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 CHAPTER FOUR  
VIRGINIA WOOLF’S JOYFUL FAILURE 
THE YEARS AND INTER-WAR POLITICS 
 Virginia Woolf’s longest fictional work, and the most agonizing for her to write, 
eventually proved to be her best-selling (Peach 168). Set mostly in London, The Years (1937) 
follows three branches of an upper middle-class family, the Pargiters, from 1880 to the “Present 
Day.” Woolf originally regarded the project as a sequel to A Room of One’s Own (1928). Like 
its predecessor, it was inspired by a speech for women (this time the London and National 
Society for Women’s Service) on the subject of “the obstacles women would encounter as they 
began to move into all the professions” (Radin 2). The Pargiters, as the project was originally 
called, was conceived as a “novel-essay” that combined fictional chapters and essay 
commentaries.135 It later broke off into two separate pieces—Woolf’s anti-fascist tract, Three 
Guineas (1938) and The Years.136  
 Although The Years has been described as Woolf’s most realist work of the 1930s, 
Pamela Caughie observes that it “arouses suspicion in those critics who try to classify” it as a 
“family chronicle” (91). Critics have noted the prevalence of repetition: “the series of echoes and 
re-echoes of words, phrases, and incidents which link one scene to another” (Radin xxii). As a 
further challenge to the “progressive” nature of domestic narratives, the characters’ memories, as 
much as the “actual” events that trigger them, organize the narrative.  
                                                 
135 Woolf writes that The Pargiters would be “an Essay-Novel . . . its to take in everything, sex, education, 
life &c . . .” (Diary, vol. 4, 129).  
136In June 1938, upon completing The Years, Woolf wrote the following: “that’s the end of six years 
floundering, striving, much agony, some ecstasy: lumping the Years & 3 Gs together as one book—as indeed they 
are” (Diary, vol. 4, 148).  
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  In this chapter, I trace two particular repetitions that place under question the 
“progressive” nature of humanist perception in the development of modern politics. The phrase 
“justice and liberty” appears regularly in public speeches and foregrounds common liberal and 
fascist practices of political language. In addition, the games and songs of working-class children 
throughout the novel thematize the masses’ desire in political representation. These refrains and 
their changing contexts, I argue, help us analyze the genre’s political implications. That analysis 
in turn enables us to detect fascism as a feature of liberal democratic life in Britain and a 
variation of modern capitalist culture, rather than as a dramatic eruption of repressed feudalism 
limited to continental Europe. Furthermore, they allow us to focus on fascism’s own production 
of “ideals” and “good intentions” rather than on its obvious differences from capitalist 
humanism. Woolf thereby problematizes the humanist critique of fascism as a dangerous 
obfuscation of its own barbarism and complicity, especially its systematic gender division of 
labor. As a result, The Years challenges liberal humanism as well as fascist departures from it.   
My reading challenges some literary critics who have aligned Woolf with the defense of 
capitalist humanism. Raymond Williams, for instance, assumes that Woolf, as a member of the 
irreverent “Bloomsbury fraction,” was an apologist for the emerging finance capitalist class. In 
the midst of turbulent post-war events and social disruption, including the retrenchment of the 
British Empire, Bloomsbury defended “the unobstructed free expression of the civilized 
individual,” and thereby safeguarded the Enlightenment project of the bourgeoisie (139-41). In 
other words, Bloomsbury helped provide the cultural means for the avant-garde of the capitalist 
class to retain its supremacy. Alex Zwerdling agrees with Williams’ assessment, writing that a 
“contained rebelliousness” underlies the writing of Roger Fry, E. M. Forster, and Lytton 
Strachey (57). Their revolt was limited by a fundamental allegiance to “their ‘independent 
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 income’ . . . the sources of the wealth that guaranteed their freedom to devote themselves to 
writing” (59). Bloomsbury’s class origins ground both critics’ analyses. Jane Marcus summarizes 
the powerful role that Woolf’s own family played in building bourgeois hegemony from the end 
of the eighteenth century onward.137  
In the context of fascism, however, Woolf’s skepticism regarding “civilized 
individualism” and her conflicts with other Bloomsbury intellectuals stand out. Her approach to 
the ideal of the bourgeois public sphere had always been critical, but never more so than in the 
1930s.138 To understand the impetus for Woolf’s conflict with such critiques, however, we must 
observe how The Years and Three Guineas sever middle-class women from the discourse of 
humanism, whose patriarchal foundations I have examined in Chapter 3.   
The representation of Virginia Woolf as a theorist of inter-war fascism has been the latest 
emergence in a twenty-year old trend in Woolf studies exploring her as a political thinker. 
Virginia Woolf and Fascism, a volume published in 2001, combines the now longstanding 
feminist investigation of Woolf’s politics with her contribution to anti-fascist thinking. The 
contributors to this important volume tend to present fascism as broadly aligned with 
“patriarchy,” and potentially countered by “feminine subjectivity,” or even “feminine 
psychology,”139 continuing an established tendency in Woolf studies to coalesce her revolts 
                                                 
137 Woolf’s ancestors were celebrated “architects of imperialism” and national historians (Marcus 80). 
138 See Peach on the relationship between Mrs. Dalloway and the public sphere (Peach 106). See also 
Jeanette McVicker, “Woolf in the Context of Fascism: Ideology, Hegemony and the Public Sphere” in Virginia 
Woolf: Texts and Contexts: Selected Papers from the Fifth Annual Conference on Virginia Woolf (NY: Pace UP, 
1996) on Woolf’s critique of the public sphere.  
139 Lisa Low writes that Mrs. Dalloway (1925) thematizes “female consciousness as resistance to fascist 
seduction” (93). Jessica Berman writes, “[T]he female characters . . . seem less insistent about the teleology of their 
lives, and therefore susceptible to natural, cyclical rhythms” that oppose the flux invoked by British fascism. (116-
7). 
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 against fascism and patriarchy (74).140 The essays follow readings established earlier by Jane 
Marcus, who for instance has written that The Years subverts “the patriarchal genealogical 
imperative of English fiction,” and celebrates the “daughters’ emergence from the tyranny of the 
father’s voice” (74). I believe that these readings engage a “seductive fallacy” that understands 
fascism as a manipulation of women with unconscious or subconscious “lures.” Woolf appears 
as an exemplary “revolutionary,” a reassuring and heroic model for anti-fascist feminism who 
vigilantly exposes the mechanics of this seduction, and herself models a woman unseduced. “Nor 
was Woolf easily seduced by a dictator’s charm,” writes Merry Pawlowski in her introduction to 
the volume (9). In this understanding, women should recover and free themselves from the ruses 
of patriarchy/fascism to achieve a higher consciousness of their material interests, which are 
professional above all. Marie-Luise Gättens characterizes Woolf’s work from this viewpoint: 
“Anti-fascist politics for women, first of all means a job and her own income” (“Three Guineas” 
25). Although I agree that Woolf focuses on the unconscious fears and desires appeased and 
engendered by fascism, her anti-fascism does not rest on women’s capacity to become more 
conscious and stable subjects, but rather on inventions of pleasure. Furthermore, I believe that 
Woolf’s critical representation of bourgeois humanism bars the alignment of women’s 
professional success with progressive politics.  
In the late 1930s, Woolf constantly “asked why the woman question was ignored” by 
humanist anti-fascist organizations (Diary, vol. 4, 273). In her work, humanist anti-fascism 
misdiagnoses its own patriarchal motives, and therefore remains complicit with fascist 
gendering. Therefore, rather than a linear narrative that progresses toward women’s sexual and 
                                                 
140 She also writes, “[Woolf] makes her radical claim that the origin of fascism is in the patriarchal family” 
(4-5). Zwerdling asserts that Woolf’s “first and most important target of attack was patriarchal power” (158). Diana 
Swanson similarly claims, “By the end of The Years the fathers are dead or dying, hollow at the core; there are no 
new fathers; and brothers are learning from their sisters to envision a new world and to practice the virtues of 
Outsiders” (40). 
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 professional “freedom,” processes of revolt and absorption compel The Years’ narrative. As the 
Pargiter women escape their status as servants in the private patriarchal home, processes of 
absorption reproduce the public patriarchal relations of power that undergird the subjugation of 
all women. In this way, middle-class women and their modern relationship to patriarchal 
capitalism become central to an analysis of “passive revolution.”141 The Years reinvents 
domestic fiction to suggest other alliances for middle-class women.  
Throughout the late 1930s, as Caughie has observed, Woolf extensively revised the entire 
conception of her project.142 These revisions disavow a repressive hypothesis of sexuality, 
gender, and writing. As we have seen, Wyndham Lewis and Olive Hawks appropriate the 
position of the truthful “outsider” as part of the kit of rhetorical strategies for their “restorative” 
and “revolutionary” fascisms. Both writers claim to “unveil” power and truth on behalf of 
oppressed women. Rather than reiterating this model of “opposition,” Woolf highlights the 
possible complicity of oppressed women within modern articulations of agency, conceived 
through loopholes, rewards, and threats. The Pargiter women indeed revolt against their private 
patriarchal homes where they were raised, but for the most part, they negotiate with modern 
public patriarchy to do so. As the years progress, they repeatedly occupy powerful new roles as 
patriarchal proxies.  
A passage in Three Guineas addresses their situation perfectly: “Behind us lies the 
patriarchal system; the private house, with its nullity, its immorality, its servility. Before us lies 
                                                 
141 Gramsci elaborates on “passive revolution” to illuminate capitalism’s tendency to absorb revolt: “The 
thesis alone in fact develops to the full its potential for struggle, up to the point where it absorbs even the so-called 
representatives of the antithesis: it is precisely in this that the passive revolution or revolution/restoration consists” 
(110). 
142 Caughie writes, “What began as a study of sexual repression and social taboos in The Pargiters turns 
into a testing out of what Woolf calls the ‘layers’ of discourse in The Years. . . Although Woolf writes in 
‘Professions for Women’ and The Pargiters as if one could dispose of restraining conventions and release the true 
self, she also doubts this view and comes more and more to acknowledge the primacy of conventions, as the essays 
begin to sound more and more like the novel chapters” (98). 
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 the public world, the professional system, with its possessiveness, its jealousy, its pugnacity, its 
greed . . .” (74). Although middle-class women are poised to enter the professions and political 
life in mass for the first time in British history, the explicit price for their “freedom" from 
fatherly domination is accepting the patriarchal relations that have organized these institutions 
thus far. Woolf foregrounds the patriarchal perceptions and practices that mediate this entry.  
Therefore, although her ostensible anti-fascist political goal aligns itself with Bottome's, 
she diverges from the suggestion that women should align themselves with basically sound 
modes of liberal politics and patriarchal relations of power. Furthermore, Woolf thwarts 
Wyndham Lewis’ characterization of the inter-war period as an era of cultural “decline” to 
suggest that the period is first and foremost an unprecedented opening for women in the crisis of 
liberal democracy. I propose that Woolf represents the inter-war instead as a threshold between 
patriarchal spaces for middle-class women. This interregnum creates an opportunity to 
materialize a shift in the discourse of modern politics.  
Fascism in The Years 
Chalk marks appear in the streets throughout The Years as traces of children’s games. 
They first appear in 1880 when Abel Pargiter visits his lover Mira in a rundown Westminster 
neighborhood: “children screamed and hopped in and out of white chalk-marks on the 
pavement” (6). In 1891, Eleanor notices that in her sister Delia’s new poverty-stricken 
surroundings, “Children had chalked the pavement into squares” (115). In 1910, the youngest 
Pargiter daughter, Rose, sees them outside the impoverished home of her cousins, Sara and 
Maggie, after their parents’ death: “Children were screaming in the road; they were playing a 
game with chalk-marks on the pavement” (172).  
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 In the “Present Day,” chalk marks serve fascist territorialization.143 Driving through the 
East End, North Pargiter notices: “Somebody had chalked a circle on the wall with a jagged line 
in it. He looked down the long vista. Door after door, window after window, repeated the same 
pattern” (310). These chalk lines form BUF icons, lightning flashes inside circles that 
deliberately echoed Nazi swastikas. Since chalk has consistently been their medium in similar 
working-class neighborhoods, one might presume that children drew them. In this instance, 
however, the children are conspicuously absent. Like Olive Hawks’ What Hope for Green 
Street?, the fascists have spoken for London’s East End and mapped it for their purposes. The 
“children” are required to accede to political expression and simultaneously to vanish. Here, 
Woolf suggests that fascism creates the semblance of full participation through mass politics 
even though the mass itself disappears. She exposes fascism as a “passive revolution,” in which 
there is an appearance of political revolution, but “no mass participation” (Gramsci 59). 
 Woolf similarly described fascist masses in her diary, where she notes a mix of 
playfulness and threat. In her diary, she observed the following scenes during a tour of Germany 
and Austria in 1935: “People gathering in the sunshine—rather forced like school sports . . . A 
sense of stupid mass feeling masked by good temper” (Diary, vol. 4, 311). In Austria, she 
noticed that “every village had a painted sign ‘Die Juden sind hier unwunscht’ But this seemed 
to be put up by authority” (311). In these scenes as in The Years, Woolf attends to the gaps 
between the “expression” of the mass, and the mass itself. The spectacle requires the presence of 
the masses, but their expression is more or less imposed—“forced” and “put up by authority.”  
                                                 
143 In her diary, Woolf noted the presence of fascist “chalk marks” in London after the League of Nations 
reconciled itself with Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia, a decision that marked the failure of the Left to articulate a 
unified anti-fascist front. She noted, “Writings chalked up all over the walls. ‘Don’t fight for foreigners. Briton 
should mind her own business.’ Then a circle with a symbol in it. Fascist propaganda, L.[Leonard] sd. Mosley again 
active” (Diary, vol. 4, 337).  
158 
  My point here is not to “exonerate” the masses from their responsibility for fascism, but 
to note that the pleasures of fascist participation are manufactured rather than “erupting” in a 
spontaneous manner from a preconceived desire. The mass displays a cheerful unity as a result of 
both idealism and threat, created by language and representation. Whereas Bottome represents 
fascism as an unrepression of feminine and homosexual desire, Woolf foregrounds fascism as a 
production of language and culture.   
 In this context, liberal responses tend not to perceive fascism’s erection of divisions 
through the medium of idealism (“good temper,” “school sports,” and children’s games), or the 
pleasures that such unity imparts to those who participate. Moreover, they serve primarily to 
mystify the divisions produced by humanist culture. In this way, the image of fascism as 
“outside” culture erases its own production of consent through the medium of language. In Three 
Guineas, the narrator declares that such responses may even impede more effective anti-fascist 
practices: “your letter tempts us . . . to listen not to the bark of the guns and the bray of the 
gramophones but to the voices of the poets, answering each other, assuring us of a unity that rubs 
out divisions as if they were chalk marks only; to discuss with you the capacity of the human 
spirit to overflow boundaries and make unity out of simplicity” (143). The chalk marks in The 
Years ultimately produce divisions, but believing in a humanist culture that would counter fascist 
division without taking into account its own fantastical production of unity, as Woolf goes on to 
say, “would be to dream.” The Years confronts fascism, not in its strictly “official” terms, but the 
fears and desires it engenders.  
Woolf foregrounds fantasies and fears surrounding modern extra-parliamentary mass 
movements. National strikes, the Suffrage movement, and Irish nationalism in particular 
challenged the British parliamentary machine, exposing the social democratic state’s bias in 
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 favor of patriarchal capitalism, and not the “neutral arbiter” it represented itself to be (Simon 
53).144 In The Years, Woolf traces the political and rhetorical circulation of the phrase “justice 
and liberty” during the demise of social democracy. In her diary, she explicitly doubted the 
efficacy of the prevalent liberal use of “justice” and “liberty” for anti-fascist rhetoric, describing 
Hugh Walpole, Storm Jameson, and other members of the anti-fascist organization, the 
Association of Writers for Intellectual Liberty (AWIL), as “old Prostitutes . . . meeting next 
week to declare their belief in Liberty. . .” (Diary, vol. 5, 147).  
Stephen Spender’s  Forward from Liberalism (1937) illuminates Woolf’s troubling 
citations of “justice” and “liberty” in the context of this unprecedented crisis of liberalism. He 
writes, “Liberals are blind to the fact that liberal justice, liberal freedom, liberal individualism, 
rest on the institution of property and the interests of a certain class. As a result of this deliberate 
blindness a fatal ambiguity has crept into liberal philosophy, so that all liberal concepts, whilst 
they mean what they say, also mean their exact opposites” (83). Spender is especially concerned 
by the use of these concepts to defend illiberal practices of Empire, as well as quasi-fascist 
“emergency tactics” of the National Government, which invoked the threat of economic decline 
to curtail individual freedom even as it prepared to wage war against a fascist regime (138). For 
both writers, these terms function increasingly as “management” devices to control masses. 
Several scenes in The Years foreground the obsolescence of liberalism and these terms, “justice” 
and “liberty” in the political context. Furthermore, more ominously, the Pargiters mobilize these 
terms to effect mass obedience in their fantasies.  
Women and the Fantasy of Mass Politics 
                                                 
144 See George Dangerfield’s The Strange Death of Liberal England: 1910 – 1914 (New York: Capricorn 
Books, 1935) for a comprehensive account of how these movements challenged liberalism.  
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 The first chapter, “1880,” introduces Delia Pargiter’s recurring fantasy, in which she 
shares a speaker’s platform with Charles Stewart Parnell. The scenario is a mass political 
gathering: “There must be a hall; banks of palms; a floor beneath them crowded with people’s 
heads . . . She was on the platform; there was a huge audience; everybody was shouting, waving 
handkerchiefs, hissing and whistling. Then she stood up” (23). In her mind, Delia projects herself 
into the role of the charismatic speaker, substituting Parnell as the leader who mesmerizes the 
audience.  
In this fantasy, Woolf foregrounds women’s desire in mass political participation, but 
differently from many liberal critics, as well as many subsequent psychoanalytic thinkers in the 
post-war period. Bottome assumes that women are particularly prone to mass politics because it 
appeals to an a priori uncultivated feminine desire. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Bottome’s 
psychological assessments of fascism ultimately place the onus of fascism onto “femininity.” 
Women who align themselves with (masculine) leadership escape this charge by supporting 
sound liberal qualities of mind.  
In Delia’s fantasy, Woolf confronts the failure of the Left to consider “desire” in an 
assessment of mass politics. At the same time, she challenges subsequent psychoanalytic 
interpretations of the nexus of women, the unconscious, and mass politics. Woolf allows us to 
theorize a motive for domestic women’s attraction to mass politics, the pleasures that arise in 
oppressed women from mass politics, but subverts a psychoanalytic mapping of women and 
fascism. Rather than suggesting that mass politics fulfills the women’s sexual desires, or the 
desires of the primitive horde, she theorizes that British imperial literature creates language and 
desire simultaneously.  
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 Psychoanalysis does indeed contribute to an understanding about “the workings of 
fascism on the level of the subject” (MacCannell 149) Adorno, for example, writes in “Freudian 
Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda” about “the coherence of masses” and the 
simultaneous “vicarious gratifications individuals obtain” (Essential 122). His work has been 
particularly important in extending the significance of Freud’s Group Psychology and Analysis 
of the Ego to discuss group formation in fascist mass politics, and locates two distinct gendered 
desires that fascism fulfills. First is the female desire to “surrender”: “Hitler . . . was well aware 
of the libidinal source of mass formation through surrender when he attributed specifically 
female, passive features to the participants of his meetings, and thus also hinted at the role of 
unconscious homosexuality in mass psychology” (122). Second, fascism gratifies the male 
subject’s desire to project himself: “by making the leader his ideal he loves himself, as it were, 
but gets rid of the stains of frustration and discontent which mar his picture of his own empirical 
self.” Thus, the individual in the mass is ambivalent: “The leader image gratifies the follower’s 
twofold wish to submit to authority and to be the authority himself” (127). Laura Frost, in giving 
this kind of focus feminist significance, explores an array of thinkers, from Horkheimer, Adorno, 
and Wilhelm Reich to Adrienne Rich, Sylvia Plath, and Erica Jong, who probe “the nature of 
fantasy and sexual desire” in fascism (46). Psychoanalysis enables us to perceive fascism “as a 
gendered sadomasochistic encounter between a male leader and the collectively feminized 
‘masses’” (38).  
In contrast, Frost claims, Woolf speculates competently on the pleasures of domination, 
but unable to escape “puritanical assumptions,” she “does not allow that the tyrant . . . may 
arouse any form of desire in women” (46). Woolf therefore exemplifies a larger refusal within 
non-psychoanalytic feminism to give voice to “fantasy, politics and desire” (40). Without such 
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 an exploration, she claims, an anti-fascist feminist politics remains stranded, analyzing merely 
the conscious and official claims of fascism. Juliet Flower MacCannell agrees with Frost’s 
warning, and observes that Hannah Arendt’s cogent analysis of fascism in Eichmann in 
Jerusalem (1963) as the “sacrifice of one’s own symbolic mandate” and a “genocidal will to 
jouissance,” nevertheless suffers from its lack of “psychoanalytic insights” (Hysteric’s Guide 
50). Arendt ultimately fails because “[t]his task can only be shouldered by a politically informed 
psychoanalysis” (149). Even more dangerous, Frost suggests, “Fascism’s position within 
feminist discourse—the dark side, the limit, the nightmare—is perfectly poised to become the 
material of fantasy” (65). 
In a related analysis that investigates women fascists, Maria-Antonietta Macciocchi 
argues that fascism intensifies female masochism, originally perfected under the patriarchal 
“authoritarian family” (74). She argues that fascism gives women more of the same 
“necrophiliac femininity” in exchange for security (73). She explains that fascism arises from the 
repression and redirection of libidinal energy as a form of mysticism that works in tandem with 
the masochistic boundaries and incitements already laid down by Christian ideals of 
womanhood: “The body of fascist discourse is rigorously chaste, pure, virginal. Its central aim is 
the death of sexuality. . . It is in the violent crisis of ‘nuns who believe they are the brides of 
Christ . . . who choose other sexual paths, such as masochistic martyrdom’ that the two roots of 
mysticism and the fascist drive can be joined” (75). But in Macciochi’s explanation, the church, 
the patriarchal family, and fascism are so continuous that it cannot account for how fascist mass 
politics might attract women in lieu of these already existent institutions.  
The Years disarticulates these mappings to reveal women, not masochistically 
“surrendering” to gratify themselves in mass politics, but on the contrary, projecting themselves 
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 into the role of the orator. Delia as a speaker becomes “permeated with delicious starts of 
flattering and exciting emotion. . .” (23). Woolf suggests that the domestic woman’s investment 
in mass politics is profoundly intertwined with language; the mass incites pleasures by giving 
women political leverage in speech and expression. Delia’s fantasy imagines a woman who, by 
speaking in public, on a platform, defies the boundaries of middle-class female passivity, 
especially the requirement to remain cloistered, invisible, and most important, silent. Here, 
Delia’s womanly virtue is pressed into an injunction to speak the truth about “justice and 
liberty.” The pleasure of her fantasy is not sexual, but rather incited by language and vice versa, 
especially by the fantasy of her “mastery” of speech. The fantasy foregrounds a Victorian 
production of sexuality that posits the textual authority of women and domestic space while 
banishing actual women from political authority.  
Delia’s fantasy is bound up with Victorian myths of middle-class female chastity and 
moral purity and therefore ultimately connects “justice” and “liberty” to patriarchal conceptions 
of female virtue: “She rose all in white in the middle of the platform” (23). Her fantasy thereby 
cancels the explicitly political mobilization of the mass and in its place, conjures a mass moved 
by the spectacle of the domestic woman. The domestic woman as speaker here depends 
paradoxically on her location in the private sphere, and her apolitical and unsullied access to 
“justice” and “truth” through her domestic confinement. Her fantasy therefore turns domestic 
womanhood into a warrant to speak as a charismatic leader to a mass.  
This scenario recalls Macciochi’s claim concerning female mysticism and purity in 
fascism. The audience drawn by Parnell captures Delia’s imagination not because of its anti-
colonial resonance, but primarily because of the possibility of charisma and control, connected in 
Delia’s mind to female chastity. Whereas Macciochi suggests fascist women’s submission to 
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 patriarchal relations of power, Woolf suggests a complex anti-patriarchal dimension in fascist 
femininity.   
In The Years, the incorporation of Parnell suggests an anti-patriarchal impetus, perhaps 
unconscious, in Delia’s pleasure. After Parnell dies, we learn that Abel Pargiter had considered 
him an “unscrupulous adventurer—that agitator who had done all the mischief . . . Some feeling 
connected with his own daughter here formed in him; he could not say exactly what, but it made 
him frown” (116).145 Woolf’s mapping suggests mass politics as a medium for anti-patriarchal 
revolt. Nevertheless, Delia’s vicarious feminine articulation of political agency ultimately 
adheres to patriarchal and imperial relations of power. 
In Three Guineas, Woolf similarly explores vicarious forms of women’s revolt, 
especially the participation of middle-class British women in patriarchal warfare as nurses and 
drivers in World War I. She foregrounds their desire to revolt against Victorian patriarchal 
confinement (rather than their sexual desire and repression) and the circuitry of power that 
shuttles this desire toward the mass politics of war and Empire: “So profound was her 
unconscious loathing for the education of the private house . . . that she would undertake any task 
however menial, exercise any fascination however fatal that enabled her to escape. Thus 
consciously she desired ‘our splendid Empire’: unconsciously she desired our splendid war” 
(39). Woolf is thus also historically specific in relation to the complexity of British “feminine 
mystique” in the nineteenth century. She also reaches beyond the psychoanalytic focus on 
individual psychology. Delia’s odd cobbling of Victorian middle-class womanhood and modern 
                                                 
145 The familial desire in focus here is not the daughter’s masochistic projection of fatherliness onto a 
political leader. On the contrary, Abel Pargiter’s jealousy reveals his desire for the daughter. As Elizabeth Abel 
claims about Three Guineas, Woolf uses psychoanalytic terms such as “the infantile complex” (referring to the 
Oedipal complex) to describe the fathers’ “covert erotic motives” toward daughters, which is “screened in particular 
historical situations, by domestic ideology.” Thus, Woolf undermines Freud in order to revise the “‘Victorian family 
romance’ while recalling psychoanalysis’ preanalytic origins in the seduction theory, which locates desire in the 
father rather than in the daughter” (Abel 105-6). 
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 politics recalls an older history of political masses and the discourse of domesticity. Nancy 
Armstrong discusses the dependence of nineteenth-century bourgeois hegemony on the 
“domestication” of the political mass. Citing the discourse around the Peterloo Massacre of 
1819, and the rise of sociology in the 1830s and 40s, she writes, “During the thirty-year period 
when the figure of combination was politically hot, it was commonly used to represent social 
disorder as a sexual scandal” (177). This discourse translates the material conditions that gave 
rise to mass movements into problems of domesticity. “Domestic space” and the figure of 
domestic womanhood thereby operated as a “form of power that has no privileged locus, that is 
neither repressive nor dogmatic, and whose efficacy reside in a capacity to distribute, classify, 
analyze, and provide spatial individuality for any object” (Armstrong 176). Delia’s fantasy 
continues this process of defusing the mass as it extinguishes its political significance and 
conjures itself as one obedient to the domestic heroine.  
Consider a scene in Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and South (1854-5), where the spectacle of 
the chaste middle-class domestic woman first arouses and then quells a mob angered by wage 
reductions: “the retrograde movement towards the gate had begun . . . perhaps, the idea of the 
approach of the soldiers, and the sight of that pale, upturned face, with closed eyes, still and sad 
as marble, though the tears welled out of the long entanglement of eyelashes, and dropped down 
. ..  Even the most desperate . . . drew back, faltered away, scowled, and finally went off, 
muttering curses on the master” (235). Such scenes may appear in novels, but the chastity 
modeled there simultaneously bars its actual appearance in the political world. Regarding these 
passages side by side, and reading them through the perverted “psychoanalytic” lens provided by 
Three Guineas, we are confronted by a desire that is simultaneously textually produced and 
borne of women’s enforced absence from the political scene.  
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 Like Olive Hawks’ writing, the fantasy turns myths of women’s virtue and domesticity 
into opportunities for revolutionary political significance. Indeed, the BUF repeatedly recruited 
women by promising access to public speaking and street demonstration. The article “Women as 
Orators, The Woman’s Part in British Union,” for instance, claims that “It is our aim to build a 
standard of speaking and oratory among the women of this Movement worthy of the greatest 
traditions of our history avoiding the excesses and caricatures which democracy produces” (14). 
Martin Durham has noted the prevalence of such calls for “women speakers” in the BUF press 
(50-1). Fascism plays on women’s perception of the modern development of mass politics as an 
opportunity to enact the authority over the private sphere promised in the pages of domestic 
fiction and attach that literary authority to the space of politics. Delia’s fantasy enacts a similar 
“patriarchal anti-patriarchal” revolt, and posits the presence of a nineteenth-century British 
passive revolutionary tradition within a proto-fascist mobilization of women’s “chastity.” In 
these fantasies, domestic women can bring order to the urban masses through language.  
Thus, Delia’s simultaneous invocation and cancellation of Parnell also suggests her 
problematic relationship to anti-colonialism. To many Britons, Parnell exemplified the “menace 
of mass mobilization.”146 He courted extra-parliamentary factions to identify with the Irish 
National Land League, including “extremist agrarians,” the Catholic Church and the Fenians 
(Jackson 119). In addition, he had a foothold in Parliament as an MP and by 1890, Gladstone had 
become an ally in the drive for Home Rule. At this historical point, Parnell legitimated the 
                                                 
146 Parnell took advantage of the modern expansion of the franchise in order to win by consensus: “In the 
general election of 1885 Parnell’s party not only won four-fifths of the Irish representation, but also completed its 
transformation into a team of Catholic merchants, shopkeepers, lawyers, and journalists pledged to vote in 
accordance with party directives” (Foster 181).  
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 possibilities of modern political mass movements as an “organic intellectual, “leading” rather 
than “dominating” the masses.147
That Delia silences Parnell in her fantasy is significant. She speaks while Parnell remains 
inaudible to the adoring crowd: “‘I am speaking in the cause of Liberty,’ she began, throwing out 
her hands, ‘in the cause of Justice . . .’ They were standing side by side. He was very pale but his 
dark eyes glowed. He turned to her and whispered” (23). Delia’s relegation of him to a whisper 
implies a pre-emptive strike against anti-colonial mass movements, even as she appears to 
champion them.  
The humanist fear of mass politics 
“Justice” and “liberty” appear again in the “1914” chapter, which concentrates on the fear 
their mass appropriation engenders in the middle class. Martin Pargiter identifies with several 
middle-class professions; once a colonial administrator and army captain, he is now a successful 
investor. As he walks through Hyde Park, he encounters three speakers addressing passersby. 
Contrary to Martin’s expectations, one of them is a “jolly good speaker” who manages to attract 
a sizeable crowd: “‘Fellow citizens!’ he was shouting. They stopped. The crowd of loafers, 
errand-boys and nursemaids gaped up at him with their mouths falling open and their eyes 
gazing blankly” (240). Martin playfully mocks the speaker’s cockney accent—“‘Joostice and 
liberty”—but feels distinctly threatened: “There wouldn’t be much justice or liberty for the likes 
of him if the fat man had his way—or beauty either” (240-1). Namely, he fears that the speaker’s 
appropriation of “justice” and “liberty” and the audience of “errand-boys and nursemaids” would 
eradicate his appreciation of art. In this scenario, Woolf elaborates on the fear that links mass 
politics with the destruction of traditional culture. But rather than lamenting that loss, she shows 
                                                 
147 Organic intellectuals help organize a “cultural and social bloc . . . [to] make coherent principles and 
problems raised by masses in their practical activity” (Gramsci 330).    
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 how Martin’s aesthetic notions are grounded on gender and class exclusivity. Moreover, she 
shows how they depend on an overlapping of “ritual,” “exhibition,” and “political” evaluations 
of art, a superimposition that, as Walter Benjamin shows, is actually a condition of fascism.  
 Martin experiences the “beauty” that the speaker threatens to eradicate as he approaches 
St. Paul’s Cathedral on his walk through London. Martin is one of many “flâneurs” in Woolf’s 
novels. In Mrs. Dalloway (1925), specters of war in the London streets bring incommunicable 
experiences of the front to bear on the everyday life of the post-war urban dweller. On his walk, 
Martin is unable to reconcile his aesthetic need to distance himself from the urban masses, and 
his constant interaction with individuals who comprise these masses. St. Paul’s enables him to 
rise above these interactions and conditions. Regarding the cathedral from a distance, Martin 
suddenly feels that “All the weights in his body seemed to shift. He had a curious sense of 
something moving in his body in harmony with the building; it righted itself: it came to a full 
stop. It was exciting—this change of proportion” (227). The cathedral reassures in him the 
transcendent possibilities of humanity that simultaneously enable him to become “more” than 
himself, and to disavow the specters of the inhuman that surround him.148    
 His contemplation recalls Benjamin’s discussion of the ritual value of art in “The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Most apparent in “ceremonial objects destined 
to serve in a cult,” ritual value depends on the object’s singularity (225). That singularity 
transmits the ritual art object’s “aura”: “the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, 
ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced” 
(221). Modernity necessitates a different kind of value in the process of eradicating its ritual 
value. Namely, the age of mechanical reproduction necessitates the exhibition value of art, in 
                                                 
148 He sees a beggar selling flowers: “She had no nose; her face was seamed with white patches; there were 
red rims for nostrils” (Woolf, The Years 235). 
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 which the object’s singularity ceases to matter: “To pry an object from its shell, to destroy its 
aura, is the mark of a perception whose ‘sense of the universal equality of things’ has increased 
to such a degree that it extracts it even from a unique object by means of reproduction” (223).  
Benjamin writes that the shift in the perception and valuation of art has repercussions 
beyond the realm of aesthetics, and is intimately connected with contemporary mass movements. 
The detachment of tradition, and the “reactivation of the object” in the individual beholder’s 
context made possible by technology, “led to a tremendous shattering of tradition which is the 
obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of mankind” (221). Despite a utopian tone 
regarding the eclipse of ritual value, Benjamin’s real focus is the dangerous overlap of ritual, 
exhibition, and political value in the fascist context. Fascism profits from this superimposition in 
the following way: “The logical result of Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political 
life.  The violation of the masses . . . has its counterpart in the violation of an apparatus which is 
pressed into the production of ritual values” (241).  
Martin yearns for the ritual value of art and rightly identifies mass politics as a symptom 
of its degradation. But his own superimposition of the ritual value of art and dependence on the 
commodity form remains invisible to him. Despite his fear of the mass appropriation of cultural 
production, he is a dedicated consumer. In the West End, he passes a shop window that contains 
a “blue pot on a Chinese stand,” and contemplates its resemblance to women on the street, who 
accordingly take on the characteristics of aesthetic commodities: “the lady looking at the pot was 
also charming” (225). Unlike the singular cathedral, the shop window demands a perception that 
senses everything as potentially “equal” by positing the supremacy of exchange value. 
Nevertheless, he reconciles these values. The view of St. Paul’s that so enthralls Martin with its 
singularity is also paradoxically made possible by a shop window: “He crossed over and stood 
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 with his back against a shop window looking up at the great dome” (227). Martin’s blissful 
unawareness suggests the lack of a critical approach to art.  
In mapping Martin’s aesthetic perception, Woolf cancels the possibility of locating an 
anti-fascist view in his desire to extinguish mass politics by invoking the ritual value of art. 
Benjamin cites Aldous Huxley’s Beyond the Mexique Bay (1934) to put into question Huxley’s 
similar aversion to the decay of ritual value and the rise of political masses. Huxley writes, 
“Advances of technology have led . . . to vulgarity” in cultural production (Benjamin 247). His 
fear of the “massification” of art paradoxically hinders a criticism of fascism. Benjamin observes 
simply, “This mode of observation is obviously not progressive” (248). As I have attempted to 
show in Chapter 1 with regard to Wyndham Lewis, this “mode of observation,” although 
skeptical of fascism’s populist dimension in Italy, is wholly in line with the more overtly elitist 
form of fascism in Britain. Indeed, Huxley in the early 1930s sympathized with Oswald 
Mosley’s autarchic national plan for reconstituting the British market. In his essay, “Abroad in 
England” (1931), Huxley wrote, “So long as there exists a gulf between what is, by the highest 
human standards, desirable and what is actually desired by a majority or even a minority of 
human beings, force has got to be used . . . [I]t follows that the application of force may have to 
be done unconstitutionally” (Huxley 64). Huxley’s attitude is wholly inadequate for anti-fascism, 
and as we can see here, even lends itself to its defense.  
In this context, Woolf’s own political and intellectual relationship to Huxley is 
illuminating. According to David Bradshaw, Huxley had a “turnaround” in the mid-1930s as a 
liberal humanist and vehement anti-fascist. After witnessing firsthand the BUF’s notorious 
Olympia rally in 1934, where hecklers and agitators were beaten with truncheons and other 
weapons, he denounced Mosley. By 1936, he was President of For Intellectual Liberty (FIL), a 
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 humanist anti-fascist organization of intellectuals that was “dedicated to the defence of 
civilization” (Bradshaw 65). We might imagine Martin in a similar position given his fear of the 
masses and concern for traditional culture. For Woolf, Huxley’s anti-fascist strategy was deeply 
problematic.  
Woolf was also involved in humanist anti-fascist organizations during the 1930s, but her 
connections to them were often vexed (Bradshaw 58). In Three Guineas, she explicitly doubts 
the efficacy of the copious, self-congratulatory, and humanist anti-fascist manifestoes, pledges, 
and subscriptions widely circulated among powerful writers: “Private people of no political 
training were invited to sign appeals asking their own and foreign governments to change their 
policy; artists were asked to fill up forms stating the proper relations of the artist to the State, to 
religion, to morality . . . What effect this inquisition has had upon governments it is for the 
politician to say. . .” (172). She herself quit her role as figurehead for the FIL. Bradshaw notes 
that “Woolf was no longer prepared to add her name to high-minded general appeals,” although 
she did lend support to the organization’s more specific initiatives.149 She also eventually 
resigned in August 1936 from the International Association of Writers for the Defense of Culture 
(IAWDC) because they based their opposition on facile notions of “civilized individuality” and 
“culture.” Woolf’s criticism of these anti-fascist strategies—the defense of traditional culture and 
Western civilization—was also unmistakably connected to her rejection of neo-classical 
modernism. In a diary entry, she recalls a conversation with T. S. Eliot and Clive Bell in which 
they discussed the retrenchment of “Civilization”: “All the gents against me. Said very likely, 
more likely than not, this war means that the barbarian will gradually freeze out culture. Nor 
                                                 
149 Bradshaw notes that Woolf supported “the recommendation of . . . journalist and pacifist Carl von 
Ossietzky for 1935 Nobel Peace Prize,” signed protests against Royal Albert Hall policies, which favored the BUF 
and discriminated against CP in its bookings, as well as “specific acts of fascist aggression, like the German re-
occupation of the Rhineland” (45-8). 
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 have we improved. Tom & Saxon said the Greeks were more thoroughly civilised. Clive also 
pessimised—saw the light going out gradually. So I flung some rather crazy theories into the air” 
(Diary, vol. 5, 258).  
 As Three Guineas makes clear, a defense of “Civilization” as such either ignored or 
wholly defended the subjugation of women. In Chapter 3 of that text, Woolf refers to 
Christianity’s privileged place in the discourse of civilization, and highlights the misogyny of St. 
Paul, who institutionalized it by barring women from “gift of prophecy”: “the prophet or 
prophetess whose message was voluntary and untaught became extinct; and their places were 
taken by the three orders of bishops, priests and deacons, who are invariably men, and invariably 
. . . paid men, for when the Church became a profession its professors were paid” (123). Woolf 
goes on to argue that the church thereby became the archetype of the gender division of labor in 
all the paid professions. As we recall, Martin’s desire to revive the ritual value of art in the midst 
of its decay is inspired by a structure dedicated to St. Paul. Both texts’ analyses of civilization 
suggest that it depends on the confinement of women to domestic labor. Martin reveals this 
dependence more keenly later when he surmises that the worshippers at St. Paul’s relate to God 
as his housekeeper Crosby does to him: “I’m Crosby’s God” (The Years 230).  
Woolf’s dislocation of “civilization” puts her in profound contrast to another 
contemporary writer who contemplated the retrenchment of the ritual value of art.150 In D. H. 
Lawrence’s The Rainbow (1915), the character Will Brangwen envisions his life work restoring 
the glory of decaying cathedrals and churches with his wood carvings. But in his milieu, he 
experiences these aesthetic objects primarily through reproductions, i.e., through books 
containing images of cathedrals: “He turned to a bookshop and found a book on Bamberg 
                                                 
150 This juxtaposition was suggested to me by Paul Bové. 
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 Cathedral . . . He lit up with thrills of bliss as he turned from picture to picture. He had found 
something at last, in these carvings. His soul had great satisfaction” (Lawrence 164). His 
“retention” of ritual value is enabled only by the mechanical reproduction that simultaneously 
erodes it. The biggest obstacle in his quest to revive the primacy of ritual value, however, is his 
wife’s profane attitude. Anna Brangwen suggests a sacrilegious view of the wood carvings in the 
Lincoln Cathedral: “These sly little faces . . . knew quite well, these little imps that retorted on 
man’s illusion, that the cathedral was not absolute.  . She was spoiling his passionate intercourse 
with the cathedral . . . He was bitterly angry. Strive as he would, he could not keep the cathedral 
wonderful to him. He was disillusioned” (204-5). 
 Thus made aware of the profanity of his age and the impossibility of realizing his residual 
aesthetic needs, Brangwen solves his dilemma by regarding his wife as a cult object. “[Absolute 
Beauty] was immoral and against mankind. So he had turned to the Gothic form . . . escaping the 
rolling, absolute beauty of the round arch. But now he had given way, and with infinite sensual 
violence gave himself to the realization of this supreme, immoral, Absolute Beauty, in the body 
of woman” (237). Anna Brangwen thereafter becomes the quintessential domestic goddess who 
pours herself into the role of motherhood. After bearing nine children, Anna “went about, big 
with child, slovenly, easy, having a certain lax dignity, taking her own time, pleasing herself, 
always, always doing things for the children, and feeling that she thereby fulfilled the whole of 
womanhood” (353). Her oldest daughter Ursula comes to question that role in a futile attempt to 
enter the “man’s world” (one of the novel’s chapter titles). Nevertheless, by worshipping his 
wife, Will Brangwen successfully staves off the monstrous and corrupt modernity that both he 
and Ursula reject as false and mechanical. Brangwen preserves the ritual value of art and 
suspends the effects of an increasingly urbanized England: “the ponderous, massive, ugly 
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 superstructure of a world of man” (193). Whereas Lawrence suggests women’s social fulfillment 
in this role, Woolf calls attention to the exploitation of women as domestic laborers in the 
attempt to sustain the ritual value of art.  
 In the final chapter of The Years, the younger generation of Pargiters expose their 
disillusionment with the older generation’s capacity for “belief.” Peggy describes her aunt 
Eleanor and uncle Martin as part of “a wonderful generation . . . believers” (331). She envies 
their capacity to believe, but also questions their undisturbed faith in civilization, which she 
regards as an automatic and self-flattering response to fascism, however earnestly intended.151 As 
she tries on this mask of earnestness to regard the project of civilization, she admits that in 
actuality, she despises the working-class masses: “I do not love my kind. Again she saw the 
ruby-splashed pavement, and faced mobbed at the door of a picture palace; apathetic, passive 
faces; the faces of people drugged with cheap pleasures; who had not even the courage to be 
themselves, but must dress up, imitate, pretend” (388).152 She has inherited the fear of political 
“masses” that we encountered earlier in Martin, and at the same time, has lost the belief that the 
middle class carries out a disinterested project of progress, “justice,” and “liberty.” Peggy’s 
dilemma pinpoints the difficulty of articulating an anti-fascist position that does not resort to a 
humanist cliché of unity that “treats divisions as mere chalk marks.” But it also advances 
Martin’s position with its awareness that a fear of masses and technology, and an insistence on 
traditional cultural production is naively and dangerously escapist.  
                                                 
151 When Eleanor proclaims, “We’re happier . ..  freer,” Peggy asks herself, “What does she mean by 
‘happiness,’ by ‘freedom’?” After all, how she can be happy in the midst of “Death . . or worse—tyranny; brutality; 
torture; the fall of civilization; the end of freedom” (Woolf, The Years 386)? 
152 In the galley proofs for The Years, Woolf had originally given very similar lines to Eleanor, who has an 
epiphany about the inadequacy of her social reform. She realizes in that version: “[T]hat was a lie she said (to 
herself) the kind of lie she hated most; (the becoming pose)—she who said that she did not pose. The lie that makes 
one out a lover of one’s kind” (Woolf, The Pargiters 24, quoted in Radin 87).  
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 Mass Politics as Theater 
In the “Present Day” chapter, the phrase “justice” and “liberty” is transplanted into a 
thoroughly modern political scene that has changed the experience of political participation. 
North Pargiter observes inter-war British politics as an “outsider”—as a former World War I 
trench soldier and a British colonist in Africa. Having just sold his sheep farm in Africa and 
returned to London, he brings along to mass political meetings a desire to cure his dislocation 
and isolation.  
People met . . . in hired halls. And one of them stood on a platform. There was the pump-
handle gesture; the wringing wet-clothes gesture; and then the voice, oddly detached 
from the little figure and tremendously magnified by the loudspeaker, went booming and 
bawling round the hall: Justice! Liberty! . . . a nice emotional quiver, went over the skin . 
. .” (404-5)  
North observes that the speaker mechanically rehearses a repertoire of predictable gestures, and 
that the meeting uses technology to amplify the voice. Despite these alienating features, upon 
hearing the “booming and bawling” of “justice” and “liberty,” North experiences a pleasant 
physical sensation: “a nice emotional quiver, went over the skin.” Here, “justice” and “liberty” 
are empty of political content. After the event is over, North reflects on this illusive unity: “next 
morning . . . there’s not an idea, not a phrase that would feed a sparrow . . . Something’s wrong, 
he thought; there’s a gap, a dislocation, between the word and the reality” (405). This political 
mode requires a mass audience that responds by bringing experiences of alienation to be 
momentarily soothed by the spectacle, but the meetings fail to enclose any “real” political needs, 
creating a gap between “justice and liberty” and their actual practice. Instead, the terms expedite 
a physical response; the audience is conditioned to experience pleasure in activist participation. 
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 Woolf implies that these political terms are now experienced “aesthetically,” in particular, as 
theater.  
 Fascism’s appropriation of this scenario is clear in a diary entry, in which Woolf 
describes a Nazi rally that she had heard in a radio broadcast: “Hitler boasted & boomed but shot 
no solid bolt. Mere violent rant, & then broke off . . . A savage howl like a person excruciated; 
then howls from the audience; then a more spaced & measured sentence. Then another bark. 
Cheering ruled by a stick. Frightening to think about the faces. & the voice was frightening” 
(Diary, vol. 5, 169). Here, she underscores the real presence of threat veiled by the production of 
unity. Here too, sound amplifying technologies (“boasting and booming”) help produce that 
threat and unity simultaneously.153 Despite the fact that the audience must accept political 
expressions not their own to create this unity, it engages in a mutual display of enthusiastic 
activism.  
Jeffrey T. Schnapp writes that the experience of theater acted as a model for the creation 
of national totalities, and effected changes in political venues across Europe in the inter-war 
period. “[T]otality remedies social difference, the fragmentation of experience, human isolation, 
the dispersal of vital impulses” and restores an imaginary “wholeness of life.” Schnapp 
investigates “the wartime/postwar generation’s fantasies regarding a theater capable of carrying 
out this task of total integration” (85). “Totaltheater” artists in Weimar Germany, Mussolini’s 
Italy, and Soviet Russia attempted to accomplish this task by creating designs for theaters that 
provided “the phantasm of total participation ensured through a technologically enhanced and 
intensified experience of the real, orchestrated and controlled by a single director/dictator” (97). 
                                                 
153 According to Rey Chow, fascism presupposes advances in sound and visual technology: “Hitler and 
Mussolini clearly understood the coterminous nature of perception and destruction, of cinematic vision and war . . . 
fascism is possible only in the age of film, the gramophone, and the loudspeaker” (Chow 37-8).  
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 In his opinion, the uses of technology and arena space were crucial for this phantasm. The fascist 
spectacle 18BL, a Totaltheater project realized in Italy, was originally designed in 1934 “to 
inaugurate the Fascist youth Olympics.” It was a traveling “theatricalization of Italian public 
life” that embodied “a mass at once individualized and mass produced” (114).  
Woolf similarly focuses on the invocation of “justice” and “liberty’ in a new political 
mode where the audience must actively participate in the production of the spectacle, but 
nevertheless remains alienated from political articulation. Of course, theatrical elements are 
interspersed throughout all three mass political “meetings” in The Years, but in this last scene, 
we have a full blown metaphor: a raised stage in an exhibition hall, a politician as “ham actor,” 
technological voice amplification, and an experience of politics as an aesthetic spectacle. 
Significantly, Woolf does not specify which Party the speaker endorses. Schnapp explains that 
this transformation of politics was a pervasive fantasy across political lines, across “Fascist, 
socialist, and even liberal modes of envisaging a theatrical revolution,” although it was most 
fully realized in fascist Italy and Stalinist Russia (123).  
 As a counter to these modern political fantasies and fears, Woolf cuts across political 
positions to challenge an ethics of speechmaking that relies on an “individual” who “speaks for 
the people as a whole” (Schnapp 117). She continued this critique in Between the Acts (1941), 
which investigates most dramatically the politics of theater and vice versa. The Years, however, 
launches this critique to inquire into the nexus of individual pleasure, attraction, and mass 
politics across party lines.  
The suspension of perorations  
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  In Woolf’s work of the late 1930s, several gay characters imply an ethics of difference, 
and bear directly on my discussion of Woolf’s anti-fascism.154 Steve Barber observes that Woolf 
inscribes “in her gay characters a mode of joyful experimentation with being” and its “ethical 
possibilities” (405). He focuses primarily on the characters of William Dodge and Miss LaTrobe 
in Between the Acts (1941), who articulate “queer difference as ethical/textual productivity,” in 
which “the other must remain strange within the greatest possible proximity” (426, 405).  
 In this section, I expand on Barber’s brief discussion of the figure of Nicholas 
Pomjalovsky in The Years, who poses the ethical problems of speech and the “ethical 
possibilities” of difference. As a gay foreigner, Nicholas challenges the ethics of assimilation and 
heterosexual coupling, the hallmarks of liberal anti-fascism. We first meet him through Eleanor 
Pargiter’s point of view in 1917. At first, she cannot pronounce his name: “it was so long that she 
could not catch it. A foreign name, she thought. A foreigner. He was clearly not English” (280). 
Even at the end of the novel, in the “Present Day,” he is known to the Pargiters simply as 
“Brown,” attesting to the Pargiters’ tendency to assimilate as a gesture of their acceptance. 
Nevertheless, Nicholas instills a yearning in the Pargiters for the enactment of difference, a 
tentative solution to the problem that North poses—how to counter the fascist erection of 
impenetrable divisions without then living in a world without difference altogether: “a world, he 
thought, that was all one jelly, one mass, would be a rice pudding world, a white counterpane 
world . . .” (410).  
 Nicholas suggests that the modern vision of heteronormative domesticity, a world 
comprised of “each in his own little cubicle; each with his own cross or holy books; each with 
                                                 
154 Broadly, critics agree with Jean Kennard that early in her writing career, Woolf equated homosexuality 
with “anti-feminist, patriarchal” groups such as the Cambridge Apostles (Kennard 67-8). See also Marcus 76 on 
Woolf and the Cambridge Apostles. Kennard notes that starting in Mrs. Dalloway, however, “Woolf associates 
homoeroticism with an anti-war position” (72), and that The Years was “the first time she links male homosexuality 
with both pacifism and empathy for women” (75).  
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 his fire, his wife,” is a vision of “the human race . . . in its infancy” (426). Contrary to Bottome, 
the idyllic Christian nuclear family here is not a political solution, but the problem that must be 
transcended. In contrast, he suggests a soul that “wishes to expand, to adventure, to form—new 
combinations” (296). Although initially repulsed by him, Eleanor finds that he “seemed to have 
released something in her; she felt not only a new space of time, but new powers, something 
unknown within her” (297).  
Woolf’s investment in Nicholas poses several problems for an anti-fascist domestic 
narrative. First, the heteronormative domestic site is negated as an anti-fascist possibility, a 
cancellation whose problems I will expand on later. More importantly here, Nicholas potentially 
appears as a prophet of a new world, as Eleanor puts it, a “new space of time” that serves as a 
fantastical unrepressed figure who could “lead the way.” Indeed, the Pargiters tend to consider 
Nicholas as a prophet. Eleanor impatiently demands of him, “when will this New World come? 
When shall we be free” (297)? North wants in him “someone, infinitely wise, and good, to think 
for him, to answer for him” (422).  
Woolf problematizes the appearance of this “man of the people” and the politics of 
speech that this figure implies. Fascism succeeds in part by manipulating these ideological needs 
and modern fantasies of prophecy. As Olive Hawks has shown, the fascist domestic novel enacts 
these very tensions and also subverts the Oedipal family. Bakhtin describes the variant of 
domestic fiction that The Years threatens to become by introducing Nicholas, a variant that 
prefigures the incarnation of an anti-capitalist hero. The modern domestic idyll invokes a “man 
of the people” to solve the dilemma of capitalist alienation, a figure who “holds the correct 
attitude toward life and death, an attitude lost by the ruling classes” and becomes “the 
representative of eternal productive labor” (Bakhtin 236). Woolf suspends this political 
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 invocation of the “outsider” to solve the crisis of domesticity, and refuses to offer a heroic model 
of virtue in her domestic novel. Nicholas eludes the role of political prophet, and thereby disrupts 
the connection of speech to political action. 
In her diary, Woolf criticizes the use of the peroration in modern politics, even for 
ostensibly anti-fascist purposes: “This is a pinch of Hitler in the cottages of Rodmell too . . . 
Holding the line—heroism—all the usual perorations, in the usual highflown tense voice. Oh for 
a speaking voice, once in a way . . .” (Diary, vol. 5, 290). The peroration as a rhetorical device in 
a speech is “the conclusion of an oration . . . [that] forcefully or earnestly sums up the content for 
the hearers,” (OED) and is meant to inspire the audience to action. She associates the peroration 
with the ideological preparation for war: “The same perorations. Tanks. No. Its the myth making 
stage of the war we’re in” (Diary, vol. 5, 291). Woolf cuts short the Pargiters’ investment in 
Nicholas as a potential orator/savior to create a wider anti-fascist gesture. 
In the final chapter, the Pargiters are gathered for a party in London. Delia believes that a 
speech could give the party “a fillip . . . a finish,” a desire Kitty echoes and expands to imply a 
utopian political desire: “a fillip a finish . . . But not the past—not memories. The present; the 
future—that was what she wanted” (417-8). They both want Nicholas to provide a speech that 
outlines the future and a new actuality. Given how repetitions and variations of the “speech” 
throughout the novel have disputed the British middle-class capacity for anti-fascism, his 
response is ethically loaded.  
Nicholas eludes the desire of the audience for a peroration and a leader, not to evade an 
anti-fascist ethics, but to enact them. Over the course of almost fifteen pages, Nicholas’s 
“speech,” to be given “in the name of all who have enjoyed themselves tonight” is constantly 
interrupted and deferred (418). Nicholas finally sits down, saying, “This is not a time for making 
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 speeches” (420).155 Later, when North asks for a peroration as the sun comes up, Nicholas still 
insists, “There is going to be no peroration . . . because there was no speech” (431).156  
Furthermore, the “speech” and the peroration are excised and replaced by laughter. When 
asked for a speech after Nicholas’ refusal, Maggie simply laughs: “No idols, no idols, no idols, 
her laughter seemed to chime as if the tree were hung with innumerable bells, and he [North] 
laughed too” (425). Her laughter, rejecting “idols” and heroism altogether, dissolves North’s 
desire to be led. Bakhtin refers to an ironic function of laughter in novels that applies here: “a 
destruction of the familiar and the creation of new matrices, a destruction of linguistic norms for 
language and thought” (237). Laughter, for Woolf too, implies the creation of different political 
values. 
Laughter and Anti-Fascism 
 In Three Guineas, laughter indicates and creates values that resist rather than appease 
domination. Woolf claims that the dominator derives satisfaction from dominating because it 
soothes his “fear of ridicule,” a fear that arises from the “reflection of other people’s feelings” 
(181-2). She goes on to claim, “Laughter as an antidote to dominance is perhaps indicated.” 
Laughter, in Julie Gottlieb’s view as well, is akin to the self-irony necessary for the subversion of 
fascism: “In public life, Mosley and his Blackshirts were noted for their dearth of humour . . . 
The fascist mind was defined by its lack of self-irony, which, in turn, encouraged subversion 
through mockery: perhaps humour was the most effective antidote to fascism” (205).  
                                                 
155 This deferral repeats an episode in the “1918” chapter, in which Sara requests a speech of Nicholas in 
Maggie’s house (322).  
156 Woolf similarly deferred from the peroration. She declared in her diary that “I could reel off patriotic 
speeches, by the dozen” as a response to fascism abroad (Diary, vol. 5, 288). But she resisted this exploitation of her 
writing. Three Guineas and The Years were originally inspired by an assignment to write a speech, and both 
ultimately refuse to suggest an authoritative and transcendent anti-fascism. 
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  In the following, I will illuminate the critical function of laughter that makes fascism 
unacceptable in The Years. Henri Bergson, Freud, Harold Nicolson, and George Meredith help 
us explore comedy’s social and critical functions in political groups, and vis-à-vis the 
increasingly pervasive technology of modernity. Especially pertinent to my analysis is how these 
writers present humor in relation to oratory and public speaking, and their place in the increasing 
militarization of civilian life. While some suggest comedy as “antidotes” against political 
domination, others claim that it is a passive mirror of political freedom already achieved. I 
suggest that Woolf claims comedy as a political “weapon,” albeit a non-violent one. In order to 
claim that function, however, she departs from a didactic relationship between domestic 
literature and politics.  
As we have seen, The Years intervenes in the rise of mass politics at the end of the 
nineteenth century onward, and contests prevalent notions of public speaking to show the 
precariousness of political authority. In Three Guineas, she writes, “Find out new ways of 
approaching ‘the public’; single it into separate people instead of massing it into one monster, 
gross in body, feeble in mind” (98). I propose that the invocation of laughter in The Years 
suggests a collectivity different from those created by modern mass politics. In particular, Woolf 
emphasizes the danger of leading “politicians,” and the contemporary circulation of the central 
liberal notions of “justice” and “liberty” for purposes of exclusion. Laughter suggests instead the 
joyful creation of collectivities, thereby working on the terrain of mass politics, but cancels the 
politically efficient mechanism of scapegoating.  
Bergson and Freud highlight the prevalence of jokes and comedy that degrade the 
authority of the speaker/orator. According to Bergson, laughter “corrects” the speaker who 
“reveals his likeness to a thing,” especially the speaker who “conveys the impression of pure 
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 mechanism, of automatism” (117). As a mode of correction, however, laughter is especially lazy. 
Bergson notes a deep seated “movement of relaxation” that results from taking “the line of least 
resistance” (186-7). As a form of revolt, then, it is slight: “Like froth, it sparkles. It is gaiety 
itself. But the philosopher who gathers a handful to taste may find that the substance is scanty . . 
.” (190). He suggests that this indolence is the result of the close relationship between laughter 
and the unconscious; both inhabit a “hidden logic,” and to access it, “the outer crust of carefully 
stratified judgments and firmly established ideas will be lifted, and we shall behold in the depths 
of our mind, like a sheet of subterranean water, the flow of an unbroken stream of images which 
pass from one into another . . .” (87).  
Sigmund Freud agrees in Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious that laughter 
“liberat[es] nonsense” (131). In a political context, jokes revolt against authority, but in a way 
that eludes “reason” and “critical judgment” (137). Allied with dreamwork, this approach is 
limited because the “dignity and authority” of speakers are degraded only because attention is 
diverted to the physical “frailties which they share with all humanity, but in particular the 
dependence of their mental functions on bodily needs” (202). As in Bergson, comedy in Freud 
does not adequately counter political and intellectual corruption; rather, it is a childish and 
temporary sense of release from the constraints of social behavior and “sublime” authority.157 At 
best, jokes are an unconscious challenge or an indirect revolt against domination that evade “the 
difficulties of direct expression” (174). Therefore, as a political tool, the ability to render a 
speaker laughable only circuitously articulates the illegitimacy of a given authority. 
Harold Nicolson discusses comedy on a more collective scale, but he claims that even 
when this laughter is collectively shared, it has a primitive effect: “when the sense of humour 
                                                 
157 “What is ‘sublime’ is something large in the figurative, psychical sense; and I should like to suggest . . . 
that . . . it is represented by an increased expenditure” (Freud, Jokes 200). 
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 ceases to be a private enjoyment and becomes public or choral it reverts to ‘primal’ laughter and 
adopts the forms of child-laughter and savage-laughter” (31). Nevertheless, Nicolson insists that 
the English sense of humor, “sceptical of all extremes of brilliance, logic or dogma,” tames 
extremes in modern political societies (37). “English humour” is proof of the nation’s social and 
political stability, and therefore its imperviousness to fascism.158 He concludes,  
A sense of humour cannot prosper either in a totalitarian and classless society or in a 
society in process of revolution. A special, fortuitous, and therefore transitory, balance 
between acceptance and revolt, between conformity and nonconformity, between the 
conventional and the eccentric, is needed before a sense of humour can pervade a whole 
society. (35)  
Humor defends nationalism against fascist radicalism: “I regard the English sense of humour as a 
charming attribute and one which serves as a valuable lubricant in the machine of society” (38). 
Perhaps because it is “childish,” humor can never really facilitate disruptions of authority. It is 
accompanied by “a common and assured pattern of convention.” A sense of humor can thus 
impair fascism primarily by drawing on the already achieved stability of democratic values. 
Nicolson’s description of laughter as “childish” is echoed in Woolf’s 1905 essay, “The 
Value of Laughter.” But there, laughter as criticism is more than a sign of a stable society or a 
“healthy” (hierarchical) class structure. Contrary to Nicolson’s account of its “charm,” Woolf 
suggests that childish humor can be mobilized to see through the affectations of masculinist 
glory: “Women and children . . . are the chief ministers of the comic spirit” for this reason (60). 
In The Years, Sir William, a colonial administrator, creates and dominates his audience in Morris 
Pargiter’s parlor. His habits of speech, formed by his gender, elevated class position, and 
                                                 
158 Harold Nicolson, diplomat, Vita Sackville-West’s husband, and Woolf’s longtime acquaintance, started 
a periodical, Action, to help Mosley found the New Party, a precursor to the British Union of Fascists.  
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 participation in Empire building “seemed too big for the quiet, English dining-room; his voice 
boomed out. He wanted an audience . . . He was boasting, of course . . . He came back to 
England after ruling a district ‘about the size of Ireland,’ as they always said” (201-2). Here, the 
speaker’s desire to dominate, to create himself through the captive obedience of his audience is 
the result of an automatic characteristic of powerful men most notable in their cliché speeches. 
Nevertheless, in “The Value of Laughter,” Woolf concedes that such humor is a resistance of the 
weak. It is possible only because its practitioners, women and children, are relatively distant 
from the systems of learning and rewarding established to glorify men.  
At this point, we are left to doubt the political efficacy of laughter in the context of 
fascism at all. Nicolson even claims that laughter can dangerously enable escapism when it 
consciously confronts fascism: “An attempt is made to reduce the menacing to the level of the 
comic, as when Hitler was represented, not as some daemonic force intent upon our destruction, 
but as a talkative little man with a moustache” (42). Similarly, Alice Yaeger Kaplan writes in 
relation to Marinetti’s proto-fascist futurist manifestoes, “futurism is funny, but it is dangerous in 
its funniness because it has the power to make me stop thinking about its effect” (76). Finally, 
Adorno in his essay, “Commitment,” warns against any assumption that “laughing” at fascism 
would aid in dismantling it.  
[T]he buffoonery of fascism, evoked by Chaplin as well, was at the same time also its 
ultimate horror. If this is suppressed, and a few sorry exploiters of greengrocers are 
mocked, where key positions of economic power are actually at issue, the attack misfires. 
The Great Dictator loses all satirical force, and becomes obscene, when a Jewish girl can 
bash a line of storm troopers on the head with a pan without being torn to pieces. For the 
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 sake of political commitment, political reality is trivialized: which then reduces the 
political effect. (Essential Frankfurt 308)  
 The Years’ description of Mussolini as a “fat man gesticulating” (the reduction of the 
political speaker to an automated body), and, as we’ve seen, its comparison of fascist 
territorialization to hopscotch chalk marks, appears to reduce the fascist will to dominate to 
childish antics. In her diary, Woolf similarly compares the fascist political menace to childish 
fantasy. She observes of British politicians, “All these grim men appear to me like grown up’s 
staring incredulously at a child’s sand castle which for some inexplicable reason has become a 
real vast castle, needing gunpowder & dynamite to destroy it. Nobody in their sense can believe 
in it . . . ” (Diary, vol. 5, 167). While here, she clearly pronounces the “buffoonery” of fascism, 
Woolf also calls attention to the particular nature of its violence. The fascists had built a 
substantial military fortress when it seemed they’d been playing like children. The seemingly 
childish farce is irreconcilable with the established political comprehension of threat, and this 
lack of accord comprises part of its danger.159 In The Years’ chalk marks, Woolf enacts a 
strategy that simultaneously ridicules the idiocy and automatism of the fascists while 
acknowledging the brutality of their authority. Even more than these important observations 
about the simultaneous attractions and horror of fascism, The Years suggests the creation of a 
politics without leaders. The novel shifts the definition of “politics” and cultural production to 
give laughter a critical function vis-à-vis fascism. As we have seen, Maggie’s laughter is not 
useful as an anti-fascist political “analysis” in terms of representing the “real.” Rather, it is 
effectively anti-fascist in terms of the collective audience it “creates.”  
                                                 
159 This fascist fantasy intersects with some high modernist projects in Woolf’s perception. Of Herbert 
Read, T.S. Eliot, George Santayana, and H.G. Wells, she writes, “Little boys making sand castles. . . Each is 
weathertight, & gives shelter to the occupant . . . I am carrying on, while I read, the idea of women discovering, like 
the 19th century rationalists, agnostics, that man is no longer God” (Diary, vol. 5, 340).  
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 Sally Jacobsen observes that the relationship between comedy and literature shifted 
dramatically in the course of Woolf’s career.160 In “The Value of Laughter,” Woolf had 
described the comic as a way to recognize the grandiose heroism mistakenly ascribed to men, 
reminding us that “no man is quite a hero or entirely a villain” (59). Here indeed, comedy works 
to present a more “realistic,” and less “romantic” identity of leaders. But laughter in The Years is 
not directed at uncovering the fallibility of specific speakers. Rather, it poses the possibility of a 
greater joy in a collectivity without a speaker to “represent” or to lead. Laughter in the novel 
therefore questions the fundamental limits of liberal politics from a feminist perspective. 
In her later works, anti-fascist laughter creates the possibilities of democratic 
communities by invoking a “chorus.” Woolf imagined the last chapter of The Years, especially, 
as a chorus: “I want a Chorus. A general statement, a song for 4 voices .  . . And how to make the 
transition from the colloquial to the lyrical, from the particular to the general” (Diary, vol. 4, 
236)? Bergson and Freud acknowledge that humor and joking form “complicit” communities. 
Bergson writes, “However spontaneous it seems, laughter always implies a kind of secret 
freemasonry, or even complicity, with other laughers, real or imaginary” (64). Freud similarly 
observes, “every joke calls for a public of its own” (Jokes 151). That Woolf sought a formation 
of a collective voice, a “general statement,” is clear. That it should compete with “fascist 
collectivization” is suggested in the novel’s repetitive inquiry into modern group formations. 
Melba Cuddy-Keane discusses “a distinctive choric voice” in Between the Acts (1941), a novel 
that is more obviously anti-fascist, and where Woolf revives the “ancient choral band and creates 
a new comic mode” (276). To create a critical value in laughter, this mode invokes an audience 
                                                 
160 “A more mature ‘humor of the heights’ than in ‘The Value of Laughter’ marks the fourth stage of 
Woolf’s idea of comedy, from 1935 to 1941. Her earlier desired effect of joviality and magnanimity now becomes 
‘joy’” (Jacobsen 227). 
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 whose desire to be free from “social constraints” does not result in a projection of a leader or an 
expulsion of “others.” Cuddy-Keane suggests that Woolf derived her revision of comedy from 
the classicist Jane Harrison, whose work  Ancient Art and Ritual (1913) theorized a unifying 
function of the chorus in the ancient Greek drama of “communal rituals,” which preceded the 
epic form. She writes, “Harrison associates the epic with a leader-centered construct, but her 
primary interest is in the earlier genre and the different kind of communal bond that it embodies. 
This bond is found not in a common loyalty to a person or an ideal but rather in the performance 
of an integrative action . . . the circumference is the whole community” (274).  
Indeed, in The Years, laughter suggests a unity that radically diverges from the fascist 
production of unity in “a leader-centered construct.” It preserves the longing for “wholeness,” 
but disavows the vehicles of the “great man” and the veiled threat. Laughter has a “strange 
effect” on Peggy Pargiter, for instance, who rejects the older Pargiters’ earnest belief in humanist 
civilization, and the emergence of fascism: “It had relaxed her, enlarged her. She felt, or rather 
she saw, not a place, but a state of being, in which there was real laughter, real happiness, and 
this fractured world was whole; whole, vast, and free” (390). Her laughter acknowledges 
subjective dislocation in a fractured modern world that reifies social relations, but it does not 
ossify into divisive claims of authenticity and identity. Moreover, it accesses the pleasures and 
attraction of community in an otherwise alienating environment. The “relaxation” effected by 
laughter, which denotes a lack of critical rigor in Bergson’s and Freud’s theories, is essential 
here to counter fascism on its own terrain—its corporation of collective “joy” as a cure for 
political alienation.  
In contrast to the fascist mass, this collectivity is marked by its negativity, and its 
conspicuous absence of leaders or programs. In Three Guineas, Woolf similarly suggests an 
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 “Outsiders Society” that counters fascism by regarding it as an “illuminating example of what we 
do not wish to be” rather than “positive” spectacles of male and female self-sacrifice (114). This 
“society” enacts the power of the obscure, “submerged experiments of which there is no public 
proof” (119). As in Three Guineas, The Years cultivates the “comic spirit” to identify fascists as 
that which we “do not wish to be.” Cuddy-Keane aptly observes that Woolf inhabits a different 
definition of politics altogether in her use of comedy:  “This handling of genre is thoroughly 
political in substituting, for the definition of politics as the exercising of power, a model of 
community as the dynamic inhabiting of mutual space” (284).  
Woolf’s ironic understanding of laughter in relation to politics can be traced in the 
influence of George Meredith. As Margaret Connolly notes, Meredith was a strong early 
influence on the development of Woolf’s thinking about comedy and gender relations.161 
Meredith allows comedy a stronger critical function than Nicolson’s “reflection,” a function that 
he nonetheless laments may be obsolete. In an “Essay on Comedy” (1877), he claims that 
Aristophanes’ comedies effected political justice. By “using laughter for his political weapon; a 
laughter without scruple,” Aristophanes revolted against Sophist corruption and “the demagogue, 
‘the saw-toothed monster’” who “chicaned the mob” (39, 37). Meredith adds that the uses of 
comedy that Aristophanes had created are no longer possible, in part because the “comic license 
in the chorus” has been “curtailed”: “He is not to be revived.” Nevertheless, in modernity, he 
suggests, his methods are still worthy of study, so that “some of the fire in him would come to 
us, and we might be revived” (39).  
                                                 
161 Connolly assumes that for both Meredith and Woolf, comedy is a weak weapon vis-à-vis political 
corruption because it can only “reveal” the illegitimacy of the authority in power, and only “relax” the critical 
faculty. She writes, “By the time the anti-comedic society of the thirties had burgeoned into the war, it was clear to 
Woolf that the weapons of comedy were nowhere near powerful enough to fight the combination of egoism and 
power that was destroying Europe” (Connolly 203). 
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 Meredith suggests that Aristophanes’ use of comedy may be more radical than a 
representation of the “real” suggested by more obviously “committed” cultural producers. 
Furthermore, like Gottlieb and Nicolson, Meredith notes the lack of comedy in military societies. 
Although Meredith wrote this essay before the rise of official fascism in Germany, he asserts that 
comedy is an appropriate antidote to the nation’s growing militarization. He writes, “the Comic 
Spirit is needful” in Germany to temper “the mob, or a marching army.” As it is, the German’s 
“irony is a missile of terrific tonnage; sarcasm he emits like a blast from a dragon’s mouth . . . 
He stamps his foe underfoot” (54). Woolf, as she inherits and extends Meredith’s defense of 
comedy, contradicts other modernists in their own invocations of laughter vis-à-vis total war.   
 Comedy was prevalent among modernist artists and writers who were concerned by the 
militarization of European societies. As Renato Poggioli has observed following Bergson, the 
surrealists used irony to show ‘the way the machine fails man . . . [or] the way man fails the 
machine’ in modernity” (140). Tyrus Miller also notes that in much 1930s European literature, 
technology was a major object of comedy: “late modernist writers confronted no less an issue 
than the survival of individual selves in a world of technological culture, mass politics, and 
shock experience, both in the battlefield and in the cities of the intervening peace” (24). 
According to Miller, the late modernists called attention to the “disruptive effects of the figural,” 
most notably in hybrid genres like prose poetry, or “wholly reinvented genres” (19). Most 
notable among the tactics of Gertrude Stein, Wyndham Lewis, Djuna Barnes, Samuel Beckett, 
and Mina Loy, is the “disruptive, deforming spell of laughter . .. .represent[ing] a world in free 
fall, offering vertiginously deranged commentary as word, body, and thing fly apart with a 
ridiculous lack of grace” (19). For Lewis especially, Miller claims, laughter helped to “absorb 
shock experience and to deflect it aggressively outward as self-preserving laughter” (54). As we 
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 have seen, in The Years and Lewis’ The Revenge for Love, the resemblance of politicians and 
public intellectuals to machines renders them absurd. 
Although Miller places Woolf in the “‘mainstream’ of European high modernist fiction” 
that sought to subdue this “chaotic modernity by means of formal techniques” (17), her play with 
the essay and novel genres, especially from the late 1920s on, also invoke the liberating effects 
of that “vertiginous fall,” and in that respect, clearly belongs in Miller’s category of late 
modernism. In contrast to Lewis, however, Woolf’s invocation of laughter in The Years is 
neither “aggressive” nor exclusive. Lewis’ satirical novels were notable for slashing the field of 
contemporary literature to leave Lewis’ own approach to art still standing. In Men Without Art, 
he equated all authentic art with satire, and because “no one will exactly rush to the assistance of 
the satirist . . . a sort of Cain among craftsmen,” he is compelled to defend it himself (13). His 
pamphlet Satire and Fiction accompanied his novel The Apes of God (1930). Woolf departs from 
Lewis’ aggressive satirical attempt to level his enemies.  
Drawing on Susan Auty’s The Comic Spirit of Eighteenth Century Novels, Cuddy-Keane 
claims that satire is much more a tool of the “establishment” since “in such works . . . society 
draws together around the prevailing norm in order to expel the elements that threaten social 
stability” (276). Although many modern writers (like Lewis) reverse this relationship so that “the 
prevailing demand for conformity” becomes the object of satire while the eccentric is privileged, 
she observes that “the dynamics of the satire are nevertheless the same: a collective perspective 
emerges that establishes the norm, and the antithetical element is expelled” (Cuddy-Keane 276).  
In contrast, Woolf’s comedy has an inclusive thrust. Cuddy-Keane suggests that Woolf 
revises the comic mode to go beyond satire, so that her “laughter reclaims its object within the 
human continuum” (276). While Woolf was writing The Years, she wrote in her diary, “The 
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 more complex a vision the less it lends itself to satire: the more it understands the less it is able to 
sum up & make linear” (Diary, vol. 4, 309). In Three Guineas, a linear and summarizing position 
that suggests stable social relations and “civilization” to fight fascism undermines itself by 
retaining patriarchal values. Woolf, in contrast, invokes an ethical community against 
domination and against the moral certainty of the political Left and Right in Britain.  
For Meredith, and consequently for Woolf, comic irony negates the politics of the 
present, but refrains from outlining the prophetic fullness of the future: “Men’s future upon earth 
does not attract it; their honesty and shapeliness in the present does . . .” (Meredith 48). This 
stance resembles Kierkegaard’s description of irony in The Concept of Irony: “It is negativity, 
because it only negates; it is infinite, because it does not negate this or that phenomenon; it is 
absolute, because that by virtue of which it negates is a higher something that still is not. The 
irony establishes nothing, because that which is to be established lies behind it” (261). As 
Kierkegaard further points out, the powers of irony are only “epoch-making” insofar as they 
negate the “actuality of experience” (29, 124). The ironist in Kierkegaard “ship[s] individuals 
from reality to ideality,” and to do so, the individuals he takes across must “divest themselves of 
all the manifold qualifications of concrete life, of titles, honors, purple robes, pompous words, 
sorrows, anxieties, etc., until only the sheer human being remained” (236). Likewise in Meredith, 
comedy identifies the absurdity of men when they “run riot in idolatries, drifting into vanities, 
congregating in absurdities, planning short-sightedly, plotting dementedly . . .” (Meredith 48).  
 In both passages, irony facilitates the disavowal of honors, rewards, and the values of the 
present, and thereby implicitly dismantles masculinist hierarchies. Vis-à-vis military values, 
then, Meredith suggests comedy to bring about the consciousness of the “social equality of the 
sexes.” Meredith prescribes a shift in gender relations as a counter to militarization, and the use 
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 of comedy to effect gender equality: “when their men . . . consent to talk on equal terms with 
their women, and to listen to them, their growth will be accelerated and be shapelier. Comedy . . 
will . . . enliven and irradiate the social intelligence” (55). In its ironic mode, comedy is a mode 
of politics rather than simply a reflection of it: “Comedy is an exhibition of [women’s] battle 
with men, and that of men with them . . . The comic poet dares to show us men and women 
coming to . . . mutual likeness; he is for saying that when they draw together in social life their 
minds grow liker” (15).  
This passage redefines politics and counters fascism by insisting on the necessity of 
laughter. In “comic” struggles involving gender, war is an inexpedient political end. Comedy 
exhibits a “battle,” a revolt against injustice, but without violence since the “other” in this 
struggle must be ensured survival. As opposed to satire, this comedy acts as a civilizing force in 
the social relations between men and women because it emphasizes the similarities rather than 
differences between the “warring” sides. It proposes that men and women become more and 
more alike throughout history. As such, laughter in The Years is a weapon—a “keen blade,” a 
“knife that both prunes and trains,” as Woolf had suggested in “The Value of Laughter,” but a 
weapon that bypasses war (“The Value of Laughter” 60). As a result, “the collectivity of the 
vision is greater than that of the group unified by its antagonism to the enemy” (Cuddy-Keane 
278).  
Domesticity and Fascism  
 Woolf’s laughter is also directed at the humanist valorization of virility. Woolf engenders 
skepticism of liberal anti-fascism based on the projection of heroic male self-sacrifice. Although 
deeply allied with them in other ways, she criticized Stephen Spender and the other members of 
the “Auden generation,” as well as her nephew, Julian Bell, for mobilizing the heroic sentiment 
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 created around World War I for anti-fascist purposes.162 When Spender declared that the 
communist party craved his martyrdom in the Spanish Civil War for anti-fascist publicity, she 
recorded in her diary: “S. [Spender] said the C.P. which he had that day joined, wanted him to be 
killed, in order that there might be another Byron. He has a child’s vanity about himself. 
Interesting to me at the moment, as I’m working out the psychology of vanity” (Diary, vol. 5, 
57). Similarly, when Julian Bell volunteered for the International Brigade, she lamented his 
“selfishness” and “raptures” rather than praising his courage: “I often argue with him on my 
walks; abuse his selfishness in going but mostly feel floored by the complete muddle & waste. 
Cant share the heroic raptures of the Medical Aid” (Diary, vol. 5, 108).163 The first chapter of 
Three Guineas accordingly outlines the political futility of masculine vanity. 
 Woolf believed that such self-congratulation obscured an accurate diagnosis of fascism, 
and perhaps even supported the cultural conditions that made it possible. The production of 
“good conscience” valorizes virility by reinforcing men’s participation in warfare. In The Years, 
North Pargiter describes vanity, or “posing in the public eye,” as a requirement of fascism, as 
much a part of its equipment as the use of technology, military conformity, and uniforms: “halls 
and reverberating megaphones . . . marching in step after leaders, in herds, groups, societies 
caparisoned . . . black shirts, green shirts, red shirts—always posing in the public eye . . .” (410).  
 Woolf relentlessly exposes the desire to create the spectacle of one’s own virtue. Rey 
Chow claims that fascism succeeds by projecting “good intentions shining forth in dazzling 
                                                 
162 See Woolf, The Diary of Virginia Woolf, vol. 5, 179. See also Woolf’s diary entry for 3 Oct. 1938, 
where she describes Auden’s public persona in relation to the Spanish Civil War: “I hope they will no longer pose as 
the young men to be sacrificed.” For a divergent reading of Woolf’s connection to the younger generation of anti-
fascist British writers, see Carlston 176 – 86. 
163 On 28 Apr. 1935, she also wrote in her diary, “Julian’s quite unaware of some of his own motives . . . 
Alix like a blackshirt, all brown & tie & tailor made. . . What is the use of trying to preach when human nature is so 
crippled” (Diary, vol. 4, 307) ? 
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 light,” and therefore, “It is therefore not by focusing on the atrocious deeds, the ‘evil’ of fascists, 
but on their moments of idealism production, their good conscience, that we can understand the 
effectiveness of fascist aesthetics” (37). In other words, fascism succeeds paradoxically by 
producing spectacles of self-sacrifice. Chow further argues that “good” liberals conspicuously 
ignore this aspect of fascism. Woolf delegitimates spectacles of female self-sacrifice in the 
domestic site as much as the valorization of male sacrifice through war.  
 In the following analysis, I am tapping into a longstanding debate on Woolf’s invocation 
of domestic space as a site of critical possibility vis-à-vis fascist capitalism. Many feminist 
critics have argued that Woolf championed domestic labor as a metaphor for anti-patriarchal 
artistry throughout her work.164 Others conclude that her stance toward domestic labor was much 
more critical.165 I believe that as in Three Guineas, The Years shows that the prevalent system of 
domestic labor has helped valorize virility in men and self-sacrifice in women to create a 
gendered culture of warfare. More specifically, The Years explores women’s philanthropic and 
social reform activities as a counterpart to masculine egotism. Woolf is less concerned with the 
subjugation of women within the patriarchal family (indeed, the narrative shows how the family 
is reformulated in the twentieth century), and more concerned with the absorption of women into 
patriarchal biopolitics.  
                                                 
164 Genevieve Sanchis-Morgan provides an extended reading of Mrs. Dalloway as a domestic artist: “in 
figuring the domestic artist Woolf explores her own artistry, one that also depends on domestic fictions” (103). She 
claims that Woolf valorized domestic labor because it “impl[ies] a female subject-position” (94). Lisa Low also 
points out that creating a non-fascist culture in Three Guineas entails “the development of the simple and peaceable 
arts in colleges that focus not on economics and military history, but on cooking, sewing, crafts; and they should 
practice vows of poverty, humility, chastity, and freedom from unreal loyalties” (99). 
165 Marie-Luise Gättens in Women Writers and Fascism: Reconstructing History calls attention to Woolf’s 
criticism of domestic labor, whether private or public, by showing that “through their ‘nurturing’ and reproductive 
work, women help to stabilize the social order; they make life livable in a society that otherwise is based on 
competition and exploitation. They thus become complicit with precisely those repressive power structures that their 
work aims to alleviate” (21). In her view, Woolf considers domestic labor to be an indispensable component of 
modern warfare and the accumulation of capital.  
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 Biopolitics and The Years 
 Zwerdling calls attention to the historical connection between social reform and capital: 
“The previous century had found a way of minimizing social guilt—the tradition of Victorian 
philanthropy, that special province of middle-class women. It was part of their duty to smooth 
out class antagonisms by ‘befriending’ the poor, visiting their homes regularly, offering advice, 
charity, help in crises” (99). Woolf’s generation, he claims, placed these activities into question. 
Woolf shows that middle-class women’s philanthropy is a crucial tactic to sustain capital, but 
also acknowledges that it was simultaneously caught up in proto-feminist articulations of 
women’s sociopolitical agency. Jacques Donzelot discusses the importance of middle-class 
women’s “alliance with social philanthropy” to undermine private patriarchy and “give her a 
new access to public life,” and even act as “the springboard she needed for the recognition of her 
political rights” (xxiii). At the same time, it was also “a deliberately depoliticizing strategy for 
establishing public services and facilities at a sensitive point midway between private initiative 
and the state,” that is, a crucial tactic in bourgeois passive revolution (55). Participation in the 
biopolitical transformation of the socius offered middle-class women political agency but 
ultimately helped to maintain class and gender hierarchy.166  
 In the “Present Day” chapter, Eleanor, a devoted social reformer, is the only Pargiter who 
is vocally and defiantly anti-fascist. When she comes across a photograph of Mussolini, the “fat 
man gesticulating” in the newspaper, she cries “Damned bully!”, passionately deploring the fall 
                                                 
166 Victorian philanthropy was closely tied to Christianity. Here, Woolf’s focus is on its secular effects in 
class politics as in Three Guineas, where Woolf writes, “In the nineteenth century much valuable work was done for 
the working class by educated men’s daughters in the only way that was open to them. But now that some of them at 
least have received an expensive education, it is arguable that they can much more effectively by remaining in their 
own class and using the methods of that class to improve a class which stands much in need of improvement” (177). 
For more on non-conformist Christianity and social reform, see Marcus 81-90, and Celia Marshik, “Virginia Woolf 
and Intellectual History: The Case of Josephine Butler and Three Guineas,” Virginia Woolf and Her Influences 
(New York: Pace UP, 1998).  
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 of liberal progress he represents: “It means the end of everything we cared for . . . freedom and 
justice” (331-2). Eleanor is confident that the humanist goals of “justice” and “liberty” that her 
life has represented oppose fascism. Indeed, when we first meet her in the first chapter, Eleanor 
has the moral qualities associated with heroines in nineteenth-century domestic fiction. Because 
of Eleanor’s charitable and social reform work in London, her sister Milly idolizes her: “Eleanor 
always would stick up for the poor. She thought Eleanor the best, the wisest, the most 
remarkable person she knew” (31). Despite her copious duties at home as the eldest daughter in a 
family whose mother is gravely ill, Eleanor trudges to the East End on her weekly “Grove Day” 
to call on the poor. Her good intentions and self-sacrifice for humanist civilization are apparent.  
 Other motives for her charity, however, are brought to the foreground, motives that shake 
the association of British middle-class women with anti-fascism. These motives align her 
interests with a hierarchical class structure. Woolf explores biopolitics as a circuitry of power 
that simultaneously empowers middle-class women and maintains public patriarchy. 
 One of Eleanor’s motives is to escape regularly from her father’s home. While she is 
living under his roof, Eleanor’s activities in the London slums afford her greater mobility, 
whereas her sisters are confined to their home in Abercorn Terrace for most of the day. In The 
Pargiters, Woolf explains that feminine charity was one of the few excuses women could employ 
to appear “legitimately” in public unchaperoned in 1880.167  
 Nevertheless, Eleanor ultimately recreates patriarchal relations of power by occupying 
the position of a “proxy.” Although reluctantly, she takes up a patriarchal voice to reprimand the 
shoddy work of her contractor, Duffus: “she adopted the tone of the Colonel’s daughter; the 
                                                 
167 Woolf writes, “An exception might be made [to her confinement]. . . when she went to Lisson Grove,” 
adding that “even she, whose mission was charitable, was expected either to take a cab, or to get one of the girls at 
the Settlement to see her into the omnibus, if she went to a meeting or concert after dark” (37). 
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 upper middle-class tone that she detested” (100). She also discloses anti-Semitic sentiments 
toward her clients that although relatively harmless in their immediate context, are nevertheless 
ominous given The Years’ 1930s context: “‘They do love finery—Jews,’ she added. ‘Yes,’ she 
said, ‘Shiny’” (31). Woolf invokes the increasingly important political rhetoric of contamination 
and cleanliness in the inter-war period, as well as the association of Jews with the inauthenticity 
of commodity culture.  
 By 1891, Eleanor owns a house in Peter Street under a philanthropic scheme, where she 
surveys her lodgers’ health and their rooms. Her position as proprietor and social reformer gives 
her the right to maintain hygiene and surveillance over working-class reproduction: “The door 
was opened by Mrs. Toms, the downstairs lodger. Oh, dear, thought Eleanor, observing the slant 
of her apron, another baby coming, after all I told her” (97). In these charitable activities, Eleanor 
replicates her father’s movement through working-class streets in London. As the novel begins, 
Abel Pargiter visits his lover, Mira, in a neighborhood he considers “sordid,” “mean,” and 
“furtive” (7). Like Eleanor, he is preoccupied with its lack of hygiene. He assesses Mira’s 
cleanliness, saying “what a dreadfully untidy girl you are,” and even checks her dog for signs of 
eczema (8). Mira transports him from quotidian drudgery by playing an assigned role: “her duty 
was to distract him” (7). Eleanor too fantasizes through the poor, eroticizing one of her clients’ 
daughters, in particular, who is, as she explains to Milly, “‘extraordinarily handsome . . . thinking 
of the red cheeks and the white pearls” (31).  
 Thus, her work in the East End allows her to identify her interests and perceptions with 
the patriarchal hierarchies it paradoxically enables her to escape from in intervals. This 
identification displaces the consciousness of her own servitude—the similarities between her and 
her servants. Her charitable activities cloak Eleanor’s status as “housekeeper,” the household 
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 manager and secretary of her father’s home, roles that intensify after her mother dies. When 
Eleanor enters her father’s study in 1891, he repeats twice, “Here’s the housekeeper” (92). 
Nevertheless, when she returns to Abercorn Terrace after a trip to Peter Street, she identifies not 
with the maids but with the proprietors: “In every front room she seemed to see a parlourmaid’s 
arm sweep over the table, laying it for luncheon . . . She would be late for her own luncheon, she 
thought” (102). Even in 1908, her younger brother, Martin, is appeased when he visits Abercorn 
Terrace and finds Eleanor at her bookkeeping: “Nothing had been changed, he was glad to see” 
(149).  
 Eleanor questions her own motives when one of her elderly lodgers, Mrs. Potter, 
expresses her wish to die to escape her unbearable physical pain, a decision that Eleanor has felt 
she and the other reformers must pre-empt: “Why do we do it? Why do we force her to live? She 
asked, looking at the medicine on the table” (100). She momentarily doubts the values of 
biopolitical discourse that her activities put into motion. Grace Radin observes that in The 
Pargiters, she is “forced to question her values and her idea of herself, to wonder if all her good 
deeds have been nothing but a pose and a meaningless pastime” (81). Although Eleanor has no 
such “epiphany” in The Years, Woolf does trouble Eleanor’s belief in biopolitical surveillance 
when she herself becomes its object in 1913 after her father’s death. The family home at 
Abercorn Terrace is assessed by a lower middle-class house agent who suggests that it needs to 
be modernized, especially the bathrooms, the kind of treatments that years before, she’d 
suggested to her contractor at Peter Street. The house agent “went round the house, sniffing and 
peering, he had indicted their cleanliness, their humanity; and he used absurd long words. He 
was hauling himself up into the class above him, she supposed, by means of long words” (215). 
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 Eleanor reveals that she also has associated “cleanliness” with “humanity,” and that she had, 
perhaps unconsciously, regarded her clients as less than human.   
Marcus compares “Eleanor’s passionate plumbing” to Woolf’s art, claiming that both 
make “order out of chaos and the fundamental rhythm of women’s lives. The novel shows us 
men . . . making a colossal mess—and women cleaning up after them. Only a woman like 
Virginia Woolf could conceive of the metaphor of the artist as charwoman to the world” (56). 
She further reads biographical significance into Eleanor’s “chastity and cleanliness” and desire 
“to be plumber to the masses, provider of cleanliness to the lives of the poor and dirty,” 
reminding us of Woolf’s “Puritan and Quaker heritage” that instilled in her the belief “that dirt 
darkened the possibility of full humanity” (68).168 This reading obscures, however, Woolf’s 
repeated criticisms of social reformers. In a diary entry, Woolf observes that “these social 
reformers & philanthropists get so out of hand, & harbour so many discreditable desires under 
the disguise of loving their kind,” and declares her preference for the artist’s greater subversive 
potential: “the only honest people are the artists” (Diary, vol. 1, 293). This distinction challenges 
Marcus’ correlation of social reform with the act of writing in Woolf’s imagination.  
Another diary entry excoriates social reformers’ will to dominate. She equates one couple 
who were “particularly concerned with the education of the poor” in Whitechapel, with a 
regressive Victorian literary tradition: “my literary taste is outraged by the smooth way in which 
the tale is made to unfold into full blown success, like some profuse peony. But I only scratch the 
surface of what I feel about these two stout volumes.” The narrative of the reformers’ “success” 
is reminiscent of progressive domestic fiction—the “profuse” plots of multi-volume Victorian 
                                                 
168 Marcus further directly compares Eleanor Pargiter to Caroline Emelia Stephen, Woolf’s aunt, who also 
built dwellings for the poor, artisans in her case (98). 
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 novels. The plot of Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and South, for instance, depends explicitly on the 
middle-class heroine’s access to the poor through charitable surveillance.  
Woolf also exposes an underlying class violence and contempt for the poor: “the peculiar 
repulsiveness of those who dabble their fingers self approvingly in the stuff of others’ souls. The 
Barnetts were at any rate plunged to the elbow; red handed if philanthropists ever were . . . And 
then the smug vigour of their self-satisfaction” (Diary, vol. 1, 255)! Furthermore, she implies that 
in some ways philanthropists and social reformers resemble dictators, and posits their potential 
complicity with political domination:  
Never a question as to the right of what they do—always a kind of insensate forging 
ahead until, naturally, their undertakings are all of colossal size & portentous prosperity. . 
. Perhaps the root of it all lies in the adulation of the uneducated & the easy mastery of 
the will over the poor. And more & more I come to loathe any dominion of one over 
another; any leadership, any imposition of the will. (Diary, vol. 1, 255) 
As this passage makes clear, Woolf suspected the “sympathy” of bourgeois reformers and their 
methods of social observation. The Years hollows out the domestic woman’s plot from the inside 
out. The domestic site is cancelled as an anti-fascist site, not least because it masks its “mastery” 
under the appearance of “self-sacrifice.” Rather, Woolf valorizes the chronotope of the bridge for 
women, and their refusal of patriarchal rewards, private or public.169  
Bridges 
Rather than Eleanor, it is Sara Pargiter who challenges the patriarchal organization of 
urban space. Sara cannot be assimilated by a liberal domestic narrative because she refuses to 
                                                 
169 Given that both domestic labor and wage labor are predicated on the production of war, she asks, “Had 
we not better plunge off the bridge into the river; give up the game; declare that the whole of human life is a mistake 
and so end it? . . The question we put to you, lives of the dead, is how can we enter the professions and yet remain 
civilized human beings; human beings, that is, who wish to prevent war” (Three Guineas 74)? 
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 “heal” and “clean.” Rather than articulating a stable space from which to launch a criticism of 
modernity, she constantly occupies sites of transition, cutting odd ways through space.  
For example, she lingers on a bridge with Rose, who is hurrying to a meeting (186), 
reappears on a bridge after indicting North for going to war (“Coward; hypocrite, with your 
switch in your hand”) (322), and runs into Martin in the steps in front of St. Paul’s (228).170 She 
is late to the two family gatherings that occur in the novel. When in public, she behaves 
inappropriately but not self-consciously. In a restaurant in the City of London with Martin, she 
discusses his sister Rose, an imprisoned Suffragette, “sitting on a three-legged stool having meat 
crammed down her throat” (232). Sara stays where she is not wanted, does not go where she is 
wanted, and in the process, interferes with defenses of war, systems of domestic labor, and lastly, 
“revolutionary” notions of both fascism and anti-fascism. Sara’s association with the bridge 
rather than the home epitomizes the transitional and unstable position of women who would 
refuse the rewards of both private and public patriarchies. Radin rightly claims that the 
“keystone” to Sara is “her repudiation of society’s bribes and rewards” (41). Her anti-fascism is 
thus seemingly oblique. Moreover, Woolf confronts the deep seated anti-Semitism of the British 
middle class by foregrounding Sara’s uneasy relationship to her Jewish neighbor. Sara’s 
dismantling of fascism therefore diverges from a liberal anti-fascism that declares its own good 
will. I suggest that Sara paradoxically suggests a far more thorough eradication of racism.  
 By the “Present Day,” Sara lives in an East End slum. When her younger cousin North 
visits her, she explains that she is disgusted by a fellow tenant, a foreign Jew who leaves “a line 
of grease” and hair in the shared bath. She recounts that to escape the space that she shares with 
the Jew, she had once applied for a journalist’s position using her dead father’s professional 
                                                 
170 The chronotope of the bridge is also an important one in Three Guineas to describe the situation of 
women who are critical of warfare. See pp. 18, 23, 60, 61, 62, and 74.   
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 connections. But she ultimately rejected it, suspecting that it would make her “servile” to a 
“conspiracy” (341). The conspiracy clearly refers to the networks of power that her patronym, 
which she describes as “a talisman, a glowing gem, a lucent emerald,” would enable her to enter 
(341).  
 Marcus claims that in this narrative, Sara correlates the oppression of British women with 
that of the Jews: “Poverty and diaspora of the family have made the condition of women like the 
condition of the Jews. As outcasts and scapegoats they have ‘joined the conspiracy’ to work 
toward a better world” (64). Although valiant, her reading erases Sara’s sense of disgust, which 
resists an easy camaraderie with the Jew, as well as the particularity of their potential 
victimization by fascism. I suggest that rather than acting as a model of political virtue, Sara 
enacts the power of the negative. Through this problematic encounter, Woolf acknowledges the 
scope of anti-Semitism in Britain, and necessitates Sara’s confrontation with a racist legacy 
deeply embedded in her self, her  family, class, and nation.  
Tony Kushner describes the pervasiveness of modern anti-Semitic sentiments and state 
policies in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century, starting with the Aliens Act of 1905, 
instituted in part to minimize the immigration of East European Jews. Of particular interest in 
this context is the “racialization of refugees from Nazism in the 1930s” (233). Referring to racist 
statements by the Home Secretary, he concludes that “the great fear of government officials was 
not the more assimilated German Jews but the threat of a flood of Ostjuden . . . [who] were seen 
as inferior, backward workers, radicals and spreaders of antisemitism wherever they went” (233). 
This fear and racism pervaded the British Left as well. Kushner cites a statement by Naomi 
Mitchison in 1943: “when one reads of what is happening [to the Jews of Europe] one has a 
tendency to think serve them right before one can catch oneself up.’ She added that such 
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 thoughts were kept within the private domain ‘so that one can get it off one’s chest and not say 
them in public’” (227). Another Mass-Observer after the war proposed the assimilation of Jews 
through inter-marriage as a humane method of ridding Europe of the “Jewish problem” (228).171 
Kushner observes that these examples of the “left-liberal Weltanshauung” represented a wider 
“frustration and irritation about Jewish difference and a blaming of the victim” that “could 
confront neither the horror nor the neatness of the Nazi solution” (228).  
 In contrast to a liberal disavowal of racism that blocks an awareness of anti-Semitism in 
the self and nation, Sara enacts a “politics of refusal” that denies the rewards of self-
congratulation in benevolent anti-Semitic assimilation. In other words, she refuses a liberal 
universalism unable to confront its own racist and sexist limits. In the process, she thwarts fascist 
and liberal forms of anti-Semitism. This “politics of refusal” as Laura Zebuhr has described in 
relation to the work of J. M. Coetzee, articulates a non-statist form of agency that cannot be 
sublated as a “practice of resistance, a politicized standpoint that can be taken on by others and 
applied for specific ends.” Similarly, the “Outsiders Society” in Three Guineas describes 
practices of “becoming” rather than virtuous positions or identities. Rather than political 
“opposition,” the outsider assumes the strategic efficacy of liminal figures who are ostensibly 
located within the bourgeoisie and institutional power. The Years also focuses on the privileged 
figures of the middle class—the “daughters of educated men” and middle-class gay men—who, 
although accepted conditionally in circuits of privilege, throw circuit breakers to dismantle the 
institutions and phantasmatic centers they happen to find themselves in. They do so neither by 
identifying with the “privileged” nor with the “oppressed.” Such circuit breaking requires instead 
                                                 
171 “‘If such a miracle were possible [and] in a few generations, if they dropped their practice about 
marriage with non-Jews, there would be no Jewish problem. Hitler had another method and I wonder if” (quoted in 
Kushner 228)? 
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 a more fundamental challenge to the definition of politics by finding ethical articulations of 
justice and liberty outside “political identity.” Both Three Guineas and The Years cultivate a 
desire to dissimulate and escape identity in order to undermine the violence of the modern state.  
 Woolf’s ironic invocation of “justice and liberty” prefigures some poststructuralist, anti-
fascist thinking. In “The Art of Telling the Truth,” Foucault discusses modern “liberty” as the 
rewards of becoming subject of/to the state. In contrast, the possibility of freedom necessitates 
turning away from “an analytics of truth” toward practices that connect aesthetics and self-
definition to ethics. The task becomes not to define oneself as “subject,” but rather to invent 
practices and “exercises” of freedom vis-à-vis and “between” relations of power (Foucault, 
Philosophy 96). Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari pay homage to Woolf directly in A Thousand 
Plateaus, citing Woolf’s invocations of liminality as instances of progressive mass politics: “In 
becoming wolf, the important thing is the position of the mass, and above all the position of the 
subject itself in relation to the pack or wolf-multiplicity . . . To be fully a part of the crowd and at 
the same time completely outside it, removed from it: to be on the edge, to take a walk like 
Virginia Woolf . . .” (29).  
 At the end of The Years is “The Present Day,” which leaves the future of women wide 
open, made possible by the indeterminacy of the value of domestic labor in the inter-war era. 
Woolf articulated this indeterminacy early in the project of writing The Pargiters: “What is a 
woman? I assure you, I don’t know; I do not believe that you know; I do not believe that 
anybody can know until she has expressed herself in all the arts and professions open to human 
skill . . . Her experience is not the same. Her traditions are different. Her values, both in art and 
in life are [different] <her own>” (The Pargiters xxxiii).172 By rejecting any positive identity of 
                                                 
172 This is part of Woolf’s “Speech before the London National Society for Women’s Service.”  
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 “woman” or anti-fascist, Sara widens the scope of anti-fascism. It is explicitly a pleasure—a joy 
in writing—that she preserves in her turn away from the professional rewards of anti-Semitism. 
She thereby implies the preservation of joy rather than self-sacrifice as an anti-fascist impetus.  
Conclusion  
 The Years enacts the anti-fascist logic implied through Nicholas and Sara by releasing 
itself from the “responsibility” of the domestic narrative, never quite reconciling with the 
mandates of bourgeois literary and political representation. In the “Present Day,” an 
indeterminable chronotope repeats and layers women’s lines of flight. Delia throws a party for 
all the surviving Pargiters, but in the absence of a suitable space for such an occasion (no one 
lives in a proper London house), they meet in the building where Eleanor and the others had held 
their political and committee meetings. It is now an office for house agents who continue cutting 
up Victorian mansions into flats. In this space, the Pargiters create a further anti-patriarchal use: 
“People were sitting on the floor, on chairs, on office stools. Long office tables, little typewriting 
tables, had been pressed into use. They were strewn with flowers, frilled with flowers” (397-8). 
The inter-war period is clearly an unprecedented chance for middle-class women in its 
dissipation of the private patriarchal home. The Years implies that they could also refuse the 
public patriarchal bribes that constantly threaten to absorb them. Here, Eleanor begins to desire 
“another life . . . here and now, in this room, with living people” (427).  
 The proof of the inter-war as an open interval comes near the very end of the novel, when 
the working-class children of the building’s caretaker provide a baffling song for the guests. To 
the Pargiters, “Not a word was recognisable . . . The grown-up people did not know whether to 
laugh or to cry. Their voices were so harsh; the accent was so hideous . . . Then they stopped. It 
seemed to be in the middle of a verse. . . shrill, discordant, meaningless . . . contrast between 
207 
 their faces, and their voices were astonishing” (429-30).173 Whereas fascists have represented 
these children’s desire according to their aesthetic and political needs, the Pargiters in this post-
patriarchal space finally refrain from rendering the desire of the “mass” in question.  
 Caughie observes that this “uncertain ending . . . is a structural necessity in a narrative 
that conceives of history and story as a dynamic complex of relations” (106). In fact, upon 
completing The Years, Woolf herself wrote in her diary, “I myself know why it’s a failure, & 
that its failure is deliberate” (Diary, vol. 5, 65). The novel refuses to achieve the requisite 
“successful” opposition between bourgeois representation and fascism. In fact, it takes apart the 
premises of this opposition throughout. Both Three Guineas and The Years question the anti-
fascist capacity of bourgeois hegemony, and suggest joyful anonymity as a strategy against 
spectacles of communist, liberal, and fascist self-congratulation. Her anti-fascism is therefore 
indeed a “failure,” both unrecognizable and uncompromising. 
                                                 
173 Abel reads the children’s significance differently, as “[m]arking an absent maternal function.” When 
similar children appear in Between the Acts, Abel claims that they are “the novel’s reconstruction of the fascist 
mother, and the sole intact identity amidst the fragments of the present” (183).   
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